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ABSTRACT	  
	  
In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  recent	  revolutions	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt,	  political	  figures	  in	  Iran	  have	  
offered	  competing	  claims	  of	  inspiration	  for	  the	  protests	  now	  spreading	  through	  the	  
broader	  MENA	  region.	  This	  paper	  aims	  to	  compare	  the	  discourse	  of	  regime	  leaders	  to	  
that	  of	  opposition	  activists,	  each	  seeking	  to	  frame	  current	  events	  in	  the	  region	  as	  a	  
reflection	  of	  their	  particular	  aspirations	  and	  competing	  worldviews.	  	  Benford	  and	  Snow's	  
literature	  on	  challenges	  facing	  movement	  adherents	  embroiled	  in	  contested	  framing	  
processes	  will	  be	  employed	  as	  a	  means	  of	  highlighting	  some	  of	  the	  various	  obstacles	  to	  
political	  transformation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Iran.	  	  The	  authors	  outline	  three	  major	  challenges	  
that	  serve	  to	  structure	  this	  discussion:	  “1)	  counterframing	  by	  movement	  opponents,	  
bystanders	  and	  the	  media,	  2)	  frame	  disputes	  within	  movements,	  and	  3)	  the	  dialectic	  
between	  frames	  and	  events”	  (Benford	  and	  Snow,	  2000,	  625).	  	  Examining	  the	  competing	  
narratives	  of	  regime	  leaders	  and	  opposition	  activists	  in	  this	  manner	  will	  help	  clarify	  the	  
unique	  challenges	  inherent	  to	  political	  transformation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Iran,	  while	  
contributing	  to	  the	  growing	  body	  of	  literature	  pertaining	  to	  authoritarian	  resilience	  and	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INTRODUCTION	  
Following	  the	  events	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  the	  contagious	  spread	  of	  demonstrations	  to	  Egypt	  and	  
elsewhere,	  it	  quickly	  became	  evident	  that	  both	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran	  
and	  the	  Green	  Movement	  came	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  regional	  upheavals	  sparked	  by	  the	  successful	  
ouster	  of	  longtime	  leaders	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt,	  as	  a	  political	  opportunity	  to	  resurrect	  the	  
flagging	  legitimacy	  each	  camp	  faced	  as	  a	  byproduct	  of	  the	  country's	  own	  political	  fallout.	  	  	  
Supreme	  Leader	  Ayatollah	  Ali	  Khamenei	  and	  his	  allies,	  credit	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  of	  1979	  as	  
the	  slow	  burning	  catalyst	  for	  the	  popular	  unrest	  directed	  towards	  corrupt	  and	  Western	  backed	  
leaders.	  	  The	  Green	  Movement	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  offers	  a	  direct	  correlation	  between	  its	  own	  
mobilization	  and	  the	  popular	  movements	  undertaken	  by	  Arab	  populations	  seeking	  political	  
enfranchisement.	  I	  wanted	  to	  study	  the	  framing	  contest	  embarked	  upon	  by	  these	  two	  camps	  
and	  assess	  the	  measure	  of	  success	  enjoyed	  by	  both	  parties	  in	  their	  quest	  to	  balance	  the	  claims	  
of	  their	  constituencies	  with	  their	  attempts	  to	  maximize	  advantages	  internationally.	  	  	  This	  
analysis	  will	  conclude	  with	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  contest	  upon	  the	  political	  
opportunity	  space	  for	  dissident	  politicians	  and	  activists	  inside	  Iran.	  	  	  
Political	  opportunity	  can	  be	  defined	  broadly	  as	  consistent	  but	  not	  necessarily	  formal	  or	  
permanent	  dimensions	  of	  the	  political	  environment	  that	  provide	  incentives	  for	  people	  to	  
undertake	  collective	  action	  by	  informing	  their	  expectations	  for	  success	  or	  failure	  (Tarrow	  1994).	  	  
However,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  political	  opportunity	  exists,	  is	  largely	  dependent	  upon	  it	  being	  
recognized	  and	  framed	  as	  such	  by	  movement	  actors.	  	  My	  study	  provides	  an	  example	  in	  which	  
we	  see	  domestic	  actors	  of	  competing	  ideology	  and	  aspirations	  purposefully	  nesting	  their	  
movements	  inside	  of	  what	  they	  conceive	  and	  champion	  as	  a	  regional	  structure	  of	  political	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opportunity	  with	  expectations	  for	  success	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  	  I	  utilize	  what	  Benford	  and	  
Snow	  (2000)	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  three	  most	  common	  processes	  that	  tend	  to	  characterize	  this	  sort	  of	  
framing	  contest.	  	  These	  include	  1)	  counterframing	  by	  movement	  opponents,	  2)	  frame	  disputes	  
within	  movements,	  and	  3)	  the	  dialectic	  between	  frames	  and	  events.	  
It	  is	  my	  intention	  in	  this	  paper	  to	  outline	  the	  collective	  action	  frames	  of	  regime	  and	  
opposition	  leaders	  invoked	  in	  direct	  relation	  to	  the	  ongoing	  protests	  in	  the	  region	  and	  illustrate	  
the	  unique	  challenges	  facing	  each	  narrative	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  three	  aforementioned	  variables.	  	  
This	  paper	  will	  necessarily	  rely	  upon	  an	  analysis	  of	  primary	  source	  documents	  consisting	  of	  
periodicals	  and	  transcribed	  statements	  made	  by	  relevant	  political	  actors	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wealth	  
of	  extant	  theoretical	  literature	  pertaining	  to	  the	  concepts	  of	  framing	  and	  political	  opportunity	  
in	  relation	  to	  social	  movements.	  	  Examining	  the	  competing	  narratives	  of	  regime	  leaders	  and	  
opposition	  activists	  in	  this	  manner	  will	  help	  clarify	  the	  unique	  challenges	  inherent	  to	  political	  
transformation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Iran,	  while	  contributing	  to	  the	  growing	  body	  of	  literature	  
pertaining	  to	  authoritarian	  resilience	  and	  political	  mobility	  of	  opposition	  actors	  in	  the	  Middle	  
East.	  
The	  initial	  task	  of	  this	  work	  is	  to	  review	  the	  theoretical	  literature	  instrumental	  to	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  political	  opportunity	  and	  framing	  as	  analytical	  tools	  for	  the	  
study	  of	  social	  movements.	  	  Where	  resource	  mobilization	  (RM)	  and	  political	  opportunity	  (PO)	  
theory	  constituted	  the	  dominant	  theoretical	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  social	  movements	  in	  
the	  1970s,	  research	  related	  to	  framing	  processes	  has	  since	  the	  1990s	  become	  increasingly	  
valued	  by	  scholars	  interested	  in	  understanding	  the	  character	  and	  course	  of	  particular	  social	  
movements.	  	  In	  fact,	  prominent	  scholars	  of	  social	  movement	  dynamics	  such	  as	  McAdam,	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McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  (1996)	  have	  gone	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say	  that	  while	  “the	  combination	  of	  political	  
opportunities	  and	  mobilizing	  structures	  affords	  groups	  a	  certain	  structural	  potential	  for	  action,	  
they	  remain	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  one	  other	  factor	  [framing	  processes]	  insufficient	  to	  account	  for	  
collective	  action”	  (p.	  5).	  	  What	  is	  more,	  while	  framing	  gained	  increasing	  currency	  amongst	  
scholars	  of	  social	  movements	  because	  of	  the	  attention	  it	  pays	  to	  issues	  of	  collective	  identity,	  
movement	  messages,	  and	  goals,	  framing	  processes	  have	  also	  been	  acknowledged	  as	  viable	  
means	  of	  increasing	  movement	  legitimacy.	  	  As	  both	  the	  regime	  and	  opposition	  in	  Iran	  seek	  to	  
legitimate	  their	  respective	  platforms	  for	  governance	  through	  the	  cooptation	  of	  current	  events	  
in	  the	  broader	  MENA	  region,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  primacy	  of	  framing	  processes	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  
movement	  goals.	  	  
Having	  squarely	  established	  the	  merits	  and	  parameters	  of	  the	  theoretical	  approach	  
employed	  within	  this	  work,	  the	  next	  task	  will	  be	  to	  provide	  a	  brief	  political	  background	  that	  
adequately	  accounts	  for	  the	  overarching	  conflict	  between	  the	  Iranian	  establishment	  and	  its	  
contemporary	  opposition.	  This	  section	  will	  include	  a	  discussion	  of	  President	  Mahmoud	  
Ahmadinejad’s	  first	  term	  in	  office,	  the	  2009	  presidential	  electoral	  contest,	  and	  summary	  of	  the	  
post	  election	  crisis	  events	  of	  June	  2009	  that	  gave	  life	  to	  the	  Green	  Movement,	  addressing	  the	  
goals	  and	  messages	  of	  the	  movement,	  which	  will	  provide	  the	  requisite	  backdrop	  to	  the	  
substantive	  work	  of	  this	  thesis;	  namely,	  comparing	  the	  collective	  action	  frames	  posited	  by	  
regime	  and	  opposition	  leaders	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  wave	  of	  popular	  protests	  sweeping	  through	  the	  
MENA	  region	  and	  the	  three	  attending	  challenges	  facing	  activists	  embroiled	  in	  contested	  
framing	  processes.	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Recalling	  these	  three	  variable	  challenges:	  1)	  counterframing	  by	  movement	  opponents,	  
bystanders	  and	  the	  media,	  2)	  frame	  disputes	  within	  movements,	  and	  3)	  the	  dialectic	  between	  
frames	  and	  events,	  I	  will	  address	  each	  challenge	  first	  from	  the	  articulated	  perspective	  of	  the	  
Green	  Movement	  before	  entertaining	  the	  same	  set	  of	  considerations	  as	  they	  pertain	  to	  regime	  
hardliners.	  	  	  While	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  discourse	  proffered	  by	  regime	  leaders	  and	  opposition	  
activists	  is	  anchored	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  contemporary	  events	  related	  to	  popular	  uprisings	  across	  
the	  MENA	  region,	  those	  events	  will	  only	  be	  discussed	  and	  referred	  to	  insofar	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  
the	  particular	  variable	  in	  question.	  	  Of	  course	  when	  addressing	  the	  third	  variable,	  the	  dialectic	  
between	  frames	  and	  events,	  more	  substantial	  attention	  will	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  shape,	  character,	  
and	  accomplishments	  of	  these	  various	  protest	  movements.	  	  Additionally,	  where	  relevant,	  
discourse	  of	  Arab	  opposition	  activists	  will	  be	  compared	  to	  their	  Iranian	  counterparts.	  	  Given	  the	  
deliberate	  internationalization	  of	  domestic	  political	  disputes	  by	  Iranian	  state	  and	  opposition	  
actors,	  evidenced	  by	  each	  camp’s	  attempts	  to	  appropriate	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  an	  assessment	  of	  
the	  relationship	  between	  this	  framing	  contest	  and	  Iranian	  foreign	  policy	  will	  also	  be	  discussed,	  
primarily	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  dialectic	  between	  frames	  and	  events.	  Again,	  this	  analysis	  will	  
conclude	  with	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  framing	  contest	  upon	  the	  political	  
opportunity	  space	  for	  dissident	  politicians	  and	  activists	  inside	  Iran.	  	  
The	  Arab	  Spring,	  a	  moniker	  that	  scholars	  have	  ascribed	  to	  the	  wave	  of	  pro-­‐democracy	  
protests	  challenging	  the	  authority	  of	  longtime	  leaders	  throughout	  the	  MENA	  region,	  is	  
perceived	  as	  a	  political	  opportunity	  by	  Iranian	  actors,	  both	  on	  the	  left	  and	  right	  of	  the	  
political/ideological	  spectrum.	  	  The	  transfiguration	  of	  the	  region	  by	  contagious	  and	  unabated	  
popular	  protest,	  from	  a	  haven	  for	  despots	  to	  a	  landscape	  of	  fraternal	  defiance,	  emboldened	  the	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flagging	  Green	  Movement	  in	  light	  of	  the	  victories	  enjoyed	  by	  activists	  in	  Tunisia,	  Egypt,	  and	  
beyond.	  	  Likewise	  the	  popular	  overthrow	  of	  despotic	  Western	  backed	  leaders	  is	  unmistakably	  
reminiscent	  of	  the	  1979	  Iranian	  Revolution	  which	  removed	  the	  Western	  allied	  monarch,	  
Mohammed	  Reza	  Pahlavi	  from	  power	  and	  installed	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  today.	  	  
	   Whether	  either	  political	  faction	  can	  successfully	  boast	  of	  emboldening	  or	  informing	  the	  
brave	  acts	  of	  their	  Arab	  neighbors	  is	  not	  incidental.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  dispute	  is	  not	  merely	  relegated	  
to	  Iranian	  actors	  but	  debated	  widely	  by	  Western	  media	  outlets	  preoccupied	  by	  the	  potential	  for	  
geo-­‐strategic	  relations	  in	  the	  region	  to	  shift	  away	  from	  US	  and	  Israeli	  interests	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  
Iranian	  resistance	  axis	  that	  most	  notably	  includes	  Syria	  and	  Lebanon.	  	  Given	  the	  high	  stakes	  of	  
this	  particular	  framing	  dispute,	  not	  only	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  prospects	  for	  political	  
transformation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Iran	  but	  also	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  the	  future	  of	  geo-­‐strategic	  relations	  
in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  the	  conclusions	  approached	  herein	  should	  continue	  to	  be	  of	  interest	  for	  
some	  time	  to	  come.	  	  Additionally	  I	  would	  reassert	  here	  the	  capacity	  of	  this	  study	  to	  contribute	  
to	  emergent	  understandings	  pertaining	  to	  authoritarian	  resilience	  and	  political	  mobility	  of	  
opposition	  actors	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  While	  framing	  literature	  is	  widely	  employed	  by	  
sociologists	  investigating	  successes	  and	  failures	  of	  various	  social	  movements	  and	  collective	  
action	  events,	  framing	  literature	  is	  less	  commonly	  employed	  in	  regional	  case	  studies	  seeking	  to	  
explain	  the	  resilience	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes	  that	  employ	  collective	  action	  frames	  in	  a	  manner	  
that	  successfully	  demobilizes	  oppositional	  activity	  at	  the	  domestic	  level.	  	  Having	  briefly	  
addressed	  the	  merits	  and	  stakes	  involved	  in	  this	  investigation,	  the	  attention	  of	  this	  work	  now	  
turns	  towards	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  theoretical	  literature	  that	  will	  structure	  the	  bulk	  of	  this	  thesis.
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CHAPTER	  1:	  LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
This	  study	  as	  specified	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  work	  provides	  an	  example	  in	  which	  we	  see	  
domestic	  actors	  of	  competing	  ideology	  and	  aspirations	  purposefully	  nesting	  their	  movements	  
inside	  of	  what	  they	  conceive	  and	  champion	  as	  a	  regional	  structure	  of	  political	  opportunity	  with	  
expectations	  for	  success	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  	  More	  specifically,	  state	  and	  opposition	  
actors	  in	  Iran	  quickly	  came	  to	  identify	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  as	  a	  transnational	  window	  of	  opportunity	  
to	  consolidate	  their	  respective	  political	  legitimacy	  at	  home	  whilst	  competing	  to	  influence	  the	  
course	  and	  character	  of	  the	  various	  political	  transformations	  ongoing	  in	  Arab	  Spring	  states.	  	  This	  
quickly	  became	  evident	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  collective	  action	  frames	  fashioned	  by	  
state	  and	  opposition	  actors	  who	  alternatively	  assigned	  credit	  to	  their	  respective	  camps	  for	  
inspiring	  the	  brave	  and	  contentious	  politics	  that	  have	  come	  to	  characterize	  key	  states	  across	  
the	  MENA	  region.	  	  These	  efforts	  in	  turn	  sparked	  a	  framing	  contest	  between	  the	  two	  parties,	  
which	  would	  ultimately	  transform	  the	  structure	  of	  political	  opportunities	  inside	  Iran,	  effectively	  
altering	  the	  space	  and	  prospects	  for	  viable	  political	  contestation	  at	  home.	  	  In	  order	  to	  
sufficiently	  address	  the	  complex	  interplay	  between	  framing	  and	  structures	  of	  political	  
opportunity,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  these	  processes	  relate	  to	  matters	  germane	  to	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  
policy	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Iran,	  I	  will	  provide	  in	  this	  chapter	  a	  discussion	  of	  these	  two	  distinct	  yet	  
related	  strands	  of	  social	  movement	  theory	  as	  justification	  for	  my	  approach	  to	  the	  analytical	  
component	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  
Political	  Opportunity	  Theory	  
The	  key	  recognition	  within	  the	  political	  opportunity	  perspective	  is	  that	  “activists’	  prospects	  for	  
advancing	  particular	  claims,	  mobilizing	  supporters,	  and	  affecting	  influence	  are	  context-­‐
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dependent”	  (Meyer	  2004,	  126).	  	  Analysts	  thereby	  direct	  much	  of	  their	  attention	  to	  the	  world	  
within	  which	  a	  social	  movement	  resides,	  as	  a	  byproduct	  of	  their	  claims	  that	  exogenous	  factors	  
enhance	  or	  constrain	  a	  movement’s	  prospects	  for	  success	  in:	  “(a)	  mobilizing,	  (b)	  advancing	  
particular	  claims	  rather	  than	  others,	  (c)	  cultivating	  some	  alliances	  rather	  than	  others,	  (d)	  
employing	  particular	  political	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  rather	  than	  others,	  and	  (e)	  affecting	  
mainstream	  institutional	  politics	  and	  policy”	  (Meyer	  2004,	  126).	  	  While	  these	  studies	  largely	  
defined	  political	  opportunities	  as	  “changes	  in	  the	  institutional	  structure	  or	  informal	  power	  
relations	  of	  a	  given	  national	  political	  system”	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  Zald	  1996,	  3),	  the	  definition	  
of	  political	  opportunity	  has	  broadened	  significantly	  over	  time,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  a	  variety	  of	  
scholars	  argue	  that	  its	  theoretical	  utility	  is	  in	  danger.	  	  While	  Tarrow	  reduces	  political	  
opportunity	  structures	  into	  five	  interrelated	  clusters	  of	  variables;	  “the	  degree	  of	  openness	  in	  
the	  polity;	  the	  stability	  of	  political	  alignments;	  the	  presence	  of	  allies	  and	  support	  groups;	  
divisions	  within	  the	  relevant	  elite	  and/or	  its	  tolerance	  for	  protest;	  and	  repression	  or	  facilitation	  
of	  dissent	  by	  the	  state”	  (Meyer	  2003,	  19)	  many	  scholars	  have	  significantly	  expanded	  the	  
concept	  to	  include	  a	  host	  of	  other	  variables.	  	  Scholars	  have	  considered	  additional	  independent	  
variables	  of	  political	  opportunity	  such	  as	  the	  organizations	  of	  previous	  challengers,	  the	  
openness	  and	  ideology	  of	  relevant	  political	  parties,	  changes	  in	  public	  policy,	  international	  
alliances	  and	  the	  concomitant	  constraints	  they	  place	  on	  state	  policy-­‐making,	  state	  capacity,	  
geographic	  scope,	  activities	  of	  countermovement	  opponents,	  potential	  activists	  perceptions	  of	  
political	  opportunity,	  and	  prospects	  for	  personal	  affiliations	  (Meyer	  2004,	  135).	  	  In	  citing	  all	  of	  
these	  various	  usages,	  Meyer	  points	  out	  that	  political	  opportunity	  variables	  are	  rarely	  disproved,	  
refined,	  or	  replaced	  but	  instead	  are	  more	  often	  added.	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In	  response	  to	  such	  a	  trend,	  Gamson	  and	  Meyer	  have	  been	  so	  bold	  to	  say	  that	  the	  term	  
“political	  opportunity”	  “threatens	  to	  become	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  fudge	  factor	  for	  all	  the	  
conditions	  and	  circumstances	  that	  form	  the	  context	  for	  collective	  action”	  (McAdam	  1996,	  25).	  	  
Yet	  McAdam	  accuses	  Meyer	  and	  Gamson	  of	  contributing	  to	  this	  very	  problem	  by	  advocating	  
that	  opportunity	  bears	  a	  strong	  cultural	  component	  and	  that	  limiting	  one’s	  analysis	  solely	  to	  
variation	  in	  political	  institutions	  and	  relations	  amongst	  political	  actors	  causes	  scholars	  to	  miss	  
something	  important	  in	  this	  equation.	  	  While	  McAdam	  acknowledges	  the	  important	  role	  culture	  
plays	  as	  one	  of	  many	  factors	  that	  affect	  collective	  action	  in	  terms	  of	  strategy	  and	  outcomes	  etc.,	  
he	  nevertheless	  advocates	  a	  more	  stringent	  definition	  of	  political	  opportunity	  and	  a	  strict	  
compartmentalization	  of	  other	  factors	  invoked	  in	  the	  study	  of	  collective	  action	  (McAdam	  1996,	  
24).	  	  Ultimately,	  while	  there	  is	  considerable	  debate	  about	  how	  far	  to	  stretch	  the	  concept	  of	  
political	  opportunity	  through	  its	  application	  in	  various	  case	  studies	  or	  models,	  Meyer	  and	  
Minkoff	  (2004,	  1459)	  argue	  that	  analysts	  concerned	  with	  different	  kinds	  of	  movements	  and/or	  
different	  questions	  about	  the	  same	  movement	  will	  predictably	  identify	  different	  factors	  as	  
independent	  variables	  of	  political	  opportunity.	  	  Nevertheless,	  they	  go	  on	  to	  insist	  upon	  the	  
importance	  of	  meticulously	  specifying	  the	  role	  of	  political	  opportunity	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  particular	  
outcome	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  scholar	  and	  their	  research.	  	  	  
	   Due	  to	  the	  discursive	  nature	  of	  the	  debate	  regarding	  the	  specification	  of	  variables	  of	  
political	  opportunity	  amongst	  scholars,	  there	  will	  be	  no	  attempt	  herein	  to	  influence	  the	  
direction	  of	  this	  debate.	  	  Instead,	  where	  relevant,	  careful	  consideration	  will	  be	  invoked	  in	  
discussing	  the	  apparent	  role	  that	  domestic,	  regional,	  and	  international	  context	  plays	  in	  
facilitating	  or	  constraining	  the	  collective	  action	  and	  incumbent	  framing	  contest	  explored	  by	  this	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thesis,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  the	  initial	  outcomes	  of	  this	  framing	  contest	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  
effectively	  altered	  political	  processes	  inside	  Iran	  thus	  far.	  	  	  
	   In	  the	  service	  of	  this	  research	  agenda	  it	  is	  therefore	  critical	  to	  recognize	  that	  while	  
political	  opportunity	  structures	  can	  constrain	  or	  facilitate	  collective	  action,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
an	  opportunity	  exists	  is	  largely	  dependent	  upon	  it	  being	  recognized	  and	  framed	  as	  such	  by	  
activists	  and	  movement	  proponents.	  	  More	  expressly	  stated,	  if	  "movement	  activists	  interpret	  
political	  space	  in	  ways	  that	  emphasize	  opportunity	  rather	  than	  constraint,	  they	  may	  stimulate	  
actions	  that	  change	  opportunity	  making	  their	  opportunity	  frame	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy"	  
(Gamson	  and	  Meyer	  1996:	  287).	  	  All	  the	  same,	  the	  structure	  of	  political	  opportunity,	  both	  
domestic	  and	  international,	  may	  not	  only	  facilitate	  or	  constrain	  collective	  action,	  but	  also	  stand	  
to	  impact	  the	  salience	  or	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  movement’s	  framing	  campaign.	  	  David	  Meyer	  (2003)	  
has	  written	  insightfully	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  international	  setting	  often	  intrudes	  upon	  
domestic	  politics	  in	  different	  states,	  introducing	  the	  notion	  of	  “nested	  institutions”	  into	  his	  
work	  as	  a	  political	  opportunity	  theorist.	  	  Stephen	  Poulson	  (2009)	  applies	  Meyer’s	  concept	  of	  
nested	  institutions	  more	  broadly	  in	  a	  case	  study	  that	  looks	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  US-­‐Iran	  relations,	  
and	  more	  explicitly	  the	  impact	  of	  bellicose	  rhetoric	  targeting	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  issued	  by	  US	  
politicians	  (post	  9/11)	  upon	  the	  Iranian	  reform	  movement	  then	  led	  by	  President	  Mohammed	  
Khatami,	  who	  had	  made	  rapprochement	  with	  the	  United	  States	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  his	  reform	  
initiatives.	  	  A	  more	  thorough	  investigation	  of	  both	  of	  these	  studies	  will	  assist	  in	  structuring	  a	  
great	  part	  of	  the	  work	  to	  follow	  in	  terms	  of	  highlighting	  the	  relationship	  between	  domestic	  and	  
international	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  and	  the	  impact	  such	  context	  has	  upon	  the	  framing	  
processes	  of	  movements	  generally.	  	  Additionally	  such	  a	  discussion	  will	  allow	  for	  an	  introduction	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to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Iranian	  government	  and	  to	  the	  Iranian	  reform	  movement	  when	  
discussing	  the	  applicability	  of	  Meyer’s	  theory	  of	  nested	  institutions	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Iran	  generally,	  
and	  in	  summarizing	  the	  major	  findings	  of	  Poulson’s	  article,	  which	  found	  inspiration	  in	  the	  
latter’s	  applicability	  to	  the	  former.	  	  	  
	   Meyer	  (2003)	  argues	  that	  international	  factors,	  such	  as	  alliances	  and	  transnational	  
movements	  both	  play	  a	  role	  in	  constraining	  the	  actions	  of	  states	  and	  their	  challengers.	  	  He	  
explains	  that	  national	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  are	  essentially	  nested	  in	  a	  greater	  
international	  context,	  and	  that	  the	  tightness	  or	  looseness	  of	  that	  nesting	  affects	  the	  range	  of	  
possible	  alliances	  and	  policy	  options	  that	  are	  available	  or	  viable	  within	  states	  (19).	  	  Coming	  to	  
terms	  with	  this	  reality	  has	  become	  increasingly	  important,	  especially	  as	  transnational	  
connections	  between	  activists	  and	  among	  states	  have	  deepened.	  In	  regards	  to	  activists,	  more	  
and	  more,	  the	  transnational	  movement	  of	  ideas,	  resources,	  and	  activists	  themselves	  is	  on	  the	  
rise.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  contemporary	  and	  germane	  example	  of	  such	  transnational	  connections	  
was	  evidenced	  by	  the	  way	  the	  Jasmine	  Revolution	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  its	  swift	  success	  went	  on	  to	  
inspire	  activists	  in	  Egypt	  and	  elsewhere,	  transitioning	  from	  an	  isolated	  instance	  of	  successful	  
regime	  change	  into	  what	  pundits	  so	  enthusiastically	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  “Arab	  Spring”.	  	  The	  now	  
infamous	  slogan	  ”Al-­‐sha’ab	  yurid	  usqut	  al-­‐nizam!”	  (The	  people	  want	  to	  topple	  the	  regime!),	  first	  
popularized	  during	  the	  recent	  Tunisian	  uprising	  became	  the	  rallying	  cry	  of	  countless	  protesters	  
in	  Egypt,	  Libya,	  Bahrain,	  Yemen,	  Syria,	  and	  elsewhere.	  	  	  
	   As	  for	  states,	  participation	  in	  trade	  agreements,	  and	  geostrategic	  alliances	  increasingly	  
limits	  domestic	  policy	  options	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  frontiers.	  	  Should	  a	  state	  act	  in	  contravention	  to	  
these	  formal	  or	  informal	  obligations	  in	  either	  caving	  in	  to	  domestic	  pressure	  or	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	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squelch	  its	  opposition	  in	  favor	  of	  upholding	  the	  status	  quo,	  or	  some	  variation	  therein,	  there	  are	  
always	  at	  least	  a	  modicum	  of	  situational	  consequences	  that	  will	  play	  out	  on	  the	  international	  
scene	  and	  therefore	  stand	  to	  constrain	  or	  facilitate	  state	  action.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  United	  States	  
has	  begun	  taking	  a	  more	  calculated	  approach	  in	  sanctioning	  the	  Iranian	  government	  in	  the	  face	  
of	  its	  continued	  disregard	  for	  human	  rights	  in	  its	  violent	  suppression	  of	  opposition	  protestors	  
and	  its	  treatment	  of	  political	  prisoners.	  	  On	  June	  9,	  2011,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Hillary	  Clinton	  
unveiled	  new	  sanctions	  that	  target	  Tehran’s	  national	  police,	  the	  Revolutionary	  Guard	  Corps	  and	  
Basij	  militia	  for	  their	  continued	  complicity	  in	  the	  harsh	  suppression	  of	  political	  dissidents	  (VOA,	  
June	  9,	  2011).	  	  Responding	  to	  these	  new	  measures,	  senior	  lawmaker	  Kazzem	  Jallali	  stated:	  
“That	  is	  not	  an	  important	  issue	  since	  we	  have	  experienced	  and	  survived	  harsh	  sanctions	  during	  
the	  (Iraqi	  imposed)	  war	  (on	  Iran	  in	  the	  1980s),”	  calling	  the	  new	  measures	  “a	  humorous	  act	  for	  
the	  public	  opinion"	  (Fars	  News	  Agency,	  June	  12,	  2011).	  	  While	  these	  measures	  are	  unlikely	  to	  
influence	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  Iranian	  government	  in	  the	  short	  run,	  depending	  upon	  the	  financial	  
losses	  incurred	  by	  various	  officials,	  such	  losses	  may	  serve	  to	  accentuate	  the	  growing	  fissures	  
within	  the	  Iranian	  political	  establishment	  and	  as	  time	  wears	  on,	  may	  come	  to	  threaten	  the	  
longevity	  of	  the	  regime	  should	  such	  officials	  come	  to	  question	  their	  allegiance	  to	  a	  system	  that	  
is	  working	  less	  to	  their	  advantage.	  	  
	   Meyer	  cites	  literature	  in	  international	  relations	  concerning	  the	  impact	  of	  domestic	  and	  
foreign	  policy	  on	  state	  decision	  making,	  scholarship	  in	  comparative	  politics	  on	  the	  development	  
of	  policy	  responses	  to	  international	  political	  problems	  over	  time,	  as	  well	  as	  ‘new	  institutional’	  
theory	  concerning	  the	  possibilities	  and	  processes	  of	  policy	  making	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  
framework	  for	  understanding	  the	  potential	  role	  of	  social	  movements	  in	  shaping	  state	  responses	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to	  both	  international	  problems	  and	  domestic	  pressures	  (23).	  	  He	  cites	  Putnam’s	  (1988)	  
metaphor	  of	  a	  two-­‐level	  game,	  which	  offers	  a	  model	  wherein	  various	  groups	  press	  their	  claims	  
at	  the	  domestic	  level	  while	  politicians	  bargain	  amongst	  themselves	  seeking	  to	  amplify	  or	  
maintain	  their	  own	  power.	  	  Simultaneously,	  governments	  seek	  to	  balance	  the	  claims	  of	  their	  
citizenry	  against	  their	  attempts	  to	  maximize	  advantages	  internationally.	  	  In	  order	  to	  effectively	  
explore	  these	  relationships,	  Putnam	  looks	  at	  the	  ‘win-­‐sets’	  in	  these	  more	  or	  less	  separate	  
games	  of	  ‘negotiation’	  and	  ‘ratification’;	  negotiation	  applying	  to	  international	  politics,	  
ratification	  to	  domestic	  politics.	  While	  Putnam	  maintains	  that	  the	  conduct	  of	  each	  process	  
transpires	  at	  ‘different	  tables’,	  he	  makes	  allowances	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  activities	  at	  one	  
table	  may	  occasionally	  intrude	  upon	  bargaining	  at	  another	  table	  (Meyer	  2003,	  23).	  	  	  
	   Tsebelis	  (1990),	  another	  scholar	  cited	  in	  Meyer’s	  article	  disagrees	  with	  the	  separate	  tables	  
metaphor	  of	  domestic	  and	  international	  games.	  	  Viewing	  the	  model	  as	  too	  restrictive,	  Tsebelis	  
argues	  that	  there	  is	  often	  instead,	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  game	  within	  a	  game.	  	  He	  envisions	  
politicians	  making	  decisions	  and	  taking	  positions	  in	  a	  domestic	  game	  cast	  against	  a	  backdrop	  in	  
which	  the	  international	  environment	  is	  a	  constant	  presence.	  	  Within	  this	  perspective,	  
institutions	  set	  the	  rules	  and	  payoffs	  for	  the	  various	  games,	  and	  decisions	  are	  treated	  less	  as	  
processes	  and	  more	  as	  events.	  	  The	  model	  holds	  structures	  and	  payoffs	  constant	  for	  a	  particular	  
game,	  ignoring	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  variables	  change	  over	  time	  in	  favor	  of	  explaining	  a	  
discrete	  decision	  (Meyer	  2003,	  23).	  	  	  
	   Ultimately,	  Meyer	  more	  enthusiastically	  endorses	  Wendt	  (1994),	  who	  offers	  an	  
alternative	  to	  these	  rational	  choice	  models,	  arguing	  that	  the	  values	  placed	  on	  particular	  
decisions	  are	  dictated	  by	  the	  roles	  and	  identities	  states	  seek	  to	  create	  and	  maintain	  for	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themselves	  in	  a	  larger	  international	  system	  (23).	  	  Iran	  for	  example	  has	  long	  been	  at	  the	  helm	  of	  
an	  axis	  of	  resistance	  to	  Israeli	  and	  American	  interests,	  policies,	  and	  campaigns	  in	  the	  MENA	  
region,	  relying	  on	  its	  Syrian/Lebanese	  ally,	  Hezbollah,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  Hamas	  to	  
effectively	  keep	  Israel	  and	  the	  United	  States	  in	  check.	  	  	  	  While	  this	  alliance	  effectively	  serves	  to	  
protect	  Iran’s	  widely	  controversial	  nuclear	  program	  from	  US	  or	  Israeli	  military	  aggression,	  it	  has	  
also	  garnered	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  credibility	  among	  Arab	  populations	  
across	  the	  region	  who	  are	  more	  than	  a	  little	  disenchanted	  with	  their	  own	  governments’	  
acquiescence	  to	  the	  persistent	  occupation	  of	  Palestine,	  and	  other	  Israeli	  and	  US	  incursions	  in	  
the	  Middle	  East.	  	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  Iran’s	  militant	  anti-­‐Israeli	  propaganda	  and	  anti-­‐American	  
discourse	  can	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  strategic	  ploy	  to	  win	  the	  support	  of	  Arab	  public	  opinion	  
thereby	  making	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  various	  Arab	  governments	  to	  give	  into	  US	  pressure	  seeking	  
to	  promote	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  Iranian	  government	  as	  a	  major	  strategic	  threat	  to	  their	  society	  and	  
the	  region.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  an	  instrument	  commonly	  employed	  by	  the	  
Iranian	  state	  to	  contain	  the	  perceived	  threat	  to	  Iran	  while	  helping	  to	  promote	  its	  regional	  
interests	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  
	   As	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  the	  region	  threatens	  to	  shift	  with	  the	  proliferation	  of	  
potentially	  more	  representative	  forms	  of	  government	  taking	  hold	  in	  various	  states,	  this	  surfeit	  
of	  popularity	  for	  the	  Iranian	  government	  may	  serve	  to	  further	  strengthen	  its	  hand	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  
That	  said,	  the	  increasingly	  violent	  crackdown	  against	  anti-­‐government	  demonstrators	  in	  Syria	  
stands	  to	  jeopardize	  Iran’s	  populist	  image	  in	  those	  same	  Arab	  states,	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  
beleaguered	  civilian	  population	  of	  Syria,	  where	  Iran	  has	  been	  largely	  suspected	  of	  aiding	  the	  
Syrian	  regime	  in	  its	  brutal	  crackdown	  of	  civilian	  protests	  (UPI,	  June	  2,	  2011).	  	  Tehran	  has	  up	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until	  this	  point	  been	  largely	  supportive	  of	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  but	  appears	  to	  draw	  the	  line	  at	  
Syria.	  	  While	  Iran	  denies	  providing	  any	  support	  for	  the	  Syrian	  government’s	  crackdown,	  Iranian	  
leaders	  have	  failed,	  up	  until	  quite	  recently,	  to	  strongly	  condemn	  the	  state	  sponsored	  violence.	  	  
This	  decision	  clearly	  speaks	  to	  Iran’s	  desire	  to	  maintain	  the	  role/identity	  it	  has	  created	  for	  itself	  
and	  its	  Syrian	  ally	  in	  the	  region,	  namely	  as	  leading	  players	  in	  the	  “line	  of	  resistance”	  against	  
Israel	  (VOA,	  June	  14,	  2011).	  	  	  	  It	  was	  not	  until	  demonstrations	  in	  Syria	  entered	  their	  eighth	  
month,	  with	  an	  estimated	  3,000	  casualties	  of	  state	  perpetrated	  violence,	  that	  President	  
Mahmoud	  Ahmadinejad	  recently	  gave	  a	  statement	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  ongoing	  crisis	  in	  Syria,	  
stating:	  “Nobody	  has	  the	  right	  to	  kill	  others,	  neither	  the	  government	  nor	  its	  opponents”	  (BBC,	  
October	  22,	  2011).	  	  Such	  a	  statement	  is	  still	  quite	  measured	  in	  its	  criticism,	  as	  it	  appears	  to	  
attribute	  blame	  to	  both	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  	  Nevertheless	  it	  is	  a	  significant	  concession	  
and	  one	  that	  points	  to	  the	  shifting	  calculations	  being	  invoked	  amongst	  the	  Iranian	  leadership	  as	  
to	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  ongoing	  crisis	  as	  well	  as	  the	  possibility	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  aftermath	  
of	  a	  successful	  popular	  upheaval	  in	  Syria.	  	  
	   Given	  the	  vested	  interest	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  holds	  in	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  Asad	  government,	  
the	  Syrian	  uprising	  not	  only	  jeopardizes	  Iran’s	  key	  strategic	  interests	  but	  also	  compromises	  its	  
ability	  to	  frame	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  as	  largely	  inspired	  and	  fashioned	  after	  Iran’s	  own	  Islamic	  
Revolution	  of	  1979.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  Ahmadinejad’s	  most	  recent	  statement	  
could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  indictment	  of	  his	  own	  government’s	  handling	  of	  the	  election	  crisis	  of	  2009	  
that	  gave	  birth	  to	  Iran’s	  contemporary	  opposition,	  more	  specifically,	  the	  Green	  Movement.	  	  
This	  point	  will	  prove	  germane	  to	  later	  chapters	  in	  which	  the	  framing	  dispute	  between	  the	  
Iranian	  regime	  and	  its	  own	  domestic	  opposition	  is	  both	  dissected	  and	  analyzed.	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   Returning	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  Meyer’s	  work	  on	  nested	  institutions	  and	  collective	  action,	  
or	  more	  broadly,	  the	  relationships	  between	  international	  relations,	  domestic	  politics,	  and	  the	  
impact	  of	  social	  movements	  on	  the	  state	  decision	  making	  process,	  Meyer	  contends	  that	  there	  
are	  two	  key	  aspects	  of	  social	  and	  political	  reality	  that	  must	  be	  acknowledged	  in	  order	  to	  
effectively	  make	  use	  of	  his	  nested	  institutions	  metaphor.	  	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  nesting	  institutions	  
rarely	  have	  exclusive	  claim	  on	  those	  they	  nest	  and	  that	  communities	  may	  straddle	  a	  variety	  of	  
nesting	  contexts.	  	  He	  explains:	  	  
We	  can	  think	  of	  a	  community	  upon	  which	  larger	  institutions,	  say	  state	  and	  
church,	  make	  competing	  claims	  on	  matters	  of	  policy	  and	  loyalty.	  Local	  
governments	  and	  churches	  can	  be	  further	  constrained	  by	  the	  larger	  structures	  in	  
which	  they	  are	  nested,	  such	  as	  a	  federal	  government,	  an	  alliance	  with	  other	  
states,	  and	  a	  transnational	  church	  (23).	  	  
	  
As	  such,	  Meyer	  cautions	  that	  you	  must	  then	  determine	  the	  exclusivity	  of	  institutions	  in	  a	  
particular	  community	  or	  context.	  	  The	  second	  acknowledgement	  pertains	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  
autonomy	  nested	  institutions	  enjoy	  within	  a	  larger	  institution.	  	  This	  he	  describes	  in	  terms	  of	  
institutional	  ‘slack’.	  	  The	  degree	  to	  which	  slack	  or	  wiggle	  room	  exists	  within	  a	  nested	  institution	  
allows	  other	  outside	  institutions	  or	  native	  communities	  to	  innovate	  policies.	  	  As	  institutions	  
become	  more	  tightly	  nested	  in	  larger	  institutions,	  competing	  claims	  from	  other	  exogenous	  
forces	  or	  institutions	  wield	  less	  influence	  and	  are	  thereby	  less	  likely	  to	  make	  an	  impact	  on	  
internal	  processes.	  	  Following	  this	  logic,	  institutional	  slack	  is	  therefore	  critical	  to	  developing	  
autonomous	  social	  and	  political	  institutions	  and	  more	  levelly	  contested	  politics	  (Meyer	  2003,	  
23-­‐24).	  	  	  
	   Temporarily	  ignoring	  international	  context,	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Iranian	  
government,	  namely	  the	  way	  the	  various	  branches	  or	  institutions	  therein	  are	  summarily	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subordinated	  to	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Leader,	  provides	  an	  ideal	  illustration	  of	  how	  tightly	  
nested	  institutions	  serve	  to	  insulate	  the	  regime	  from	  the	  demands	  of	  local	  actors	  or	  exogenous	  
institutions	  like	  reform	  minded	  political	  parties	  and	  civil	  society	  organizations.	  	  The	  Iranian	  
regime	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  unique	  and	  contradictory	  political	  character	  that	  is	  predicated	  
upon	  a	  constitution	  that	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  upholds	  the	  notion	  of	  popular	  sovereignty	  while	  
simultaneously	  subordinating	  such	  provisions	  by	  institutionalizing	  the	  supremacy	  of	  clerical	  rule	  
through	  the	  concept	  of	  velayat-­‐e-­‐faqih	  (Schirazi,	  1).	  	  	  
Velayat-­‐e-­‐faqih	  (Mandate	  of	  the	  Jurist)	  was	  a	  theory	  introduced	  by	  the	  architect	  of	  the	  
Islamic	  Revolution,	  Ayatollah	  Ruhollah	  Khomeini	  and	  constituted	  a	  bold	  innovation	  in	  the	  
history	  of	  Shi’ism	  	  (Arjomand	  1988,	  98).	  	  He	  essentially	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  
divinely	  inspired	  Imam,	  sovereignty	  cedes	  to	  qualified	  jurists	  or	  Shiite	  religious	  leaders	  whose	  
responsibility	  he	  stated	  constitutes:	  “governing	  and	  administering	  the	  country	  and	  
implementing	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  sacred	  law”	  (Khomeini	  1971	  qtd.	  in	  Arjomand	  1988,	  99).	  	  By	  
encouraging	  his	  acclamation	  as	  Imam	  amongst	  the	  Iranian	  populace,	  he	  was	  able	  to	  further	  
refine	  his	  theory	  in	  support	  of	  clerical	  rule	  into	  one	  that	  endorsed	  the	  supremacy	  of	  a	  single	  
supreme	  leader	  with	  absolute	  jurisdiction	  over	  all	  matters	  of	  state	  (Arjomand	  1988,	  99).	  	  In	  
Weberian	  terms,	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  through	  his	  charisma,	  was	  able	  to	  imbue	  the	  office	  of	  
supreme	  leader	  with	  extraordinary	  qualities	  ensuring	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  institution	  as	  a	  defining	  
feature	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  following	  the	  demise	  of	  it’s	  founder.	  The	  following	  diagram	  
illustrates	  the	  institutional	  nesting	  of	  the	  Iranian	  national	  government	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  
Supreme	  Leader:	  
Figure	  1.	  Diagram	  of	  Iran’s	  Intricate	  Political	  System	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Based	  on	  the	  BBC	  Diagram	  featured	  in	  the	  Iran	  Country	  Profile,	  entitled	  Who	  holds	  the	  power?	  	  
	  
In	  examining	  Figure	  1	  above,	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  supreme	  leader	  across	  all	  aspects	  of	  government	  
either	  directly,	  or	  via	  his	  powerful	  subsidiary	  the	  Guardian	  Council	  becomes	  vividly	  apparent.	  	  
The	  supreme	  leader,	  presently	  Ayatollah	  Khamenei,	  sees	  to	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  leadership	  
within	  the	  armed	  forces,	  the	  judiciary,	  the	  expediency	  council	  and	  6	  of	  the	  12	  members	  of	  the	  
guardian	  council,	  the	  other	  6	  of	  whom	  are	  appointed	  by	  the	  head	  of	  the	  judiciary	  which	  reports	  
directly	  to	  the	  supreme	  leader	  and	  is	  expected	  to	  adjudicate	  in	  accordance	  with	  his	  will.	  	  The	  
guardian	  council	  is	  a	  key	  institutional	  powerhouse	  that	  serves	  as	  an	  intervening	  vehicle	  for	  the	  
supreme	  leader	  to	  influence	  the	  course	  of	  popular	  elections	  to	  the	  office	  of	  the	  president,	  
parliament,	  and	  the	  important	  institution	  known	  as	  the	  assembly	  of	  experts.	  	  The	  assembly	  of	  
experts	  is	  charged	  with	  the	  responsibility	  of	  monitoring	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  supreme	  leader	  and	  
appointing	  his	  successor	  in	  the	  instance	  of	  the	  leader's	  passing	  or	  under	  circumstances	  in	  which	  
it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  he	  is	  no	  longer	  fit	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  duties	  of	  his	  office.	  	  	  
	   While	  regular	  elections	  are	  held	  for	  each	  of	  these	  bodies,	  the	  guardian	  council	  must	  first	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vet	  all	  individuals	  who	  wish	  to	  stand	  for	  one	  of	  these	  various	  offices.	  	  In	  approving	  or	  rejecting	  
candidates	  for	  public	  office	  the	  guardian	  council	  is	  not	  obliged	  to	  justify	  these	  decisions.	  The	  
guardian	  council	  is	  also	  tasked	  with	  giving	  its	  ascent	  to	  any	  bill	  passed	  by	  parliament	  before	  the	  
law	  can	  be	  enacted.	  	  This	  is	  ostensibly	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  laws	  passed	  by	  parliament	  do	  not	  
conflict	  with	  either	  the	  Iranian	  constitution	  or	  Islamic	  Law.	  	  Where	  disputes	  over	  legislation	  
between	  parliament	  and	  the	  guardian	  council	  become	  intractable,	  the	  body	  known	  as	  the	  
expediency	  council	  then	  intervenes	  to	  settle	  the	  dispute.	  	  Recalling	  that	  all	  members	  of	  the	  
expediency	  council	  are	  appointed	  or	  approved	  by	  the	  supreme	  leader,	  this	  institution	  is	  yet	  
another	  vehicle	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  leader’s	  will	  is	  upheld	  in	  all	  controversial	  legislative	  matters.	  	  	  
	   This	  discussion	  of	  the	  machinations	  of	  the	  Iranian	  governing	  apparatus	  while	  abbreviated,	  
should	  clearly	  illustrate	  the	  difficulties	  facing	  exogenous	  actors	  seeking	  to	  influence	  the	  policy	  
making	  process.	  	  Iranian	  governmental	  institutions	  are	  extremely	  exclusive	  as	  all	  power	  brokers	  
are	  either	  directly	  appointed	  by	  the	  supreme	  leader	  or	  are	  elected	  to	  power	  after	  a	  thorough	  
vetting	  of	  candidates	  by	  the	  guardian	  council.	  	  The	  various	  institutions	  that	  constitute	  Iran’s	  
governing	  body	  are	  also	  tightly	  nested	  or	  tethered	  to	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Leader,	  making	  
it	  very	  difficult	  for	  any	  reform	  minded	  actor	  or	  constituency	  operating	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  
office	  of	  the	  supreme	  leader	  to	  attempt	  to	  increase	  the	  institutional	  slack	  between	  bodies	  or	  
alter	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  various	  actors.	  	  	  
	   This	  conclusion	  is	  further	  substantiated	  when	  acknowledging	  the	  ineffectual	  role	  that	  
political	  parties	  play	  in	  fielding	  candidates	  for	  election.	  	  Parties	  themselves	  go	  through	  a	  
thorough	  vetting	  process	  and	  are	  closely	  monitored	  and	  restricted	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  organize	  
and	  contest	  in	  Iran’s	  various	  national,	  state	  and	  local	  elections.	  	  The	  right	  to	  form	  political	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parties	  and	  associations	  is	  codified	  in	  Paragraph	  2	  Article	  26	  of	  Iran’s	  1979	  constitution	  which	  
allows	  for	  the	  “formation	  of	  parties,	  societies,	  whether	  Islamic	  or	  pertaining	  to	  one	  of	  the	  
recognized	  religious	  minorities	  …	  provided	  that	  they	  do	  not	  violate	  the	  principles	  of	  
independence,	  freedom,	  national	  unity,	  the	  criteria	  of	  Islam,	  or	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  
(Samii,	  1).”	  	  	  
	   A	  subsequent	  law	  passed	  in	  September	  1981	  made	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  political	  party	  
dependent	  upon	  getting	  a	  permit	  from	  the	  Interior	  Ministry.	  	  Article	  10	  of	  the	  Parties	  Law	  
specified	  that	  a	  commission	  (the	  Article	  10	  Commission)	  consisting	  of	  one	  Interior	  Ministry	  
official,	  two	  parliamentarians,	  and	  two	  judiciary	  representatives	  would	  issue	  party	  permits	  and	  
dissolve	  parties	  acting	  illegally	  (Samii,	  2).	  Controversy	  surrounding	  the	  dissolving	  of	  particular	  
parties	  for	  political	  expediency	  does	  occur	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  the	  
conclusion	  of	  this	  work.	  	  It	  suffices	  to	  state	  here	  that	  according	  to	  a	  statement	  made	  by	  Deputy	  
Interior	  Minister	  Mohammad	  Javad	  Haq-­‐Shenas	  at	  the	  time	  when	  he	  was	  secretary	  of	  the	  
Article	  10	  Commission,	  although	  there	  is	  political	  activity	  inside	  the	  country,	  “the	  system,	  as	  a	  
whole,	  is	  not	  conducive	  to	  political	  parties”	  (Samii,	  2).	  	  In	  addition	  to	  extremely	  short	  campaign	  
seasons,	  the	  role	  of	  political	  parties	  in	  Iran	  is	  further	  diminished	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  individuals	  can	  
be	  members	  of	  several	  organizations	  and	  in	  recognizing	  that	  parties	  do	  not	  field	  candidates	  but	  
rather	  publish	  a	  list	  of	  candidates	  that	  they	  endorse	  (Samii,	  2).	  	  	  
	   In	  a	  sense	  political	  parties	  have	  as	  much	  to	  prove	  to	  the	  clerical	  elite	  in	  regards	  to	  their	  
ideological	  allegiance	  to	  the	  regime	  and	  supreme	  leader	  as	  the	  potential	  candidates	  that	  parties	  
ultimately	  endorse.	  	  Therefore,	  we	  see	  as	  a	  byproduct	  of	  this	  discussion	  that	  political	  parties	  in	  
Iran	  lack	  the	  kind	  of	  autonomy	  capable	  of	  ensuring	  viable	  oppositional	  politics	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	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institutional	  slack	  afforded	  to	  them	  as	  a	  byproduct	  of	  the	  licensing	  protocol	  imposed	  upon	  
them.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  dismiss	  the	  accomplishments	  of	  previously	  active	  reformist	  political	  parties	  
and	  their	  candidates	  such	  as	  Khatami’s	  Islamic	  Participation	  party	  which	  aided	  his	  ascension	  to	  
the	  presidency	  as	  well	  as	  helped	  reform	  minded	  candidates	  gain	  a	  majority	  of	  seats	  in	  the	  
parliamentary	  elections	  of	  2000.	  	  This	  era	  marked	  the	  most	  vibrant	  period	  of	  political	  debate	  
amongst	  the	  various	  constituent	  political	  elites	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic.	  	  It	  is	  also	  
however	  largely	  recognized	  that	  as	  a	  byproduct	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Participation	  party’s	  success	  
during	  the	  Khatami	  era	  in	  visibly	  lobbying	  for	  reform,	  and	  its	  role	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  presidential	  
election	  crisis	  of	  2009,	  the	  party	  now	  finds	  its	  permit	  revoked	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  March	  2012	  
Parliamentary	  elections	  (Al-­‐Arabiya,	  November	  4,	  2011).	  	  In	  light	  of	  this	  troubled	  dynamic,	  one	  
may	  conclude	  that	  Iran	  appropriately	  conforms	  to	  Meyer’s	  theory	  concerning	  the	  chilling	  
impact	  of	  tightly	  nested	  institutions	  upon	  exogenous	  forces	  seeking	  to	  impact	  the	  course	  and	  
content	  of	  internal	  processes	  or	  politics.	  	  	  
	   Meyer	  asserts	  that	  like	  domestic	  context,	  international	  context	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  
interrelated	  variables	  of	  institutional	  exclusivity	  and	  the	  autonomy	  of	  smaller	  nested	  
institutions,	  arguing	  that	  both	  stand	  to	  influence	  the	  structure	  of	  political	  opportunities	  facing	  
dissidents.	  	  Tighter	  and	  more	  exclusive	  nesting	  institutions	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  further	  
reduce	  the	  strength	  of	  local	  actors	  and	  limit	  their	  ability	  to	  effect	  relevant	  change	  at	  the	  
domestic	  level.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Iran,	  civil	  society	  organizations	  operating	  inside	  the	  country	  often	  
fall	  victim	  to	  the	  conflicts	  playing	  out	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Iran	  on	  the	  international	  scene.	  	  	  	  
	   Even	  more	  so	  than	  political	  parties,	  civil	  society	  organizations	  are	  scrutinized	  and	  often	  
persecuted	  by	  the	  state	  as	  many	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  seek	  to	  ensure	  and	  enforce	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some	  modicum	  of	  accountability	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  state.	  	  Commonly,	  as	  a	  means	  of	  disarming	  
these	  organizations,	  the	  state	  will	  often	  allege	  that	  they	  are	  working	  in	  the	  service	  of	  foreign	  
governments	  seeking	  to	  foment	  social	  unrest.	  	  	  	  These	  charges	  are	  often	  levied	  unsubstantiated	  
and	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  political	  expediency	  in	  neutralizing	  the	  challenge	  posed	  by	  that	  particular	  
organization.	  	  The	  use	  of	  such	  allegations	  reflects	  the	  tightly	  nested	  identity	  that	  the	  Iranian	  
regime	  has	  created	  for	  itself	  in	  the	  international	  arena,	  one	  that	  stands	  in	  diametric	  opposition	  
to	  the	  West.	  	  Unfortunately,	  many	  civil	  society	  organizations,	  particularly	  those	  that	  advocate	  
on	  behalf	  of	  human	  rights,	  often	  find	  themselves	  common	  casualties	  of	  their	  country’s	  politics	  
and	  demeanor	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  	  Additionally,	  certain	  US	  initiatives	  such	  as	  the	  Iran	  
Democracy	  Fund,	  introduced	  by	  the	  George	  W	  Bush	  administration	  and	  publicized	  as	  a	  project	  
of	  regime	  change,	  have	  provided	  Iranian	  hardliners	  with	  probable	  cause	  for	  suspicion	  that	  these	  
organizations	  may	  have	  been	  accepting	  funds	  and	  instructions	  from	  the	  United	  States	  (NIAC,	  
January	  23,	  2008).	  	  	  
	   Additionally	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  the	  Iranian	  Parliament	  has	  been	  considering	  the	  
adoption	  of	  a	  controversial	  law	  that	  would	  further	  impede	  the	  work	  of	  civil	  society	  
organizations	  by	  creating	  a	  new	  supervisory	  “Supreme	  Committee”	  largely	  consistent	  of	  
appointees	  from	  the	  Interior	  Ministry	  and	  members	  of	  the	  security	  apparatus,	  with	  only	  one	  
member	  included	  to	  represent	  and	  advocate	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  organizations	  themselves	  (HRW,	  
April	  10,	  2011).	  This	  committee	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  issuing	  permits	  to	  organizations,	  
monitoring	  their	  activities,	  and	  maintaining	  ultimate	  authority	  over	  their	  boards	  of	  directors.	  	  
The	  law	  would	  also	  require	  that	  official	  permission	  be	  obtained	  prior	  to	  NGOs	  making	  contact	  
with	  any	  international	  organizations	  including	  membership	  in	  international	  organizations,	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participation	  in	  training	  seminars	  or	  meetings	  abroad,	  signing	  contracts	  or	  memoranda	  of	  
understanding	  or	  receiving	  funds	  or	  other	  aid	  from	  international	  organizations.	  	  	  
	   These	  stringent,	  oppressive	  measures	  are	  at	  once	  a	  response	  to	  the	  resilience	  of	  Iranian	  
civil	  society	  to	  date	  in	  its	  attempts	  to	  hold	  the	  Iranian	  government	  accountable	  to	  its	  own	  
constitution	  and	  international	  norms	  pertaining	  to	  universal	  human	  rights	  such	  as	  freedom	  of	  
association	  and	  assembly,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  international	  climate	  characterized	  by	  threats	  of	  reprisal	  
regarding	  Iran’s	  uranium	  enrichment	  activity.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  identify	  which	  of	  these	  two	  factors	  
weighs	  heavier	  in	  the	  appraisal	  of	  lawmakers	  considering	  this	  legislation.	  	  What	  is	  certain	  
however,	  just	  as	  Tsebelis	  (1990)	  describes,	  is	  that	  politicians	  in	  Iran	  are	  making	  decisions	  and	  
taking	  positions	  in	  a	  domestic	  game	  cast	  against	  a	  backdrop	  in	  which	  the	  international	  
environment	  is	  a	  constant	  presence.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  hostilities	  that	  typify	  the	  international	  
environment	  and	  the	  strategic	  alliances	  and	  image	  that	  Iran	  has	  forged	  for	  itself	  therein,	  
periods	  of	  heightened	  conflict	  abroad	  consistently	  serve	  to	  undermine	  the	  project	  of	  reform	  at	  
the	  domestic	  level	  in	  a	  manner	  in	  keeping	  with	  Meyer’s	  theory.	  	  Stephen	  Poulson	  (2009)	  further	  
illustrates	  this	  dynamic	  relationship	  between	  exclusive	  international	  arrangements	  and	  the	  
impact	  on	  Iranian	  activists	  during	  the	  Khatami	  era.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  his	  work	  alludes	  to	  the	  
impact	  of	  framing	  on	  the	  expansion,	  or	  in	  this	  case	  contraction,	  of	  political	  opportunity	  
domestically.	  	  	  
	   Poulson	  (2009)	  applies	  Meyer’s	  concept	  of	  nested	  institutions	  more	  broadly	  in	  a	  case	  
study	  that	  looks	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  US-­‐Iran	  relations	  on	  the	  Iranian	  reform	  movement	  post	  9/11.	  	  
As	  such	  I	  will	  lean	  on	  Poulson’s	  case	  study	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  elaborate	  account	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  
international	  context	  on	  social	  movements	  operating	  in	  a	  particular	  domestic	  context.	  	  More	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explicitly,	  Poulson’s	  article	  examined	  the	  impact	  of	  bellicose	  rhetoric	  targeting	  the	  Iranian	  
regime	  issued	  by	  the	  Bush	  administration	  in	  2002	  (namely	  Iran’s	  inclusion	  in	  the	  ‘axis	  of	  evil’)	  
upon	  the	  reform	  initiatives	  of	  President	  Khatami,	  who	  had	  made	  rapprochement	  with	  the	  
United	  States	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  his	  reformist	  platform.	  	  	  
	   Due	  to	  the	  polemical	  nature	  of	  US-­‐Iran	  relations,	  and	  the	  unprincipled	  actions	  of	  
American	  and	  Iranian	  officials	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  last	  several	  decades,	  the	  deficit	  of	  trust	  
that	  separates	  the	  two	  nations	  continues	  to	  jeopardize	  a)	  rapprochement	  between	  the	  two	  
countries,	  b)	  resolution	  and	  accord	  regarding	  Iran’s	  nuclear	  program,	  c)	  meaningful	  coordinated	  
action	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  common	  interests/challenges	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  d)	  the	  successful	  
reform/democratization	  of	  the	  Iranian	  government,	  with	  advocates	  of	  reform	  routinely	  framed	  
as	  harbingers	  of	  a	  hostile	  western	  agenda.	  	  The	  mistrust	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Iranians,	  largely	  born	  
of	  the	  US	  backed	  1953	  coup	  that	  removed	  democratically	  elected	  Prime	  Minister,	  Mohammed	  
Mossadegh	  from	  power,	  went	  on	  to	  inform	  the	  anti-­‐American	  overtones	  of	  the	  Islamic	  
Revolution	  and	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  it	  gave	  birth	  to.	  	  The	  US	  hostage	  crisis,	  which	  immediately	  
followed	  those	  events,	  went	  on	  to	  inflame	  anti-­‐Iranian	  sentiment	  in	  the	  United	  States	  where	  
politicians	  were	  still	  reeling	  from	  the	  loss	  of	  their	  key	  regional	  ally,	  Shah	  Mohammed	  Reza	  
Pahlavi	  who	  ultimately	  ceded	  power	  to	  the	  revolutionaries.	  	  	  	  
	   Poulson	  points	  out	  that	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  9/11,	  several	  opportunities	  presented	  
themselves	  that	  could	  have	  formed	  the	  basis	  for	  new	  and	  improved	  diplomatic	  relations	  
between	  the	  two	  states	  (2009,	  29).	  	  	  	  Poulson	  cited	  President	  Khatami’s	  call	  for	  a	  dialogue	  
amongst	  civilizations	  and	  improved	  relations	  with	  the	  West;	  the	  condolences	  extended	  to	  the	  
US	  by	  Iran	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  9/11,	  and	  the	  shared	  interests	  on	  the	  part	  of	  both	  governments	  in	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securing	  social	  and	  political	  stability	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  as	  key	  dimensions	  of	  this	  political	  
window	  of	  opportunity	  (31-­‐32).	  	  	  	  Unfortunately,	  both	  states	  proved	  to	  be	  too	  heavily	  invested	  
(or	  nested)	  in	  their	  opposition	  to	  the	  other	  to	  fully	  take	  advantage	  of	  their	  common	  interests	  
and	  broker	  a	  historic	  accord.	  	  	  
	   While	  this	  impasse	  largely	  served	  to	  uphold	  the	  status	  quo	  between	  the	  two	  states	  at	  the	  
international	  level,	  the	  Supreme	  Leader	  Ali	  Khamenei	  used	  President	  Mohammad	  Khatami’s	  
calls	  for	  an	  accord	  with	  the	  US	  and	  Bush’s	  unprovoked	  demonization	  of	  the	  Iranian	  state	  to	  
discredit	  President	  Khatami’s	  other	  key	  initiatives	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  the	  institutional	  slack	  
within	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Iranian	  national	  government.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  his	  second	  term,	  
Khatami	  had	  become	  convinced	  of	  the	  necessity	  to	  redefine	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  guardian	  council	  
and	  to	  restrict	  its	  ability	  to	  intercede	  in	  the	  elected	  offices	  of	  the	  state,	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  
level	  of	  autonomy	  afforded	  to	  the	  executive	  and	  legislative	  branches	  of	  government.	  	  This	  
realization,	  and	  Khatami’s	  introduction	  of	  twin	  bills	  targeting	  the	  guardian	  council	  came	  on	  the	  
heels	  of	  considerable	  conflict	  between	  the	  parliament	  and	  the	  guardian	  council	  over	  a	  variety	  
of	  measures	  aimed	  at	  strengthening	  both	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  further	  protecting	  the	  civil	  
liberties	  afforded	  to	  citizens	  within	  the	  constitution.	  	  The	  introduction	  of	  this	  legislation	  was	  
also	  preceded	  by	  a	  period	  of	  increased	  social	  unrest	  and	  student	  demonstrations	  in	  response	  to	  
several	  instances	  of	  state	  persecution	  of	  both	  the	  press	  and	  individuals	  who	  dared	  to	  question	  
the	  absolute	  authority	  of	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Leader.	  	  	  The	  political	  environment	  during	  
this	  period	  was	  therefore	  fraught	  with	  conflict	  unfamiliar	  to	  the	  Islamic	  Republic,	  and	  Khamenei	  
and	  his	  conservative	  allies	  wasted	  no	  opportunity	  to	  vilify	  both	  the	  demonstrators	  and	  the	  last	  
ditch	  legislation	  aimed	  at	  reforming	  the	  governing	  structure	  of	  the	  state.	  	  	  Therefore	  what	  was	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potentially	  a	  missed	  opportunity	  at	  the	  level	  of	  international	  relations,	  Khamenei	  was	  able	  to	  
transform	  into	  an	  opportunity	  to	  frame	  and	  discredit	  domestic	  opposition	  to	  his	  office	  and	  the	  
undue	  power	  he	  holds	  over	  the	  tightly	  nested	  structure	  of	  the	  state.	  	  	  	  
	   As	  alluded	  to	  above,	  many	  groups	  during	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  conceptualized	  Western	  
ideas	  and	  culture	  as	  an	  epidemic,	  which	  threatened	  to	  stunt	  Iran’s	  social	  and	  political	  
development.	  This	  notion,	  termed	  Westoxification	  or	  Occidentosis,	  was	  widely	  adopted	  and	  
used	  by	  religious	  leaders	  during	  the	  revolutionary	  period	  and	  conservative	  factions	  of	  the	  
Iranian	  state	  continue	  to	  invoke	  the	  term	  in	  their	  public	  discourse.	  	  In	  fact,	  vigilance	  against	  
Westoxification	  has	  become	  the	  primary	  rhetorical	  device	  to	  attack	  the	  reform	  movement	  in	  its	  
past	  and	  present	  incarnations	  (Poulson	  2009,	  35).	  	  	  Having	  sought	  rapprochement	  with	  the	  
West,	  only	  to	  be	  branded	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  ‘axis	  of	  evil,’	  Khatami	  and	  his	  subsequent	  reform	  
initiatives	  fell	  pray	  to	  criticism	  as	  being	  largely	  Western	  inspired	  and	  inherently	  threatening	  to	  
the	  Iranian	  state.	  	  This	  was	  the	  case	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  many	  efforts	  made	  by	  Khatami	  to	  condemn	  
Bush’s	  pronouncements.	  	  Poulson	  (2009)	  quotes	  the	  Iranian	  News	  Agency	  report	  of	  Khatami’s	  
reaction	  to	  Bush’s	  speech,	  stating:	  	  
President	  Khatami	  evaluated	  Bush’s	  speech	  as	  ‘intervening,	  warmongering,	  
insulting,	  a	  repetition	  of	  his	  past	  propagation,	  and	  worse	  than	  all,	  truly	  insulting	  
the	  Iranian	  nation.’	  Khatami	  added	  that	  the	  ‘great	  Iranian	  Nation’	  will	  never	  yield	  
to	  arrogant	  demands	  of	  foreigners,	  although	  ‘we	  are	  against	  warmongering,	  and	  
favour	  peace.	  	  A	  type	  of	  peace	  that	  is	  based	  on	  prevalence	  of	  justice	  for	  the	  
whole	  mankind’”	  (34).	  
	  	  	  	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  such	  strong	  condemnation,	  on	  March	  2,	  2002,	  in	  a	  speech	  on	  Iran’s	  national	  public	  
radio,	  Ayatollah	  Khamenei	  accused	  the	  reformers	  of	  unwittingly	  doing	  the	  bidding	  of	  the	  United	  
States.	  	  Therein	  he	  made	  an	  appeal	  for	  the	  reformers	  in	  the	  executive	  and	  legislative	  branches	  
of	  government	  to	  come	  to	  their	  senses	  stating:	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What	  kind	  of	  dialogue	  can	  be	  held	  with	  the	  side,	  which	  does	  not	  even	  accept	  you	  
at	  all,	  with	  the	  side,	  which	  is	  against	  your	  existence	  as	  the	  Islamic	  Republic?	  	  
America	  says	  explicitly	  that	  it	  is	  opposed	  to	  the	  religious	  system,	  it	  is	  in	  particular	  
opposed	  to	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  because	  it	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  awakening	  of	  the	  
world	  of	  Muslims.	  	  America	  sees	  the	  Iranian	  reform	  movement	  as	  a	  move	  against	  
the	  Islamic	  system.	  	  That	  is	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  Iranian	  reform	  movement.	  
America	  does	  not	  really	  recognize	  [understand]	  a	  group	  of	  our	  brothers	  and	  
sisters	  who	  are	  known	  as	  reformists	  (Poulson	  2009,	  35-­‐36).	  	  	  	  
	  
While	  Khamenei	  initially	  framed	  the	  reform	  movement	  as	  largely	  misunderstood	  by	  the	  United	  
States,	  as	  Khatami	  pressed	  forward	  with	  his	  reform	  initiatives	  hardliners	  within	  the	  government	  
began	  to	  commonly	  suggest	  that	  Khatami	  and	  his	  Participation	  party	  were	  working	  “in	  
cooperation	  with	  the	  staunchest	  enemy	  of	  the	  Islamic	  system,	  namely	  America”	  (Poulson	  2009,	  
37).	  	  	  Even	  after	  Khatami	  abandoned	  his	  attempt	  to	  restore	  relations	  with	  the	  US,	  hardliners	  
persisted	  in	  framing	  his	  administration	  as	  purveyors	  of	  insidious	  Western	  policies	  aimed	  at	  
weakening	  the	  Iranian	  government,	  effectively	  splintering	  the	  movement	  by	  the	  conclusion	  of	  
2002	  (Poulson	  2009,	  38).	  	  	  
The	  reform	  movement	  as	  a	  precursor	  to	  the	  Green	  Movement	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  
in	  the	  subsequent	  chapter.	  	  What	  is	  essential	  to	  acknowledge	  here	  is	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  
political	  opportunity,	  both	  domestic	  and	  international,	  may	  not	  only	  facilitate	  or	  constrain	  
collective	  action,	  but	  also	  stands	  to	  impact	  the	  salience	  or	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  movement’s	  
framing	  campaign.	  	  It	  is	  apparent	  from	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  Iranian	  political	  system	  and	  its	  
structure	  that	  the	  tightly	  nested	  institutional	  arrangements	  make	  reforming	  the	  political	  
apparatus	  incredibly	  difficult.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  backdrop	  of	  international	  relations	  
characterized	  by	  an	  antagonistic	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Iran	  presents	  
serious	  challenges	  for	  Iranian	  reformers	  seeking	  to	  liberalize	  the	  political	  structure	  along	  the	  
lines	  of	  a	  more	  pluralistic	  system	  beholden	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  respect	  for	  individual	  liberties.	  	  
	   27	  
So	  long	  as	  these	  individuals	  may	  be	  summarily	  vilified	  as	  collaborators	  with	  Western	  leaders	  
who	  aggressively	  single	  out	  the	  Iranian	  state	  as	  the	  greatest	  threat	  to	  US	  interests	  in	  the	  region,	  
activists	  will	  remain	  stymied	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  influence	  the	  domestic	  political	  debate	  
through	  the	  diffusion	  of	  reform	  oriented	  collective	  action	  frames,	  let	  alone	  achieve	  any	  
meaningful	  concessions	  from	  the	  Supreme	  Leader	  or	  his	  affiliate	  arms	  of	  government.	  	  One	  
reason	  for	  this	  has	  been	  the	  obvious	  absence	  of	  non-­‐Western,	  and	  more	  specifically,	  Middle	  
Eastern	  democratic	  states,	  counter	  examples	  that	  could	  serve	  to	  challenge	  the	  Iranian	  
leadership’s	  dismissal	  of	  democracy	  as	  a	  Western	  project	  to	  undermine	  the	  Islamic	  
government.	  	  So	  long	  as	  the	  Middle	  East	  remains	  largely	  bereft	  of	  democratic	  systems	  of	  
governance,	  and	  Western	  leaders	  continue	  to	  practice	  situational	  ethics	  in	  their	  haphazard	  
support	  for	  peoples’	  movements	  vs.	  loyal	  autocrats	  in	  the	  region,	  the	  challenges	  facing	  local	  
activists	  in	  Iran	  will	  persist	  unabated.	  	  This	  reality	  is	  in	  part	  what	  makes	  the	  Iranian	  framing	  
debate	  regarding	  the	  origin	  and	  inspiration	  for	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  so	  compelling.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  
the	  outcome	  of	  the	  more	  successful	  popular	  uprisings	  in	  Tunisia,	  Egypt,	  and	  Libya	  are	  far	  from	  
clear	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  type	  of	  political	  systems	  will	  be	  constructed	  to	  supplant	  the	  ancien	  
regime	  in	  each	  case.	  	  Both	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  and	  its	  opposition	  have	  demonstrated	  interest	  in	  
influencing	  the	  course	  of	  these	  eventualities.	  	  Both	  sides	  have	  reached	  out	  to	  Arab	  activists	  and	  
leaders	  with	  their	  own	  set	  of	  cautionary	  advice	  regarding	  how	  best	  to	  proceed	  with	  matters	  of	  
statecraft.	  	  These	  overtures	  are	  extensions	  of	  the	  framing	  contest	  embarked	  upon	  by	  Iranian	  
hardliners	  and	  opposition	  activists,	  and	  reflect	  their	  competing	  aspirations	  and	  expectations	  for	  
success	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  	  	  While	  much	  referred	  to	  up	  to	  this	  point,	  the	  concept	  of	  
framing	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  overall	  arch	  of	  social	  movement	  theory	  has	  yet	  to	  be	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thoroughly	  discussed.	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  conclude	  with	  a	  review	  of	  the	  theoretical	  literature	  
instrumental	  to	  delineating	  the	  concept	  of	  frames	  as	  an	  analytical	  tool	  for	  the	  study	  of	  social	  
movements.	  	  
Framing	  Processes	  
Benford	  and	  Snow	  remind	  us	  that	  frames,	  in	  a	  general	  sense,	  help	  to	  render	  events	  or	  
occurrences	  as	  meaningful	  and	  in	  turn	  stand	  to	  organize	  experience	  and	  guide	  action.	  	  
Collective	  action	  frames,	  according	  to	  Benford	  and	  Snow,	  also	  perform	  this	  interpretive	  
function	  “by	  simplifying	  and	  condensing	  the	  “world	  out	  there,”	  but	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  
mobilize	  potential	  adherents	  and	  constituents,	  to	  garner	  bystander	  support,	  and	  to	  demobilize	  
antagonists	  (1998,198;	  2000,614).	  	  In	  this	  way,	  movement	  frames	  provide	  a	  context	  for	  
collective	  action.	  	  Another	  function	  of	  framing	  involves	  the	  identification	  of	  grievances.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  grievance	  is	  framed	  affects	  movement	  tactics	  (Poulson	  2005,	  
10).	  	  In	  fact,	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  elaborate	  upon	  this	  and	  various	  other	  functions	  of	  framing	  
activities	  in	  their	  identification	  of	  three	  core	  framing	  tasks;	  diagnostic	  framing,	  prognostic	  
framing,	  and	  motivational	  framing	  (2000,	  615).	  	  	  The	  authors	  explain	  that	  in	  pursuing	  these	  core	  
framing	  tasks,	  movement	  actors	  attend	  to	  the	  interrelated	  challenges	  of	  “consensus	  
mobilization”	  and	  “action	  mobilization”	  (Klandermans	  cited	  in	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  2000,	  615).	  	  	  
In	  considering	  the	  dearth	  of	  literature	  that	  has	  focused	  on	  diagnostic	  framing	  in	  which	  
problems/grievances	  are	  identified	  and	  attributed,	  several	  case	  studies	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  
development	  and	  articulation	  of	  what	  Gamson	  et	  al	  (1982,	  1992a,b)	  have	  come	  to	  refer	  to	  as	  
“injustice	  frames.”	  	  These	  studies	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  movements	  identify	  the	  
“victims”	  of	  a	  particular	  injustice	  and	  amplify	  their	  victimization.	  	  Because	  social	  movements	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seek	  to	  rectify	  or	  reform	  some	  problematic	  or	  issue,	  it	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  structured	  action	  is	  
contingent	  upon	  identifying	  the	  source	  or	  sources	  of	  causality,	  blame,	  or	  culpability.	  	  The	  
attributional	  component	  of	  diagnostic	  framing	  attends	  to	  this	  function	  by	  focusing	  blame	  or	  
responsibility.	  	  Related	  to	  the	  attributional	  component	  of	  framing	  activities,	  scholars	  have	  also	  
discussed	  the	  tendency	  amongst	  social	  movement	  organizations	  (SMOs)	  to	  engage	  in	  
“boundary	  framing”	  (Hunt	  et	  al	  1994,	  194)	  and	  “adversarial	  framing”	  (Gamson	  1992a)	  in	  which	  
activists	  seek	  to	  delineate	  the	  boundaries	  of	  “good”	  and	  “evil”	  and	  cast	  clear	  protagonists	  and	  
antagonists	  accordingly	  (Benford	  and	  Snow	  2006,	  617).	  	  The	  development	  of	  such	  movement	  
frames	  therefore	  aids	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  collective	  identity	  of	  a	  movement	  especially	  where	  
boundary	  and	  adversarial	  framing	  is	  invoked.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  assists	  in	  the	  recruitment	  of	  
participants	  as	  scholars	  have	  noted	  that	  collective	  identity	  is	  often	  an	  important	  part	  of	  why	  
people	  participate	  in	  a	  social	  movement.	  	  Poulson	  (2006)	  notes	  that	  self-­‐identification	  as	  a	  
“union	  member,	  African-­‐American,	  environmentalist,	  human	  rights	  activist,	  a	  democrat,	  a	  
communist,	  etc.	  is	  usually	  considered	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  social	  movement	  mobilization”	  
(10).	  	  	  
Iranian	  movements	  have	  at	  various	  times	  fashioned	  collective	  identities	  for	  themselves	  
and	  engaged	  in	  adversarial	  framing	  campaigns	  of	  various	  sorts.	  	  Poulson	  utilizes	  the	  example	  of	  
Muslim	  revolutionaries	  actively	  fashioning	  Islam	  into	  an	  activist	  revolutionary	  doctrine	  in	  order	  
to	  make	  self-­‐identification	  as	  a	  “Muslim”	  an	  appealing	  identity	  for	  Iranian	  student	  activists	  in	  
the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  1979	  revolution	  (11).	  	  Likewise	  in	  regards	  to	  boundary	  or	  adversarial	  framing,	  
Poulson	  makes	  note	  of	  dichotomized	  worldviews	  Iranian	  movement	  leaders,	  particularly	  
establishment	  leaders	  often	  invoke	  which	  amounts	  to	  a	  simple	  accounting	  of	  ideas	  as	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“Western”	  or	  “Muslim”	  which	  often	  amounts	  to	  construction	  of	  the	  “West”	  as	  “other.”	  	  This	  
was	  a	  primary	  and	  important	  frame	  invoked	  during	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  and	  a	  byproduct	  of	  
the	  way	  Iranian	  culture	  became	  fashioned	  at	  the	  crossroads	  of,	  and	  often	  in	  competition	  with	  
the	  great	  Western	  and	  Eastern	  empires	  (22).	  	  	  
I	  have	  already	  alluded	  to	  the	  use	  of	  boundary	  and	  attributional	  framing	  of	  the	  West	  as	  
an	  undesirable/nefarious	  other,	  popularly	  invoked	  during	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution,	  and	  the	  
persistent	  utility	  of	  this	  frame	  to	  undercut	  meaningful	  political	  reforms	  inside	  Iran	  purportedly	  
due	  to	  the	  reforms	  being	  Western	  inspired.	  	  This	  reductionist	  worldview	  endorsed	  by	  the	  
Iranian	  leadership	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  seemingly	  substantiates	  the	  largely	  controversial	  theory	  
proposed	  by	  Western	  scholars,	  most	  notably	  Bernard	  Lewis,	  Samuel	  Huntington	  and	  their	  
acolytes,	  predicting	  an	  inevitable	  clash	  of	  civilizations.	  	  President	  Khatami	  tried	  to	  challenge	  
ideologues	  in	  both	  hemispheres	  in	  championing	  the	  cause	  of	  fostering	  a	  dialogue	  amongst	  
civilizations	  and	  was	  effectively	  undermined	  by	  political	  “realists”	  in	  both	  camps,	  namely	  by	  the	  
supreme	  leader	  and	  the	  presidential	  administration	  of	  George	  W.	  Bush.	  	  Yet	  beyond	  being	  a	  
useful	  rhetorical	  construction	  to	  undercut	  the	  reformists	  on	  the	  domestic	  front,	  the	  Iranian	  
leadership	  has	  also	  used	  this	  sort	  of	  boundary	  and	  attributional	  framing	  in	  order	  to	  endorse	  its	  
own	  political	  system	  abroad	  and	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  people	  of	  the	  MENA	  region	  languishing	  under	  
authoritarian	  regimes	  with	  close	  ties	  to	  Western	  powers.	  	  	  
Poulson	  (2006)	  advances	  that	  one	  way	  to	  evaluate	  these	  contrary	  positions—one	  
advocating	  dialogue,	  the	  other	  advocating	  incontrovertible	  clash—is	  as	  competing	  frames	  of	  
interpretation	  regarding	  the	  ongoing	  relations	  between	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  West	  (22).	  
Conservative	  ideologues	  in	  Iran,	  like	  their	  American	  counterparts	  in	  the	  West,	  believe	  their	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values	  and	  political	  system	  may	  be	  a	  template	  for	  progressive	  social	  development	  in	  other	  
nations	  and	  the	  rhetorical	  frame	  of	  civilizational	  clash	  helps	  support	  their	  conservative	  ideology	  
which	  strongly	  opposes	  Western	  imperial	  interests/interference	  in	  the	  region.	  	  
Returning	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  three	  core	  framing	  tasks,	  prognostic	  framing,	  the	  
second	  of	  the	  three	  tasks,	  involves	  the	  articulation	  of	  a	  proposed	  solution	  and	  the	  strategies	  for	  
the	  execution	  or	  implementation	  of	  such	  proposals.	  	  In	  this	  way	  prognostic	  framing	  attends	  to	  
the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  to	  be	  done	  as	  well	  as	  the	  problems	  of	  consensus	  building	  and	  action	  
mobilization	  (Benford	  and	  Snow	  2000,	  616).	  	  Some	  research	  in	  this	  area	  has	  indicated	  that	  there	  
is	  often	  a	  correspondence	  between	  a	  social	  movement’s	  diagnostic	  and	  prognostic	  framings,	  
meaning	  that	  the	  identification	  of	  specific	  problems	  and	  causes	  often	  serve	  to	  constrain	  the	  
range	  of	  possible	  solutions	  and	  strategies	  the	  organization	  may	  reasonably	  advance	  (616).	  	  
Additionally,	  because	  prognostic	  framing	  takes	  place	  within	  an	  environment	  consisting	  of	  
multiple	  organizations	  with	  which	  the	  social	  movement	  invariably	  seeks	  to	  engage	  and	  respond,	  
this	  multi-­‐organizational	  field	  stands	  to	  place	  additional	  constraints	  on	  the	  prognostic	  framing	  
of	  the	  particular	  movement	  in	  question.	  	  Such	  a	  field	  within	  this	  context	  may	  include	  movement	  
opponents,	  targets	  of	  influence,	  media,	  and	  bystanders.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement,	  
movement	  opponents	  and	  the	  targets	  of	  influence	  happen	  to	  be	  largely	  one	  in	  the	  same,	  more	  
specifically	  the	  hardline	  political	  establishment	  and	  its	  constituents.	  	  It	  requires	  no	  stretch	  of	  
the	  imagination	  that	  an	  SMO’s	  prognostic	  framing	  activity	  typically	  includes	  the	  refutation	  of	  
the	  logic	  or	  relevancy	  of	  solutions	  posited	  by	  opponents	  in	  addition	  to	  providing	  a	  rationale	  for	  
its	  own	  set	  of	  demands	  or	  solutions	  to	  the	  social	  ills	  the	  movement	  emerged	  to	  address.	  	  This	  
dynamic	  alludes	  to	  the	  process	  of	  counterframing,	  an	  essential	  feature	  identified	  at	  the	  outset	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of	  this	  work	  to	  be	  characteristic	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  framing	  contest	  being	  scrutinized	  herein	  (Benford	  
1987,	  75	  and	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  2000,	  617).	  	  Counterframing	  and	  contested	  framing	  processes	  
will	  be	  discussed	  at	  greater	  length	  towards	  the	  conclusion	  of	  this	  chapter	  as	  one	  of	  three	  
overlapping	  processes	  inherent	  to	  frame	  development,	  generation	  and	  elaboration.	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  third	  and	  final	  component	  of	  the	  core	  framing	  tasks	  discussed	  by	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  
is	  motivational	  framing,	  in	  which	  the	  movement	  champions	  a	  “call	  to	  arms”	  or	  more	  precisely,	  a	  
rationale	  for	  engaging	  in	  ameliorative	  collective	  action.	  	  Essential	  to	  this	  work	  is	  the	  
construction	  of	  appropriate	  vocabularies	  of	  motive	  and	  imbuing	  a	  sense	  of	  agency	  amongst	  
actual	  adherents	  and	  potential	  adherents	  (617).	  	  Such	  socially	  constructed	  vocabularies	  aim	  to	  
provide	  movement	  constituents	  with	  compelling	  accounts	  or	  rationales	  for	  engagement	  in	  
collective	  action	  as	  well	  as	  those	  to	  sustain	  participation.	  	  	  While	  these	  core	  framing	  tasks;	  
diagnostic,	  prognostic,	  and	  motivational	  framing	  are	  each	  essential	  to	  constructing	  the	  kind	  of	  
social	  reality	  which	  might	  afford	  movement	  actors	  the	  agency	  to	  effectively	  achieve	  their	  goals	  
via	  collective	  action,	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  such	  campaigns	  may	  be	  related	  to	  the	  many	  other	  
variable	  features	  of	  collective	  action	  frames.	  	  In	  general	  collective	  action	  frames	  tend	  to	  vary	  
across	  four	  categories	  or	  variable	  features,	  as	  referred	  to	  by	  authors,	  Benford	  and	  Snow.	  	  These	  
four	  variable	  features	  include	  1)	  problem	  identification	  and	  direction/locus	  of	  attribution,	  2)	  
flexibility/rigidity	  and	  inclusivity/exclusivity,	  3)	  variation	  in	  interpretive	  scope	  and	  influence,	  and	  
4)	  resonance.	  	  	  
The	  first	  variable	  feature,	  problem	  identification	  and	  direction/locus	  of	  attribution,	  is	  
likely	  the	  most	  obvious	  way	  collective	  actions	  frames	  differ	  from	  one	  another.	  	  Unfortunately	  
there	  is	  little	  empirical	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  much	  in	  the	  way	  of	  what	  the	  impact	  of	  such	  
	   33	  
differences	  in	  problem	  identification	  and	  locus	  attribution	  hold	  for	  the	  success	  of	  social	  or	  
political	  mobility.	  	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  briefly	  discuss	  the	  work	  of	  Gerhards	  and	  Rucht	  (1992),	  
which	  examined	  the	  differences	  between	  two	  late-­‐1980s	  West	  German	  mobilization	  campaigns	  
in	  respect	  to	  the	  number	  of	  problems	  activists	  identified.	  	  The	  authors	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  
“larger	  the	  range	  of	  problems	  covered	  by	  a	  frame,	  the	  larger	  the	  ranges	  of	  social	  groups	  that	  
can	  be	  addressed	  with	  the	  frame	  and	  the	  greater	  the	  mobilization	  capacity	  of	  the	  frame”	  (580	  
qtd.	  in	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  2000,	  618).	  	  They	  specified	  within	  their	  hypothesis	  however	  that	  such	  
conditions	  may	  only	  be	  expected	  to	  hold	  true	  when	  the	  various	  problems	  covered	  by	  a	  frame	  
could	  be	  “plausibly	  connected	  to	  one	  another.”	  
Similarly,	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  second	  variable	  feature	  discussed	  by	  the	  authors;	  
flexibility/rigidity	  and	  inclusivity/exclusivity	  of	  a	  movement	  frame,	  such	  variation	  may	  likewise	  
stand	  to	  facilitate	  or	  impede	  the	  efficacy	  and	  mobilizing	  capacity	  of	  the	  framing	  campaign.	  	  
Hypothetically,	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  (2000)	  suggest	  that	  the	  more	  inclusive	  and	  flexible	  collective	  
action	  frames	  are,	  the	  greater	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  frame	  may	  evolve	  into	  what	  they	  refer	  to	  
as	  a	  master	  frame.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  a	  master	  frame	  bears	  direct	  relation	  in	  turn,	  to	  the	  third	  
variable	  feature,	  variation	  of	  interpretive	  scope	  and	  influence.	  	  This	  variable	  in	  turn	  is	  not	  
unrelated	  to	  the	  first	  (problem	  identification	  and	  direction/locus	  of	  attribution)	  as	  Benford	  and	  
Snow	  point	  out	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  movement’s	  collective	  action	  frame	  is	  typically	  associated	  
with	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  particular	  group	  or	  set	  of	  related	  problems.	  However,	  some	  collective	  
action	  frames,	  the	  authors	  posit,	  are	  quite	  broad	  in	  terms	  of	  scope	  so	  as	  to	  function	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  
“master	  algorithm”	  that	  colors	  and	  constrains	  the	  orientations	  and	  activities	  of	  other	  
movements	  (618).	  	  This	  is	  what	  is	  implied	  by	  the	  term	  master	  frame.	  	  A	  master	  frame	  is	  so	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broad	  and	  generic	  that	  more	  common	  movement-­‐specific	  collective	  action	  frames	  are	  often	  
derivatives	  of	  it.	  	  	  	  The	  concept	  of	  a	  master	  frame	  must	  however	  necessarily	  be	  distinguished	  
from	  another	  common	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  as	  an	  SMO’s	  general,	  central,	  or	  primary	  frame.	  	  The	  
later	  is	  more	  appropriately	  referred	  to	  as	  an	  “organizational	  frame”	  or	  a	  movement-­‐specific	  
frame.	  	  Only	  a	  handful	  of	  collective	  action	  frames	  have	  been	  identified	  as	  being	  sufficiently	  
broad	  in	  interpretive	  scope,	  inclusivity,	  flexibility,	  and	  cultural	  resonance	  as	  to	  be	  appropriately	  
considered	  as	  master	  frames	  (619).	  	  	  
Poulson	  (2006)	  in	  his	  work,	  which	  chronicles	  and	  analyzes	  social	  movements	  in	  
twentieth	  century	  Iran,	  posits	  that	  the	  master	  frame	  influential	  and	  actively	  negotiated	  
throughout	  twentieth	  century	  Iran	  and	  into	  the	  present	  has	  been	  the	  master	  frame	  of	  
sovereignty.	  	  Poulson	  suggests	  that	  this	  frame	  was	  and	  is	  negotiated	  at	  two	  levels:	  	  
1)	  frames	  of	  national	  sovereignty	  addressed	  how	  the	  Iranian	  state	  (or	  larger	  
Islamic	  community)	  could	  achieve	  national	  independence	  from	  the	  influence	  of	  
Great	  Britain,	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  2)	  frames	  of	  individual	  
sovereignty	  addressed	  the	  requirements,	  as	  articulated	  by	  the	  leaders,	  that	  
individuals	  should	  fulfill	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  the	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  governance.	  	  
This	  often	  included	  how	  individual	  Iranians	  should	  respond	  to	  Western	  ideas	  and	  
Western	  Materialism	  (14).	  	  	  
	  
Poulson	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  in	  Iran,	  religious	  and	  nationalist	  leaders	  alike	  have	  argued	  the	  
necessity	  for	  Iran	  to	  be	  independent	  from	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  West.	  	  While	  I	  have	  already	  
discussed	  at	  length	  the	  challenges	  posed	  to	  reformers	  by	  these	  previously	  negotiated	  frames	  of	  
national	  sovereignty,	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  issue	  of	  individual	  sovereignty	  has	  been	  
framed	  across	  movements	  and	  by	  the	  state	  also	  presents	  challenges	  for	  the	  Iranian	  opposition	  
moving	  forward.	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It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  during	  the	  1905	  Constitutional	  Revolution,	  one	  frame	  of	  
individual	  sovereignty	  used	  to	  mobilize	  protesters	  was	  the	  concept	  of	  equality	  among	  Iranian	  
citizens	  (146).	  	  While	  this	  concept	  was	  ultimately	  codified	  in	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1906,	  it	  elicited	  
stringent	  criticism	  from	  clerical	  figures,	  most	  notably	  Fazlollah	  Nuri,	  who	  refuted	  the	  notion	  by	  
using	  resonant	  counter-­‐frames	  that	  reinforced	  the	  superiority	  of	  Muslim	  ideals.	  	  Nuri	  made	  
sweeping	  pronouncements	  against	  the	  constitutionalists	  in	  regards	  to	  this	  issue	  of	  equality	  
stating:	  	  
Oh!	  my	  religious	  brothers,	  now	  think	  attentively	  over	  the	  Islamic	  provisions	  and	  
see	  the	  differences	  they	  have	  established	  among	  subjects	  concerning	  the	  
persons	  obligated	  to	  observe	  the	  precepts	  of	  Islam	  …	  
	  Oh	  heretics!	  If	  this	  state	  law	  is	  in	  conformity	  with	  Islam,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  
include	  equality	  in	  it	  and	  if	  it	  is	  at	  variance	  with	  Islam,	  it	  would	  be	  against	  what	  is	  
written	  in	  the	  previous	  part	  [of	  the	  constitution]	  that	  is:	  whatever	  is	  against	  
Islam	  cannot	  be	  lawful.	  	  
[…]	  He	  [God]	  granted	  you	  privileges,	  but	  you	  deny	  them	  by	  saying	  that	  you	  must	  
be	  equal	  brothers	  with	  Zoroastrians,	  Armenians,	  and	  Jews:	  God’s	  curse	  upon	  
those	  who	  approve	  of	  this	  equality”	  (121).	  
	  
Nuri	  advanced	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  constitution	  under	  negotiation	  at	  the	  time	  was	  more	  of	  a	  
European	  concept	  than	  an	  Islamic	  one,	  and	  was	  therefore	  illegitimate.	  	  	  
	   As	  alluded	  to	  in	  Poulson’s	  definition	  of	  individual	  sovereignty	  quoted	  above,	  today	  the	  
concept	  is	  articulated	  by	  the	  leadership	  and	  in	  the	  present	  constitution	  drafted	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  
the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  in	  terms	  of	  defining	  the	  criteria	  individuals	  should	  possess	  in	  order	  to	  
obtain	  the	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  governance.	  	  Poulson	  explains,	  as	  a	  practical	  matter,	  individual	  
sovereignty	  and	  the	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  government	  are	  largely	  assessed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
religious	  piety,	  ethnicity,	  gender,	  age,	  etc.	  (15).	  	  These	  criteria	  amongst	  others	  are	  utilized	  by	  
the	  Guardian	  Council	  to	  vet	  candidates	  interested	  in	  running	  for	  competitive	  elections	  for	  all	  
the	  popularly	  elected	  components	  of	  the	  state	  including	  the	  parliament,	  the	  presidency,	  and	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the	  assembly	  of	  experts.	  	  Under	  the	  present	  constitution,	  citizens	  are	  no	  longer	  strictly	  equal	  in	  
terms	  of	  their	  access	  to	  influence	  the	  political	  affairs	  of	  the	  state	  and	  so	  in	  this	  regard	  individual	  
sovereignty	  varies	  in	  degree.	  	  While	  religious	  minorities	  in	  Iran	  have	  sovereign	  rights	  in	  relation	  
to	  voting,	  and	  can	  contest	  for	  most	  political	  offices,	  they	  are	  denied	  the	  right	  to	  run	  for	  the	  
office	  of	  the	  Presidency,	  and	  have	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  seats	  in	  Parliament	  for	  which	  they	  are	  
eligible	  to	  contest.	  	  	  
The	  contemporary	  opposition,	  both	  the	  22nd	  of	  Khordad	  movement	  and	  the	  Green	  
Movement	  which	  is	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  latter,	  have	  framed	  their	  objections	  to	  the	  political	  
status	  quo	  in	  terms	  that	  target	  the	  present	  system	  of	  guardianship	  which	  intercedes	  between	  
the	  people	  and	  the	  political	  affairs	  of	  the	  state,	  ostensibly	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  Islam.	  	  While	  it	  is	  
becoming	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  this	  system	  of	  guardianship	  does	  little	  more	  than	  safeguard	  
the	  interests	  of	  elite	  power	  brokers	  and	  their	  unfettered	  access	  to	  the	  spoils	  of	  the	  state,	  the	  
authority	  vested	  in	  the	  office	  of	  Supreme	  Leader	  couched	  in	  revolutionary	  Islamic	  discourse	  still	  
resonates	  with	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  Iranian	  populous.	  	  This	  is	  true	  in	  part	  thanks	  to	  the	  
strict	  limitations	  placed	  upon	  freedom	  of	  the	  press	  and	  the	  targeted	  character	  assassinations	  of	  
various	  dissident	  figures,	  a	  dynamic	  that	  hints	  once	  more	  at	  the	  relationship	  between	  political	  
opportunity	  structures	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  framing	  processes.	  	  
	   Resonance	  is	  the	  fourth	  and	  final	  major	  variable	  feature	  across	  which	  collective	  action	  
frames	  have	  been	  consistently	  seen	  to	  vary.	  	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  (2000)	  explain	  that	  the	  concept	  
of	  resonance	  is	  germane	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  or	  mobilizing	  potency	  of	  a	  framing	  
campaign.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  concept	  assists	  in	  attending	  to	  the	  question	  of	  why	  some	  frames	  
appear	  to	  be	  more	  effective	  or	  “resonant”	  than	  others	  (619).	  	  The	  authors	  suggest	  that	  two	  sets	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of	  interacting	  variables	  account	  for	  the	  variation	  in	  degree	  of	  frame	  resonance	  or	  success:	  
credibility	  of	  the	  proposed	  frame	  and	  its	  relative	  salience	  (619).	  	  	  
	   Frame	  credibility	  in	  turn	  is	  a	  function	  of	  three	  factors	  which	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  identify	  
as	  frame	  consistency,	  credibility,	  and	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  frame	  articulators.	  	  Frame	  
consistency	  is	  typically	  evaluated	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  congruency	  between	  the	  SMO’s	  articulated	  
beliefs,	  claims,	  and	  actions.	  	  Inconsistency	  itself	  may	  be	  seen	  to	  manifest	  in	  two	  major	  ways:	  in	  
terms	  of	  contradictions	  between	  beliefs	  and	  claims	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  discrepancies	  between	  a	  
movement’s	  frames	  and	  its	  tactical	  actions	  i.e.	  in	  contradiction	  between	  word	  and	  deed	  (620).	  
	   The	  empirical	  credibility	  of	  a	  frame,	  the	  second	  of	  three	  factors	  related	  to	  the	  credibility	  
of	  movement	  frames	  generally,	  refers	  to	  the	  apparent	  fit	  between	  the	  frame(s)	  and	  events	  in	  
the	  world.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  less	  important	  that	  an	  SMO’s	  diagnostic	  and	  prognostic	  claims	  are	  
actually	  factual,	  but	  that	  there	  exists	  empirical	  referents	  that	  lend	  themselves	  to	  being	  “read	  as	  
“real”	  indicators	  of	  the	  diagnostic	  claims”	  (620).	  	  The	  authors	  posit	  that	  hypothetically,	  the	  
more	  culturally	  believable	  the	  claimed	  evidence,	  and	  the	  greater	  number	  of	  such	  evidentiary	  
examples,	  the	  more	  credible	  the	  frame	  and	  the	  broader	  its	  appeal.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  authors	  
point	  out	  that	  it	  is	  not	  always	  essential	  that	  the	  frame	  and	  its	  claimed	  connection	  to	  reality	  has	  
to	  be	  generally	  believable,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  necessarily	  believable	  to	  some	  segment	  of	  prospective	  
or	  actual	  adherents	  (620).	  	  
	   The	  final	  factor	  impacting	  the	  credibility	  relates	  to	  the	  perceived	  credibility	  of	  the	  frame	  
articulators.	  	  Here	  hypothetically,	  the	  greater	  the	  status	  and	  perceived	  expertise	  of	  the	  frame	  
articulator	  or	  organization	  they	  represent	  amongst	  the	  pool	  of	  potential	  adherents	  and	  
constituents,	  the	  more	  plausible	  and	  resonant	  the	  frame(s)	  or	  claim(s)	  (621).	  Resonance,	  they	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elaborate	  is	  further	  assessed	  across	  three	  dimensions:	  centrality,	  experiential	  commensurability	  
and	  narrative	  fidelity.	  	  Centrality	  relates	  to	  how	  essential	  the	  beliefs,	  values,	  and	  ideas	  
associated	  with	  the	  movement	  frame	  are	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  targeted	  by	  the	  framing	  
campaign.	  	  Experiential	  commensurability	  is	  assessed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  whether	  the	  posited	  
frames	  are	  congruent	  or	  resonant	  with	  the	  personal	  everyday	  experiences	  of	  the	  targets	  of	  
mobilization.	  Lastly,	  narrative	  fidelity—or	  “cultural	  resonance,”	  the	  preferred	  term	  amongst	  
many	  movement-­‐framing	  researchers,	  is	  measured	  according	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  proffered	  
frames	  resonate	  with	  their	  targets	  cultural	  narrations.	  	  Hypothetically,	  the	  greater	  the	  cultural	  
resonance	  of	  a	  movement	  frame	  the	  greater	  its	  salience	  and	  potential	  capacity	  for	  mobilization	  
(621-­‐622).	  	  	  	  The	  importance	  of	  cultural	  resonance	  to	  the	  mobilizing	  capacity	  of	  a	  particular	  
framing	  campaign	  has	  been	  confirmed	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  studies	  across	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  social	  
movements	  and	  is	  certainly	  evident	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Iranian	  social	  movement’s	  documented	  by	  
Poulson	  (2006)	  and	  under	  investigation	  here.	  	  One	  goal	  of	  this	  work	  is	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  how	  
seriously	  constraining	  the	  prevailing	  culture	  is	  in	  the	  limits	  it	  places	  upon	  Iranian	  activists	  
seeking	  to	  innovate	  and	  advance	  particular	  movement	  frames	  related	  to	  popular	  sovereignty.	  	  	  	  
	   Having	  attended	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  variable	  features	  of	  collective	  action	  frames,	  it	  is	  
now	  necessary	  to	  examine	  the	  processes	  associated	  with	  the	  development,	  generation	  and	  
elaboration	  frames,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  they	  are	  diffused	  across	  movements,	  cultures,	  and	  time.	  	  
These	  processes	  by	  which	  frames	  are	  made	  can	  be	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  three	  sets	  of	  
overlapping	  dynamics;	  discursive,	  strategic,	  and	  contested,	  the	  latter	  being	  of	  primary	  focus	  of	  
the	  case	  driven	  component	  of	  this	  work.	  	  	  	  
	   39	  
	   Discursive	  processes,	  aptly	  named,	  refer	  to	  the	  conversations,	  written	  or	  verbalized	  in	  
the	  context	  of,	  or	  in	  relation	  to,	  movement	  activities.	  	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  (2000)	  argue	  that	  
collective	  action	  frames	  result	  from	  two	  basic	  interactive,	  discursive	  processes:	  frame	  
articulation	  and	  frame	  amplification	  or	  punctuation	  (623).	  	  Frame	  articulation	  involves	  the	  
weaving	  together	  of	  events	  and	  experiences	  in	  a	  coherent	  and	  compelling	  fashion.	  	  The	  authors	  
note	  that	  what	  makes	  the	  resultant	  collective	  action	  frame	  novel	  or	  successful	  is	  not	  so	  much	  
the	  originality	  or	  novelty	  of	  its	  ideational	  elements	  but	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  are	  “spliced	  
together	  and	  articulated,	  such	  that	  a	  new	  angle	  of	  vision,	  vantage	  point,	  and/or	  interpretation	  
is	  provided”	  (623).	  	  Frame	  amplification	  or	  punctuation	  involves	  the	  accenting	  or	  highlighting	  of	  
some	  issues,	  events,	  or	  beliefs	  as	  being	  more	  salient	  than	  others.	  	  The	  authors	  explain	  that	  such	  
punctuated	  or	  accented	  elements	  or	  slogans	  serve	  as	  conceptual	  handles	  or	  pegs	  for	  linking	  
together	  various	  events	  and	  issues.	  	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  offer	  such	  examples	  as:	  “Liberte,	  
Fraternite,	  Egalite,”	  “Power	  to	  the	  People,”	  “We	  shall	  Overcome,”	  and	  “Homeless,	  Not	  
Helpless”	  (623).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution,	  the	  slogan	  “Independence,	  Freedom,	  and	  
Islamic	  Republic”	  illustrates	  this	  function.	  	  	  	  	  
	   	  Strategic	  processes	  associated	  with	  framing	  activities	  relate	  to	  the	  efforts	  made	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  SMOs	  to	  link	  their	  interests	  and	  interpretive	  frames	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  particular	  end,	  
be	  it	  the	  attraction	  of	  prospective	  constituents	  or	  obtaining	  the	  assistance	  of	  actual	  or	  
prospective	  resource	  providers.	  	  These	  strategic	  processes	  were	  initially	  conceptualized	  by	  
scholars	  as	  “frame	  alignment	  processes”	  and	  may	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  four	  basic	  categories:	  
frame	  bridging,	  frame	  amplification,	  frame	  extension,	  and	  frame	  transformation	  (Benford	  and	  
Snow	  2000,	  624).	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Frame	  bridging	  refers	  to	  the	  linking	  of	  two	  or	  more	  ideologically	  congruent	  but	  
structurally	  unconnected	  frames	  regarding	  a	  particular	  issue	  or	  problem.	  	  Frame	  bridging	  may	  
serve	  to	  link	  the	  movement	  with	  individuals	  by	  tapping	  into	  an	  unmobilized	  sentiment	  pool,	  or	  
it	  can	  serve	  to	  bridge	  the	  divide	  between	  likeminded	  movements.	  	  Frame	  amplification	  was	  
already	  discussed	  to	  some	  extent	  as	  a	  facet	  of	  discursive	  processes,	  nevertheless	  it	  is	  also	  
recognized	  as	  a	  strategic/alignment	  process	  as	  it	  attends	  to	  the	  idealization,	  embellishment,	  
clarification,	  or	  invigoration	  of	  existing	  values	  or	  beliefs.	  	  Recalling	  the	  importance	  of	  cultural	  
resonance	  to	  the	  mobilizing	  potential	  of	  collective	  action	  frames,	  the	  utilitarian/strategic	  
benefits	  of	  frame	  amplification	  are	  clear.	  	  What	  is	  more,	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  
movements	  that	  have	  been	  stigmatized	  because	  their	  beliefs	  and/or	  values	  contradict	  the	  
dominant	  culture’s	  core	  values.	  	  The	  Green	  Movement	  is	  certainly	  accused	  of	  as	  much	  by	  
regime	  leaders	  who	  consistently	  refer	  to	  the	  Green	  Movement	  leadership	  and	  adherents	  as	  
“seditionists.”	  	  Needless	  to	  say	  I	  will	  elaborate	  upon	  this	  in	  subsequent	  chapters	  of	  this	  work	  
(Benford	  and	  Snow	  2000,	  624).	  	  	  
Frame	  extension	  involves	  depicting	  an	  SMOs	  interests	  and	  frame(s)	  as	  extending	  beyond	  
its	  primary	  interests	  so	  as	  to	  include	  issues	  and	  concerns	  presumed	  to	  be	  of	  interest	  or	  
importance	  to	  potential	  adherents.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  frame	  bridging	  and	  frame	  extension	  are	  rather	  
similar,	  where	  frame	  extension	  involves	  more	  explicitly	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  movement’s	  
purview	  so	  to	  speak.	  	  While	  empirical	  examinations	  of	  frame	  extension	  indicate	  that	  
movements	  often	  employ	  this	  alignment	  strategy,	  the	  tactic	  is	  subject	  to	  various	  hazards	  and	  
constraints.	  The	  authors	  cite	  several	  studies	  (McCallion	  and	  Maines	  [1999],	  Benford	  [1993]	  and	  
Babb	  [1996])	  that	  illustrate	  the	  problematic	  side	  of	  this	  alignment	  process.	  	  In	  particular	  Babb’s	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(1996)	  study	  of	  the	  US	  labor	  movement	  (1866-­‐1886)	  demonstrates	  that	  movement	  constituents	  
may	  sometimes	  engage	  in	  frame	  extension	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  
vision	  and	  intensions	  of	  movement	  leaders,	  contributing	  to	  movement	  instability.	  	  These	  
studies	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  movement	  framing	  activities	  are	  far	  from	  immune	  to	  
contest	  and	  at	  times	  evade	  the	  tight	  control	  of	  movement	  elites	  sometimes	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  
the	  movement	  in	  question	  (Benford	  and	  Snow	  2000,	  625).	  
	   Frame	  transformation,	  the	  last	  of	  the	  strategic	  alignment	  processes,	  is	  concerned	  with	  
changing	  old	  understandings	  and	  meanings	  and/or	  the	  generation	  of	  new	  ones.	  	  The	  authors	  
admit	  that	  few	  movement	  studies	  deal	  explicitly	  with	  this	  form	  of	  frame	  alignment.	  	  For	  my	  
purposes	  I	  am	  more	  interested	  in	  frame	  transformation	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  framing	  
contests	  between	  a	  movement	  and	  its	  target(s)	  of	  influence.	  While	  many	  social	  movements	  at	  
times	  struggle	  to	  demonstrate	  concrete	  achievements,	  some	  succeed	  in	  transforming	  the	  
prevailing	  movement	  frames	  of	  their	  adversaries	  or	  targets	  of	  influence.	  	  Attention	  to	  the	  way	  
in	  which	  the	  Green	  Movement	  has	  effectively	  transformed	  political	  establishment	  frames	  
regarding	  Ahmadinejad’s	  administration	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  exemplifies	  this	  strategic	  alignment	  
process	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  which	  chronicles	  the	  relevant	  political	  background	  
to	  the	  framing	  contest	  explored	  by	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  	  
This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  last	  of	  the	  three	  dominant	  framing	  processes	  emphasized	  by	  
Benford	  and	  Snow	  (2000),	  contested	  processes.	  	  	  	  This	  set	  of	  processes	  is	  most	  essential	  to	  this	  
work,	  as	  the	  incumbent	  variables	  discussed	  therein	  will	  constitute	  the	  primary	  foci	  employed	  in	  
the	  analytical	  work	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  According	  to	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  (2000),	  the	  three	  most	  
common	  challenges	  facing	  activists	  engaged	  in	  contested	  processes	  are:	  1)	  counterframing	  by	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movement	  opponents,	  bystanders	  and	  the	  media,	  2)	  frame	  disputes	  within	  movements,	  and	  3)	  
the	  dialectic	  between	  frames	  and	  events	  (625).	  	  It	  is	  my	  intention	  in	  this	  paper	  to	  outline	  the	  
collective	  action	  frames	  of	  Iranian	  regime	  and	  opposition	  leaders	  invoked	  in	  direct	  relation	  to	  
the	  ongoing	  protests	  in	  the	  region,	  illustrating	  the	  unique	  challenges	  facing	  each	  narrative	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  three	  aforementioned	  variables.	  	  	  
Counterframing	  was	  briefly	  mentioned	  as	  a	  component	  of	  prognostic	  framing	  processes	  
yet	  the	  concept	  deserves	  further	  elaboration	  here.	  	  The	  authors	  point	  out	  that	  the	  very	  
existence	  of	  a	  social	  movement	  indicates	  a	  degree	  of	  contention	  regarding	  the	  meaning	  of	  
some	  aspect	  of	  reality	  (Benford	  1993a;	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  2000,	  626).	  	  Recalling	  that	  collective	  
action	  frames	  largely	  serve	  as	  interpretive	  frameworks	  intended	  to	  mobilize	  potential	  
adherents	  and	  constituents,	  to	  garner	  bystander	  support,	  and	  to	  demobilize	  antagonists,	  it	  
stands	  to	  reason	  that	  the	  antagonists	  or	  those	  opposed	  to	  the	  changes	  advocated	  by	  the	  
movement	  will	  actively	  seek	  to	  repudiate	  the	  movement’s	  diagnostic	  and	  prognostic	  frames.	  	  
Such	  repudiations	  or	  challenges	  leveraged	  against	  a	  social	  movement’s	  collective	  action	  
frame(s)	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  counterframing.	  	  This	  includes	  attempts	  to	  “rebut,	  undermine,	  or	  
neutralize	  a	  person’s	  or	  group’s	  myths,	  versions	  of	  reality,	  or	  interpretive	  framework”	  (Benford	  
1987,	  75;	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  2000,	  626).	  	  Counterframing	  in	  turn	  often	  sparks	  reframing	  activity	  
by	  the	  movement	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  ward	  off	  potential	  damage	  to	  the	  movements	  previous	  
claims	  or	  attributes,	  sparking	  framing	  contests	  between	  the	  movement	  and	  its	  detractors	  (626).	  
Framing	  contests	  do	  not	  solely	  erupt	  between	  movements	  and	  their	  adversaries,	  but	  
may	  also	  occur	  internally.	  These	  intra-­‐movement	  disagreements	  are	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  
frame	  disputes.	  	  Such	  disputes	  typically	  center	  on	  disagreements	  pertaining	  to	  the	  movement’s	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diagnostic	  and	  prognostic	  framing;	  particularly	  as	  these	  framing	  processes	  relate	  to	  the	  
movement’s	  depiction	  of	  reality,	  both	  present	  and	  projected.	  	  	  More	  generally	  intra-­‐movement	  
disputes	  may	  manifest	  over	  frame	  resonance,	  sparking	  disagreements	  regarding	  “how	  reality	  
should	  be	  presented	  so	  as	  to	  maximize	  mobilization”	  (Benford	  1993,	  691	  qtd.	  In	  Benford	  and	  
Snow	  2000,	  626).	  	  	  
The	  third	  and	  final	  challenge	  accompanying	  contested	  framing	  processes	  concerns	  the	  
dialectic	  tension	  between	  collective	  action	  frames	  and	  collective	  action	  events.	  	  Benford	  and	  
Snow	  (2000)	  cite	  Ellingson’s	  	  (1995)	  study	  of	  public	  discourse	  and	  riots	  about	  abolitionism	  in	  
antebellum	  Cincinnati	  as	  illustrative	  of	  this	  dynamic	  (627).	  	  Ellingson	  found	  that	  competition	  
amongst	  speakers	  or	  movements	  serves	  to	  define	  and	  narrow	  understandings	  of	  the	  problem	  at	  
hand	  and	  the	  possibilities	  for	  collective	  action.	  	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  “episodes	  of	  
collective	  action	  may	  lead	  speakers	  to	  reopen	  the	  discursive	  struggle	  by	  providing	  evidence	  for	  
speakers	  and	  audiences	  who	  witnessed	  the	  event	  to	  assess	  the	  accuracy	  of	  competing	  
diagnoses,	  measure	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  solution,	  or	  articulate	  new	  arguments”	  (Ellingson	  1995,	  
135).	  	  The	  essential	  insight	  here,	  then,	  is	  that	  events	  stand	  to	  significantly	  alter	  the	  underlying	  
ideas	  or	  beliefs	  articulated	  by	  movement	  actors,	  affecting	  the	  salience	  of	  previously	  articulated	  
beliefs	  thereby	  altering	  the	  meaning	  of	  actors’	  interests—all	  of	  which	  he	  concludes,	  affects	  the	  
power	  of	  a	  particular	  discourse	  or	  frame.	  	  	  
Conveniently,	  the	  dialectic	  between	  frames	  and	  events	  reinforces	  the	  much-­‐discussed	  
relationship	  between	  political	  opportunity	  and	  framing	  processes.	  	  Just	  as	  collective	  action	  
events	  stand	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  process	  of	  creating	  frames	  or	  discourses,	  so	  too	  do	  broader	  
shifts	  in	  exogenous	  factors	  stand	  to	  enhance	  or	  constrain	  a	  movement’s	  prospects	  for	  success	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in	  mobilizing	  adherents,	  advancing	  particular	  claims,	  cultivating	  certain	  alliances,	  employing	  
particular	  political	  strategies	  and	  tactics,	  and	  affecting	  mainstream	  institutional	  politics	  and	  
policy	  (Ellingson	  1995,	  137	  and	  Meyer	  2004,	  126).	  	  These	  relationships,	  namely	  between	  
structures	  of	  political	  opportunity	  and	  movement	  framing	  processes,	  and	  the	  dialectic	  between	  
frames	  and	  events	  are	  particularly	  critical	  to	  the	  analytical	  work	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  In	  comparing	  the	  
contested	  framing	  of	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  (conceptualized	  as	  a	  political	  opportunity)	  on	  the	  part	  
of	  both	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  and	  the	  Green	  Movement,	  I	  hope	  to	  elucidate	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  
debate	  on	  the	  socio-­‐political	  reality	  in	  Iran	  and	  the	  concomitant	  implications	  for	  political	  
contestation	  therein.	  	  Having	  discussed	  the	  theoretical	  frameworks	  essential	  to	  accomplishing	  
this	  task,	  the	  chapter	  to	  follow	  will	  provide	  a	  brief	  political	  background	  that	  adequately	  
accounts	  for	  the	  overarching	  conflict	  between	  the	  Iranian	  establishment	  and	  its	  contemporary	  
opposition.	  This	  section	  will	  include	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  post	  election	  crisis	  events	  of	  June	  2009	  
that	  gave	  life	  to	  the	  Green	  Movement,	  addressing	  the	  goals	  and	  messages	  of	  the	  movement,	  
which	  will	  provide	  the	  requisite	  backdrop	  to	  the	  substantive	  analytical	  work	  of	  this	  thesis;	  
namely,	  comparing	  the	  collective	  action	  frames	  posited	  by	  regime	  and	  opposition	  leaders	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  wave	  of	  popular	  protests	  sweeping	  through	  the	  MENA	  region	  and	  the	  three	  
attending	  challenges	  facing	  actors	  embroiled	  in	  contested	  framing	  processes.	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CHAPTER	  2:	  POLITICAL	  BACKGROUND	  
As	  noted	  within	  a	  component	  of	  the	  preceding	  literature	  review,	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  is	  
characterized	  by	  a	  unique	  and	  contradictory	  political	  character	  that	  is	  predicated	  upon	  a	  
constitution	  that	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  upholds	  the	  notion	  of	  popular	  sovereignty	  while	  
simultaneously	  subordinating	  such	  provisions	  by	  institutionalizing	  the	  supremacy	  of	  clerical	  rule	  
through	  the	  concept	  of	  velayat-­‐e-­‐faqih.	  	  However,	  as	  the	  product	  of	  a	  popular	  revolutionary	  
movement,	  the	  regime	  is	  dependent	  upon	  maintaining	  a	  semblance	  of	  popular	  participation	  
through	  its	  electoral	  politics.	  	  As	  such	  the	  regime	  perceives	  high	  voter	  turnout	  for	  elections	  as	  a	  
confirmation	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic’s	  popular	  legitimacy	  and	  therefore	  strongly	  encourages	  
public	  participation,	  portraying	  voting	  as	  a	  national	  and	  patriotic	  duty	  (Lust-­‐Okar	  and	  Zerhouni,	  
61).	  	  	  Based	  upon	  analysis	  of	  previous	  campaigns	  for	  both	  president	  and	  parliamentary	  
elections,	  voter	  turnout	  has	  been	  positively	  correlated	  to	  the	  intensity	  of	  competition	  exhibited	  
amongst	  candidates	  (Lust-­‐Okar	  and	  Zerhouni,	  59).	  	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  briefly	  describe	  Ahmadinejad	  as	  both	  candidate	  and	  President	  
before	  turning	  to	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  2009	  presidential	  election	  contest	  and	  the	  social	  movement	  
and	  political	  violence	  that	  proceeded	  from	  it.	  	  Attention	  will	  paid	  to	  the	  disparate	  political	  
climates	  that	  characterized	  both	  the	  2005	  and	  2009	  presidential	  contests,	  particularly	  the	  
radically	  divergent	  responses	  to	  the	  allegations	  of	  electoral	  fraud	  that	  were	  levied	  following	  
both	  contests.	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Ahmadinejad	  as	  Candidate	  and	  President	  
The	  2005	  presidential	  elections	  that	  first	  brought	  Ahmadinejad	  to	  power	  took	  place	  on	  the	  
heels	  of	  significant	  setbacks	  for	  reformers/proponents	  of	  former	  President	  Mohammed	  
Khatami.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  legislative	  defeats	  faced	  by	  Khatami	  during	  his	  second	  term,	  the	  
parliamentary	  elections	  of	  2004	  saw	  the	  reformers	  lose	  their	  majority	  in	  Parliament,	  in	  large	  
part	  due	  to	  the	  extraordinary	  intervention	  of	  the	  guardian	  council	  in	  the	  electoral	  vetting	  
process.	  	  Largely	  frustrated	  by	  political	  rules	  that	  actively	  worked	  to	  disqualify	  viable	  reformist	  
candidates	  from	  national	  elections,	  liberal	  constituencies	  began	  calling	  for	  a	  boycott	  of	  the	  
2005	  presidential	  poll.	  	  It	  was	  this	  liberal	  boycott	  that	  is	  largely	  suspected	  to	  have	  paved	  the	  
way	  for	  Ahmadinejad’s	  first	  electoral	  victory	  as	  president	  in	  2005.	  	  	  
During	  an	  election	  in	  which	  the	  language	  of	  reform	  had	  become	  common	  currency	  –	  
“when	  even	  conservative	  former	  police	  chiefs	  were	  reinventing	  themselves	  as	  champions	  of	  
women's	  rights	  –	  Mr.	  Ahmadinejad	  was	  the	  only	  candidate	  to	  make	  no	  attempt	  to	  appeal	  to	  
reformist	  voters”	  (BBC,	  June	  22,	  2005).	  	  Instead,	  Ahmadinejad	  who	  was	  largely	  considered	  an	  
underdog	  in	  the	  presidential	  race	  promised	  to	  "chop	  the	  hands	  off"	  corrupt	  officials	  and	  be	  an	  
advocate	  for	  the	  country’s	  poor,	  promising	  to	  redistribute	  Iran’s	  oil	  wealth	  in	  a	  populist	  fashion	  
(BBC,	  June	  22,	  2005;	  August	  4,	  2010).	  	  His	  populist	  message	  and	  disregard	  for	  the	  reformist	  
agenda	  is	  largely	  reflective	  of	  his	  political	  ties	  to	  the	  hardline	  political	  party,	  Jamiyat-­‐i	  Isargaran-­‐
i	  Inqilab-­‐i	  Islami,	  roughly	  translated	  as	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  Devotees	  Society,	  of	  which	  he	  was	  
a	  founding	  member	  (Samii,	  9).	  	  While	  the	  term	  isar	  in	  Arabic	  translates	  as	  altruism,	  in	  the	  
Iranian	  context,	  the	  term	  isargari	  is	  used	  to	  invoke	  the	  notion	  of	  someone	  who	  gives	  selflessly	  
to	  a	  sacred	  cause	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  party,	  more	  specifically	  invokes	  the	  image	  of	  somebody	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who	  has	  sacrificed	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  (Samii,	  3).	  	  The	  Isargaran	  was	  
outspoken	  in	  its	  criticisms	  of	  President	  Khatami	  and	  his	  attempts	  to	  further	  empower	  the	  
executive	  office,	  a	  key	  component	  of	  his	  reformist	  agenda.	  	  In	  this	  regard	  the	  Isargaran	  
complained:	  	  
In	  circumstances	  in	  which	  society	  is	  being	  eroded	  by	  economic	  problems,	  and	  
hardships,	  unemployment,	  drug	  addiction,	  discrimination,	  and	  corruption	  on	  
various	  levels,	  which	  economic	  or	  social	  dilemma	  can	  possibly	  be	  resolved	  by	  
focusing	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  president	  should	  be	  given	  more	  
authority?	  (Samii,	  4)	  
	  
Such	  criticisms	  resound	  with	  Ahmadinejad’s	  ultimate	  electoral	  strategy,	  which	  played	  heavily	  to	  
populist	  issues	  and	  largely	  ignored	  reformist	  concerns.	  	  The	  party	  however	  was	  initially	  divided	  
over	  who	  to	  support	  in	  the	  2005	  presidential	  race,	  due	  to	  purported	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  
electability	  of	  Ahmadinejad	  versus	  former	  police	  chief	  Mohammad	  Qalibaf.	  	  While	  the	  Isargaran	  
officially	  endorsed	  Qalibaf	  in	  the	  first	  round,	  Ahmadinejad’s	  surprise	  success	  in	  the	  initial	  poll	  
garnered	  him	  the	  support	  of	  both	  the	  Isargaran	  and	  Abadgaran,	  a	  second	  leading	  hardline	  
political	  party,	  in	  the	  ensuing	  runoff	  election.	  
It	  came	  as	  a	  shock	  to	  most	  that	  Ahmadinejad	  beat	  out	  five	  other	  candidates	  in	  the	  first	  
round	  of	  elections	  in	  order	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  run-­‐off	  against	  former	  two	  term	  president	  and	  
pillar	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic,	  Akbar	  Hashemi	  Rafsanjani.	  	  While	  Rafsanjani	  is	  notoriously	  
vulnerable	  to	  criticisms	  of	  economic	  corruption	  and	  mismanagement,	  it	  came	  as	  no	  surprise	  
that	  the	  former	  President	  and	  longtime	  head	  of	  the	  Assembly	  of	  Experts	  and	  Expediency	  
Council	  placed	  first	  in	  the	  initial	  round	  of	  voting	  (BBC,	  June	  25,	  2009;	  March	  2,	  2011).	  	  	  During	  
the	  first	  round	  of	  voting	  that	  took	  place	  on	  June	  17,	  approximately	  63%	  of	  Iran’s	  47	  million	  
eligible	  voters	  went	  to	  the	  polls	  with	  Rafsanjani	  winning	  21%,	  Ahmadinejad	  19.5%,	  and	  Karroubi	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17.3%	  according	  to	  Iran’s	  Interior	  Ministry	  (BBC,	  June	  18,	  2005).	  	  	  As	  no	  candidate	  received	  over	  
50%	  of	  the	  vote,	  a	  runoff	  election	  ensued	  between	  the	  two	  frontrunners.	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  
note	  that	  this	  was	  the	  first	  time	  a	  runoff	  election	  was	  required	  to	  settle	  an	  Iranian	  presidential	  
race	  and	  may	  have	  resulted	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  decrease	  in	  voter	  participation	  by	  nearly	  20%	  of	  
all	  eligible	  voters	  compared	  to	  the	  2001	  presidential	  contest	  (BBC,	  June	  18,	  2005;	  CNN,	  June	  9,	  
2001).	  	  These	  initial	  results	  fell	  prey	  to	  criticisms	  of	  electoral	  fraud,	  with	  allegations	  leveled	  by	  
third	  place	  contender	  Mehdi	  Karroubi	  who	  went	  on	  the	  record	  stating:	  "There	  has	  been	  bizarre	  
interference	  …	  Money	  has	  changed	  hands"	  (BBC,	  June	  18,	  2005).	  	  He	  requested	  that	  Khamenei	  
appoint	  a	  committee	  to	  investigate	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  Guardian	  Council,	  the	  Interior	  Ministry,	  
the	  Revolutionary	  Guards	  and	  the	  Basij	  militia,	  a	  request	  that	  not	  only	  went	  unfulfilled	  but	  
garnered	  the	  ire	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Leader	  who	  took	  offense	  at	  the	  allegations.	  	  	  
In	  the	  second	  round,	  Presidential	  contender	  Rafsanjani	  also	  cautioned	  that	  a	  victory	  for	  
Ahmadinejad	  would	  signal	  voter	  fraud.	  	  In	  substantiation	  of	  these	  concerns,	  it	  was	  reported	  
that	  Interior	  ministry	  officials	  monitoring	  polling	  stations	  received	  some	  300	  complaints	  of	  
electoral	  violations	  in	  Tehran	  alone.	  	  Nevertheless,	  Ahmadinejad	  was	  sworn	  in	  as	  the	  sixth	  
president	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran	  without	  much	  controversy	  and	  certainly	  absent	  the	  
kind	  of	  public	  ire	  that	  followed	  the	  June	  2009	  presidential	  poll.	  	  This	  is	  likely	  a	  byproduct	  of	  the	  
significant	  dip	  in	  voter	  participation	  resulting	  from	  the	  boycott,	  itself	  an	  indication	  of	  public	  
skepticism	  about	  the	  electoral	  integrity	  of	  the	  poll	  and	  the	  rules	  governing	  the	  contest.	  	  That	  is	  
not	  to	  imply	  however	  that	  there	  was	  no	  disillusionment	  following	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  election	  
contest.	  	  One	  young	  Iranian	  interviewed	  by	  the	  BBC	  following	  the	  vote	  commented:	  "I	  think	  we	  
made	  a	  big	  mistake,	  Mostafa	  Moin	  [the	  unsuccessful	  reformist	  candidate]	  warned	  us	  that	  if	  we	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boycotted	  the	  election	  we'd	  be	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  a	  'dark	  age	  of	  totalitarian	  rule'.	  It	  looks	  like	  
he	  might	  have	  been	  right”	  (BBC,	  June	  22,	  2005).	  	  These	  kinds	  of	  concerns,	  echoed	  particularly	  
among	  the	  young	  and	  progressive,	  stemmed	  from	  observations	  regarding	  Ahmadinejad’s	  
tenure	  as	  Tehran	  Mayor,	  a	  position	  he	  was	  appointed	  to	  in	  2003.	  	  While	  presiding	  as	  mayor	  he	  
reduced	  social	  freedoms	  and	  curtailed	  many	  of	  the	  reforms	  introduced	  by	  more	  moderate	  
figures	  that	  ran	  the	  city	  before	  him	  (BBC,	  August	  4,	  2010).	  	  This	  led	  many	  to	  speculate	  regarding	  
future	  rules	  governing	  public	  spaces	  like	  sidewalks	  and	  universities,	  which	  many	  suspected	  
would	  be	  swiftly	  segregated	  (RFE,	  July	  13,	  2011).	  	  	  
Ahmadinejad’s	  first	  term	  was	  characterized	  by	  several	  half-­‐hearted	  attempts	  to	  roll	  back	  
social	  freedoms	  enjoyed	  under	  the	  Khatami	  administration;	  re-­‐instituting	  gender	  segregation	  in	  
some	  public	  academic	  institutions,	  re-­‐enforcing	  more	  strict	  adherence	  to	  the	  government’s	  
mandated	  dress	  codes,	  and	  attempting	  to	  check	  the	  pervasive	  influence	  of	  Western	  culture	  
through	  the	  abolishment	  of	  Western	  music	  and	  the	  confiscation	  of	  home	  satellite	  dishes	  (BBC,	  
December	  13,	  2005).	  	  It	  is	  unclear	  whether	  the	  majority	  of	  these	  policies	  were	  explicitly	  
endorsed	  and	  pursued	  by	  Ahmadinejad,	  or	  whether	  these	  policies	  reflect	  the	  extremism	  of	  the	  
officials	  that	  Ahmadinejad	  appointed	  to	  various	  national	  and	  provincial	  posts.	  	  What	  is	  clear	  is	  
that	  Ahmadinejad’s	  electoral	  victory	  created	  the	  opportunity	  for	  an	  attempt	  at	  returning	  to	  the	  
status	  quo	  ante	  that	  preceded	  the	  Khatami	  era.	  	  	  
While	  alienating	  those	  who	  had	  grown	  accustomed	  to	  the	  freedoms	  entailed	  upon	  them	  
by	  the	  Khatami	  administration,	  Ahmadinejad	  clearly	  made	  some	  inroads	  amongst	  the	  poor	  and	  
lower	  middle	  class	  by	  fulfilling	  his	  campaign	  promise	  to	  “put	  the	  fruits	  of	  oil	  wealth	  on	  the	  
ordinary	  person’s	  dinner	  table”	  (Ehsani,	  MERIP).	  	  This	  promise	  was	  realized	  by	  increasing	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pensions	  and	  government	  worker’s	  wages,	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  low-­‐interest	  loans	  to	  young	  
married	  couples	  and	  entrepreneurs,	  and	  by	  distributing	  so-­‐called	  justice	  shares	  of	  state	  firms	  
that	  sell	  stock	  to	  the	  public	  (NYTimes,	  June	  9,	  2009).	  	  Nevertheless,	  these	  policies	  have	  fallen	  
prey	  to	  numerous	  criticisms	  by	  economists	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  ill	  effects	  of	  this	  kind	  
of	  extraordinary	  injection	  of	  oil	  revenue	  into	  the	  economy.	  	  This	  kind	  of	  capital	  injection	  is	  
believed	  to	  have	  exacerbated	  pre-­‐existing	  and	  persistent	  problems	  with	  inflation	  and	  countered	  
any	  real	  benefit	  these	  redistributive	  policies	  may	  have	  brought	  to	  the	  poor.	  Additionally,	  the	  
dispensation	  of	  justice	  shares	  was	  also	  criticized	  by	  discerning	  economists,	  based	  upon	  
precedents	  that	  have	  accompanied	  similar	  economic	  experiments	  in	  former	  Soviet	  states.	  	  By	  
design,	  some	  5	  million	  recipients	  in	  the	  lowest	  income	  bracket	  were	  organized	  in	  337	  
cooperatives	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  roughly	  $3	  billion	  worth	  of	  shares	  of	  state	  companies.	  	  
However	  as	  the	  Russian	  experience	  has	  shown,	  low-­‐income	  people	  are	  often	  all	  too	  willing	  to	  
sell	  their	  small	  shares	  to	  individuals	  or	  companies	  looking	  to	  make	  a	  fortune	  in	  a	  piecemeal	  
fashion	  	  (Ehsani,	  MERIP).	  	  	  
By	  the	  June	  2009	  presidential	  elections,	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Iranian	  economy	  had	  become	  a	  
major	  campaign	  issue,	  with	  each	  of	  Ahmadinejad’s	  three	  contenders	  countering	  the	  President’s	  
narrative	  regarding	  Iran’s	  economic	  prosperity	  under	  his	  tenure.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  a	  rise	  in	  
inflation	  over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  4-­‐year	  stint	  in	  office,	  unemployment	  also	  steadily	  rose	  over	  that	  
same	  period	  from	  10.5%	  in	  2005	  to	  17%	  in	  2009	  (NYTimes,	  June	  9,	  2009).	  	  With	  society	  
increasingly	  divided	  between	  those	  that	  felt	  they	  had	  benefited	  from	  Ahmadinejad’s	  
redistributive	  policies	  and	  those	  that	  complained	  about	  rising	  inflation,	  the	  deteriorating	  
human	  rights	  situation,	  the	  contraction	  of	  liberties,	  increasing	  pressure	  on	  civil	  society	  activism,	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and	  Iran’s	  increasing	  isolation	  in	  the	  international	  arena,	  the	  stage	  was	  set	  for	  the	  fiercely	  
contested	  2009	  presidential	  election	  (Tezcur,	  18-­‐19).	  
The	  2009	  Presidential	  Election	  
Contributing	  to	  the	  heightened	  competition	  that	  preceded	  the	  2009	  presidential	  election	  was	  
the	  unprecedented	  move	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  state	  to	  sanction	  and	  broadcast	  nationally	  televised	  
debates	  between	  each	  of	  the	  four	  presidential	  candidates.	  	  Running	  against	  the	  presidential	  
incumbent	  were	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  Mir	  Hossein	  Mousavi,	  former	  Speaker	  of	  the	  Parliament	  
Mehdi	  Karroubi,	  and	  former	  head	  of	  the	  Revolutionary	  Guards	  Mohsen	  Rezai.	  	  With	  their	  
former	  titles	  to	  commend	  them,	  all	  three	  candidates	  running	  against	  Ahmadinejad	  are	  well	  
known	  figures	  in	  the	  Iranian	  political	  establishment,	  with	  Karroubi	  a	  former	  rival	  for	  the	  
Presidency	  in	  2005	  placing	  third	  in	  the	  first	  round	  of	  elections	  after	  Ahmadinejad	  and	  former	  
president	  Ayatollah	  Hashemi	  Rafsanjani.	  	  The	  Supreme	  Leader	  is	  also	  known	  to	  have	  had	  
contentious	  relations	  with	  all	  three	  of	  Ahmadinejad’s	  running	  mates.	  	  When	  he	  was	  president	  in	  
the	  1980s	  Khamenei	  frequently	  clashed	  with	  Mousavi	  and	  Rezai,	  when	  Mousavi	  was	  prime	  
minister	  and	  Rezai	  the	  head	  of	  Iran’s	  Revolutionary	  Guards.	  He	  also	  issued	  a	  strong	  public	  
rebuke	  of	  Karroubi	  in	  2005,	  after	  the	  latter’s	  allegations	  of	  electoral	  misconduct	  (Sadjadpour,	  
Carnegie	  Endowment,	  June	  2009).	  	  While	  each	  a	  prominent	  figure	  within	  their	  own	  right,	  
Mousavi	  was	  identified	  early	  on	  as	  the	  leading	  contender	  capable	  of	  unseating	  the	  President	  in	  
the	  summer’s	  electoral	  contest	  thanks	  in	  part	  to	  former	  President	  Khatami	  having	  thrown	  his	  
weight	  behind	  him.	  	  	  
He	  was	  also	  the	  candidate	  with	  the	  most	  contentious	  historical	  relationship	  to	  Ayatollah	  
Khamenei.	  	  	  	  During	  their	  shared	  executive	  tenure	  from	  1981-­‐1989	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  and	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President,	  Mousavi	  and	  Khamenei	  were	  renowned	  for	  their	  frequent	  clashes	  concerning	  
economic	  management,	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  Iraq	  war,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Iran	  should	  open	  
up	  to	  western	  companies	  when	  postwar	  reconstruction	  began	  (Tisdell,	  The	  Guardian,	  2009).	  	  
Ironically,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  these	  debates	  Mousavi	  was	  the	  more	  isolationist	  of	  the	  two	  
men.	  	  Yet	  putting	  the	  particularities	  of	  their	  disagreements	  aside	  and	  focusing	  on	  the	  discordant	  
relationship	  between	  the	  two	  leaders,	  one	  may	  hardly	  imagine	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  the	  Supreme	  
Leader	  would	  look	  forward	  to	  renewing	  a	  professional	  relationship	  with	  his	  former	  adversary	  
whose	  political	  career	  he	  abruptly	  ended	  by	  abolishing	  the	  position	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  back	  in	  
’89.	  	  Mousavi	  had	  since	  avoided	  politics,	  refusing	  to	  run	  for	  office	  in	  either	  the	  1997	  or	  2005	  
presidential	  elections.	  	  	  
Mousavi’s	  decision	  to	  run	  in	  2009	  was	  primarily	  motivated	  by	  his	  discontent	  with	  the	  
Ahmadinejad	  government,	  which	  he	  accused	  of	  having	  abandoned	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  Islamic	  
Revolution	  and	  of	  governing	  with	  dictatorial	  methods	  (Tezcur,	  14).	  	  When	  asked	  about	  the	  
likelihood	  of	  older	  tensions	  between	  the	  Supreme	  Leader	  and	  himself	  precipitating	  newer	  ones	  
should	  he	  win	  the	  presidency,	  Mousavi	  simply	  stated,	  “the	  problems	  we	  had	  then	  were	  based	  
in	  the	  constitution.	  But	  now,	  of	  course,	  these	  responsibilities	  are	  much	  more	  clearly	  spelled	  out	  
in	  the	  constitution,	  and	  there	  is	  much	  more	  room	  for	  harmony”	  (Klein	  and	  Siamdoust,	  Time,	  
2009).	  	  Lacking	  a	  direct	  quote	  from	  the	  leader	  himself	  for	  which	  to	  compare	  with	  Mousavi’s,	  it	  is	  
difficult	  to	  discern	  whether	  Khamenei	  perceived	  such	  space	  for	  harmony	  in	  a	  renewed	  political	  
and	  professional	  relationship.	  	  However	  looking	  to	  the	  leader’s	  statements	  in	  which	  he	  advised	  
the	  people	  concerning	  how	  best	  to	  cast	  their	  vote,	  he	  certainly	  seemed	  to	  invoke	  the	  popular	  
conception	  of	  one	  candidate	  in	  particular,	  imploring	  people	  to	  look	  to	  and	  vote	  for	  “those	  who	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live	  a	  simple	  and	  modest	  life,	  who	  are	  acquainted	  with	  the	  problems	  and	  sufferings	  of	  other	  
people	  and	  who	  have	  avoided	  extravagance”	  (Sadjadpour,	  Carnegie	  Endowment,	  2009).	  	  This	  is	  
the	  very	  image	  that	  Ahmadinejad	  has	  worked	  so	  hard	  to	  cultivate	  for	  himself,	  implying	  the	  
leader’s	  implicit	  preference.	  	  	  
While	  mention	  of	  the	  leader’s	  rebuke	  of	  Karroubi	  for	  his	  cries	  of	  electoral	  foul	  play	  back	  
in	  2005	  serve	  to	  illustrate	  that	  concerns	  surrounding	  the	  free	  and	  fair	  nature	  of	  Iranian	  
elections	  were	  not	  unprecedented,	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  all	  three	  candidates	  united	  in	  their	  
expressed	  concern	  and	  allegations	  of	  fraud	  following	  the	  summer’s	  election	  proved	  more	  
challenging	  than	  ever	  for	  the	  regime	  to	  simply	  sweep	  under	  the	  proverbial	  rug.	  	  The	  official	  
breakdown	  of	  the	  vote	  between	  candidates	  was	  reported	  as	  63.3%	  for	  Ahmadinejad,	  34.15%	  
for	  Mousavi,	  1.7%	  for	  Rezai,	  and	  0.85%	  for	  Karroubi.	  	  The	  overwhelming	  turnout	  for	  the	  
president	  was	  certainly	  surprising,	  however	  the	  rate	  of	  turnout	  for	  Ahmadinejad	  was	  
particularly	  suspicious	  in	  certain	  provinces	  in	  particular,	  especially	  in	  Mousavi’s	  hometown	  as	  
well	  as	  in	  over	  50	  provinces	  where	  there	  have	  been	  acknowledged	  reports	  of	  voter	  turnout	  
exceeding	  registered	  voters.	  	  In	  Mousavi’s	  home	  province	  of	  East	  Azerbaijan,	  the	  official	  results	  
give	  Ahmadinejad	  a	  clear	  majority	  of	  57%.	  	  Mousavi,	  a	  native	  Azeri	  of	  Turkish	  decent	  received	  
42%.	  	  This	  is	  a	  remarkable	  turnaround	  for	  the	  leader	  who	  only	  received	  10%	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  this	  
province	  back	  in	  2005,	  with	  the	  majority	  going	  to	  reformist	  candidates	  (Rogers,	  The	  Guardian,	  
2009).	  
The	  Guardian	  produced	  an	  illustrative	  graphic	  contrasting	  turn	  out	  for	  Ahmadinejad	  
from	  2009	  to	  2005	  as	  well	  as	  the	  combined	  conservative	  vote	  for	  the	  same	  year.	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Graphic	  1.	  Chart	  of	  Iran’s	  Presidential	  Election	  Turnout,	  2005,	  2009	  
	  
Data:	  The	  Guardian	  (Rogers,	  The	  Guardian,	  2009)	  
This	  visual	  aid	  helps	  to	  superficially	  put	  people’s	  deep	  concerns	  surrounding	  the	  authenticity	  of	  
the	  vote	  into	  perspective.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  voter	  turnout	  for	  Ahmadinejad	  essentially	  exceeded	  
the	  2005	  combined	  conservative	  vote	  in	  every	  province	  is	  particularly	  surprising	  given	  the	  lack	  
of	  progress	  he	  has	  made	  in	  redressing	  Iran’s	  economic	  woes	  which	  were	  a	  major	  component	  of	  
his	  campaign	  back	  in	  2005.	  	  His	  promises	  to	  combat	  economic	  corruption	  and	  redistribute	  some	  
of	  the	  wealth	  accumulated	  by	  Iran’s	  lucrative	  oil	  industry	  directly	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  people	  
failed	  to	  amount	  to	  substantial	  gains	  in	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  or	  quality	  of	  life	  for	  the	  significant	  
percentage	  of	  the	  population	  residing	  in	  poverty.	  	  Iran’s	  economic	  woes	  especially	  regarding	  its	  
historic	  problems	  with	  inflation	  have	  continued	  to	  plague	  the	  country	  under	  the	  President’s	  
first	  term	  in	  office,	  with	  some	  of	  the	  president’s	  critics	  arguing	  that	  his	  redistributive	  politics	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have	  only	  served	  to	  exacerbate	  the	  country’s	  inflation	  rate.	  Unemployment	  has	  also	  remained	  
high	  as	  Iran	  continues	  to	  struggle	  to	  integrate	  the	  800,000	  young	  people	  who	  enter	  the	  Iranian	  
job	  market	  every	  year	  (Abootalebi,	  5).	  	  Having	  failed	  to	  live	  up	  to	  his	  promises	  of	  meaningful	  
economic	  reform,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  President	  would	  have	  so	  significantly	  gained	  
in	  popularity.	  	  	  
	   However,	  people’s	  deepest	  concerns	  surrounding	  the	  elections	  have	  stemmed	  from	  the	  
establishment’s	  response	  to	  allegations	  of	  fraud.	  	  Following	  over	  a	  week	  of	  social	  and	  political	  
unrest,	  the	  Guardian	  Council	  announced	  that	  it	  was	  ready	  to	  recount	  a	  random	  sample	  of	  10%	  
of	  the	  ballots	  cast	  although	  it	  was	  not	  legally	  obliged	  to.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  their	  inquiry	  the	  Council	  
confirmed	  that	  by	  their	  estimation,	  50	  cities	  experienced	  more	  than	  100%	  of	  eligible	  votes	  cast	  
despite	  allegations	  from	  the	  opposition	  that	  the	  number	  of	  cities	  to	  have	  experienced	  such	  
irregularities	  was	  actually	  170.	  	  The	  Council	  also	  estimated	  that	  3	  million	  extra	  votes	  might	  have	  
been	  counted,	  however	  this	  number	  would	  fail	  to	  change	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  favor	  of	  
another	  candidate	  (Abootalebi,	  9).	  	  	  
Failing	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  these	  irregularities	  may	  be	  more	  pronounced	  should	  a	  more	  
comprehensive	  recount	  and	  investigation	  be	  undertaken,	  the	  Council	  had	  the	  audacity	  to	  
declare	  the	  Republic’s	  tenth	  presidential	  elections	  the	  healthiest	  since	  the	  1979	  Islamic	  
Revolution	  (Black,	  The	  Guardian,	  2009).	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  investigation,	  
the	  true	  extent	  of	  corruption	  will	  remain	  in	  question	  and	  observers	  are	  left	  to	  interpret	  the	  
regime’s	  reticence	  in	  this	  regard	  as	  an	  implication	  of	  complicity	  in	  suspected	  misconduct.	  	  
According	  to	  officials’	  own	  admissions,	  while	  only	  46.2	  million	  citizens	  were	  eligible	  and	  
registered	  to	  vote,	  57	  million	  ballots	  were	  published	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  precincts	  had	  a	  
	   56	  
sufficient	  number	  at	  their	  disposal	  (Abootalebi,	  9).	  	  	  	  In	  his	  address	  to	  the	  public	  at	  the	  ritual	  
Friday	  prayer	  on	  June	  19th,	  2009	  the	  Supreme	  Leader	  stated:	  "[The]	  Islamic	  establishment	  
would	  never	  manipulate	  votes	  and	  commit	  treason.	  The	  legal	  structure	  in	  this	  country	  does	  not	  
allow	  vote-­‐rigging,"	  while	  going	  on	  to	  point	  out	  that	  "there	  is	  a	  difference	  of	  11	  million	  votes.	  
How	  can	  vote-­‐rigging	  happen?"	  (Badiozamani,	  CNN,	  2009).	  	  As	  Khamenei	  pointed	  out,	  the	  gap	  
between	  the	  number	  of	  votes	  cast	  for	  Ahmadinejad	  and	  Mousavi	  amounted	  to	  approximately	  
11	  million,	  which	  by	  all	  accounts	  is	  a	  substantial	  difference.	  	  Yet	  while	  this	  difference	  is	  
substantial,	  it	  is	  also	  potentially	  incriminating	  when	  one	  recalls	  that	  the	  regime	  issued	  
approximately	  11	  million	  extra	  ballots	  to	  precincts	  across	  the	  country	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  
each	  polling	  station	  might	  adequately	  accommodate	  everyone	  who	  turned	  out	  to	  vote.	  	  In	  
aggressively	  defending	  its	  position	  upon	  the	  matter,	  the	  regime	  transformed	  the	  largest	  round	  
of	  protests	  to	  rock	  the	  country	  since	  the	  heyday	  of	  the	  revolution	  from	  those	  concerned	  with	  
electoral	  misconduct	  into	  a	  movement	  dedicated	  to	  the	  realization	  of	  more	  sweeping	  and	  
ambitious	  goals	  related	  to	  extensive	  political	  reform.	  
The	  Election	  Aftermath	  and	  the	  Green	  Movement	  
Protests	  following	  the	  contested	  vote	  began	  with	  a	  massive	  demonstration	  on	  June	  15,	  2009	  in	  
Tehran.	  	  According	  to	  Tehran	  Mayor,	  Mohammad	  Qalibaf,	  over	  three	  million	  people	  were	  
demonstrating	  in	  the	  streets	  that	  day	  (Hashemi	  and	  Postal,	  289).	  	  Demonstrations	  also	  took	  
place	  in	  other	  major	  cities	  such	  as	  Shiraz	  and	  Isfahan	  as	  documented	  on	  YouTube	  and	  other	  
social	  networking	  sites.	  	  	  The	  protests	  strengthened	  the	  Green	  Movement	  that	  initially	  
coalesced	  in	  support	  of	  the	  presidential	  campaign	  of	  Mir	  Hossein	  Mousavi.	  	  These	  protests	  
continued	  sporadically	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  following	  year.	  	  There	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  heavy	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street	  presence	  of	  both	  demonstrators	  and	  security	  forces	  throughout	  the	  month	  of	  June	  and	  
July.	  	  Initially	  the	  most	  common	  slogans	  addressed	  protesters	  incredulity	  concerning	  the	  
election	  results,	  most	  commonly	  encapsulated	  by	  the	  slogan:	  “Where’s	  my	  vote?!”	  	  As	  the	  state	  
responded	  to	  the	  opposition	  with	  force,	  protestors	  shouted:	  “Do	  not	  be	  afraid,	  do	  not	  fear,	  we	  
are	  together!”	  In	  the	  face	  of	  Khamenei	  and	  the	  Guardian	  Council’s	  refusals	  to	  thoroughly	  
investigate	  allegations	  of	  fraud	  let	  alone	  call	  for	  new	  elections,	  protestors	  slogans	  began	  to	  
decry	  the	  leadership	  as	  despotic,	  shouting	  “Down	  with	  the	  Dictator!”	  These	  protests	  by	  day	  
were	  accompanied	  by	  roof	  top	  calls	  of	  “Allah-­‐u-­‐Akbar”	  by	  night.	  	  This	  practice	  was	  a	  mainstay	  of	  
revolutionary	  tactics	  used	  to	  communicate	  support	  for	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  in	  1979.	  	  Facing	  
increasing	  arrests	  and	  strategic	  acts	  of	  violence	  against	  protesters,	  the	  opposition	  was	  forced	  to	  
become	  more	  creative	  in	  their	  strategic	  appropriation	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  revolutionary	  tactics.	  	  	  	  	  
With	  the	  leadership	  refusing	  to	  issue	  permits	  to	  protest	  organizers,	  the	  opposition	  
necessarily	  appropriated	  many	  of	  the	  state	  sanctioned	  holidays	  that	  the	  Iranian	  government	  
often	  uses	  to	  protest	  historic	  injustices	  or	  to	  celebrate	  significant	  victories	  in	  the	  revolutionary	  
struggle	  to	  supplant	  the	  Pahlavi	  monarchy.	  	  These	  dates	  included	  but	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  various	  
Friday	  Prayer	  meetings,	  the	  state	  commemoration	  of	  Jerusalem	  Day	  (founded	  by	  Khomeini	  to	  
demonstrate	  Iranian	  solidarity	  with	  the	  occupied	  Palestinian	  people),	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  
seizure	  of	  the	  American	  Embassy,	  Student	  Day	  (which	  commemorates	  the	  state	  inflicted	  killing	  
of	  3	  students	  in	  1953	  who	  were	  participating	  in	  anti-­‐American	  demonstrations),	  Ashura	  (the	  
day	  commemorating	  the	  martyrdom	  of	  Imam	  Hussein	  and	  his	  entourage	  by	  his	  Sunni	  rival	  
Yazid),	  and	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic.	  	  Many	  hoped	  that	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  
anniversary	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic,	  commemorated	  on	  February	  11,	  2010	  would	  be	  a	  day	  of	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reckoning	  for	  the	  regime,	  bringing	  the	  opposition	  back	  out	  into	  the	  streets	  in	  full	  force.	  	  
However,	  in	  spite	  of	  significant	  networking	  online,	  that	  included	  the	  publication	  of	  protest	  
routes,	  and	  the	  production	  of	  movie-­‐style	  trailers	  advertising	  the	  upcoming	  protests,	  the	  day	  
was	  instead	  marked	  by	  a	  national	  rally	  led	  by	  President	  Ahmadinejad	  featuring	  a	  crowd	  of	  
hundreds	  of	  thousands	  and,	  alternatively,	  sporadic	  demonstrations	  of	  an	  unknown	  quantity	  of	  
activists	  who	  were	  prevented	  from	  coming	  together	  by	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  security	  forces	  out	  
in	  the	  streets	  (Talt,	  The	  Guardian,	  February	  11,	  2010).	  	  	  
While	  there	  have	  been	  very	  few	  street	  demonstrations	  following	  the	  thwarted	  
mobilization	  that	  took	  place	  on	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  in	  February	  2010,	  the	  
Green	  Movement	  has	  survived	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  regime’s	  best	  efforts	  to	  bury	  it.	  	  The	  movement	  
was	  particularly	  beset	  by	  the	  challenge	  of	  defining	  itself,	  having	  initially	  supported	  the	  
candidacy	  of	  Mir	  Hossein	  Mousavi	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  system	  that	  adherents	  had	  yet	  to	  lose	  
faith	  in,	  and	  then	  galvanized	  by	  the	  support	  of	  fellow	  electoral	  candidates	  and	  their	  
constituencies,	  who	  united	  in	  their	  concerns	  surrounding	  the	  authenticity	  of	  the	  vote.	  	  Beyond	  
challenging	  the	  regime	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  election	  fraud,	  the	  movement	  needed	  to	  formulate	  a	  
set	  of	  demands	  capable	  of	  sustaining	  the	  support	  of	  its	  social	  base	  especially	  after	  the	  
leadership	  made	  clear	  that	  there	  was	  to	  be	  no	  comprehensive	  recount	  or	  new	  elections.	  	  To	  this	  
end	  Mousavi	  issued	  a	  series	  of	  public	  statements	  in	  the	  service	  of	  this	  cause.	  	  His	  seventeenth	  
statement,	  issued	  on	  January	  1,	  2010,	  not	  only	  took	  stock	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  violent	  
persecution	  of	  proponents	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement	  during	  the	  Ashura	  processionals	  in	  Tehran	  
on	  December	  27,	  but	  also	  offered	  five	  points	  towards	  reconciliation	  and	  redressing	  the	  
demands	  of	  the	  opposition.	  	  These	  five	  points	  included:	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1) The	  government	  should	  ensure	  that	  it	  is	  directly	  accountable	  to	  the	  
nation,	  the	  parliament	  and	  the	  judiciary	  branch	  […]	  The	  government	  must	  
be	  held	  directly	  responsible	  for	  the	  trouble	  it	  has	  caused.	  Rest	  assured,	  if	  
it	  is	  competent	  and	  just,	  it	  should	  be	  able	  to	  answers	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  
the	  people	  and	  the	  parliament.	  If	  it	  is	  dishonest	  and	  incompetent,	  the	  
parliament	  and	  the	  judiciary	  branch	  should	  react	  within	  their	  
constitutional	  powers.	  
2) Propose	  transparent	  and	  credible	  regulation	  of	  the	  election	  process	  to	  
guarantee	  that	  the	  nation	  has	  free	  and	  fair	  elections,	  without	  trickery	  and	  
interference.	  This	  regulation	  must	  ensure	  people’s	  participation	  in	  
elections	  despite	  their	  differences	  of	  opinion	  or	  affiliations	  [abridged].	  
3) Free	  and	  exonerate	  all	  political	  prisoners.	  I	  am	  confident	  that	  this	  act	  will	  
not	  be	  read	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  weakness,	  but	  will	  in	  fact	  demonstrate	  the	  
visionary	  nature	  of	  the	  establishment	  [abridged].	  
4) Among	  the	  essential	  elements	  that	  can	  contribute	  to	  a	  solution	  are	  
freedom	  of	  the	  press	  and	  media,	  along	  with	  the	  releases	  of	  confiscated	  
newspaper	  licenses	  [abridged].	  
5) Abiding	  by	  article	  27	  of	  the	  constitution	  to	  recognize	  the	  people’s	  right	  to	  
form	  legal	  congregations	  and	  to	  establish	  political	  groups	  and	  parties	  
[abridged]	  (Hashemi	  and	  Postal)	  
	  
In	  conclusion,	  Mousavi	  welcomed	  suggestions	  to	  his	  proposal	  and	  emphasized	  that	  the	  
opposition	  would	  recognize	  gradual	  good	  faith	  efforts	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  regime	  in	  the	  
furtherance	  of	  these	  goals.	  	  Accompanying	  these	  five	  recommendations	  was	  an	  
acknowledgment	  of	  the	  increasing	  radicalization	  of	  protest	  slogans	  that	  accompanied	  the	  rise	  in	  
casualties	  amongst	  demonstrators	  on	  and	  before	  December	  27,	  2009,	  however	  Mousavi	  took	  
pains	  to	  emphasize	  that	  this	  was	  the	  natural	  end	  result	  of	  the	  regime’s	  brutality.	  	  This	  
acknowledgment	  informed	  the	  urgency	  of	  his	  words	  regarding	  the	  promotion	  of	  national	  
reconciliation	  brokered	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  five	  points.	  	  Contrary	  to	  the	  
accusations	  of	  regime	  hardliners,	  it	  was	  never	  the	  articulated	  desire	  of	  Mousavi,	  Karroubi,	  
Khatami,	  nor	  other	  prominent	  figures	  of	  the	  opposition	  to	  stoke	  revolution	  or	  strive	  for	  regime	  
change.	  	  Mousavi	  reiterated	  the	  commitment	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement	  to	  upholding	  Iran’s	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Islamic	  and	  national	  identity,	  its	  opposition	  to	  foreign	  rule	  and	  commitment	  to	  the	  constitution	  
(Khordad	  88).	  	  	  
	   On	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  election	  crisis,	  on	  June	  12,	  2010,	  Mousavi	  issued	  a	  
charter	  for	  the	  Green	  Movement.	  	  The	  document	  largely	  elaborated	  on	  the	  aforementioned	  
five	  points	  while	  enumerating	  the	  movement’s	  roots	  and	  goals,	  fundamental	  strategies,	  
endeavoring	  to	  describe	  the	  collective	  identity	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement,	  it’s	  values,	  and	  
commitment	  to	  both	  peaceful	  and	  legal	  means	  of	  achieving	  the	  movement’s	  objectives.	  	  Again	  
Mousavi	  took	  pains	  to	  emphasize	  the	  movement’s	  commitment	  to	  working	  within	  the	  
constitutional	  framework,	  calling	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  all	  articles	  of	  the	  constitution,	  
particularly	  chapter	  three,	  which	  makes	  repeated	  reference	  to	  the	  sovereign	  rights	  of	  the	  
people	  (Hashemi	  and	  Postal,	  335).	  	  In	  announcing	  the	  forthcoming	  release	  of	  the	  Green	  
Movement	  Charter,	  Mousavi	  declared:	  “Our	  constitution	  holds	  potentials	  that,	  if	  executed,	  can	  
satisfy	  even	  those	  inclined	  toward	  structural	  change”	  (Mahtafar,	  Tehran	  Bureau).	  This	  comment	  
reflects	  Mousavi’s	  subtle	  attempt	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  adherents	  radicalized	  by	  the	  regime’s	  violent	  
persecution	  of	  movement	  activists,	  particularly	  those	  seeking	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  regime’s	  
theocratic	  origins.	  	  Such	  an	  overture,	  while	  subtle,	  was	  essentially	  unprecedented	  at	  the	  time	  
particularly	  because	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  campaign	  launched	  by	  regime	  hardliners	  branding	  
movement	  activists	  as	  seditionists	  both	  in	  the	  show	  trials	  that	  followed	  the	  mass	  arrests	  of	  
Green	  Movement	  activists	  and	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  public	  statements	  made	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Leader	  
and	  his	  cadre.	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The	  Decline	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement?	  
The	  publication	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement	  Charter	  did	  little	  to	  rejuvenate	  the	  movement.	  	  While	  
issued	  in	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  election	  protests,	  and	  accompanied	  by	  a	  call	  
from	  Mousavi	  and	  Karroubi	  for	  peaceful	  demonstrations	  to	  commemorate	  the	  occasion,	  the	  
opposition	  remained	  largely	  out	  of	  sight	  on	  June	  12,	  2010.	  	  Sporadic	  demonstrations	  were	  
reported	  to	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  corners	  of	  Tehran	  and	  other	  major	  cities,	  however	  notably	  
absent	  were	  the	  millions	  of	  people	  who	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  only	  one	  year	  earlier	  in	  protest	  over	  
the	  purported	  victory	  of	  Ahmadinejad	  in	  the	  presidential	  poll.	  	  Several	  factors	  account	  for	  the	  
minimal	  mobilization	  of	  “Greens”	  on	  this	  day	  not	  the	  least	  of	  which	  include	  state	  issued	  threats	  
disseminated	  via	  text	  message	  across	  national	  cell	  phone	  networks	  warning:	  "In	  case	  of	  any	  
illegal	  action	  and	  contact	  with	  the	  foreign	  media,	  you	  will	  be	  charged	  as	  a	  criminal"	  (BBC,	  June	  
10,	  2010).	  	  	  
Commenting	  on	  the	  occasion,	  the	  mother	  of	  a	  jailed	  female	  student	  activist	  explained:	  “I	  
understand	  why	  people	  are	  no	  longer	  willing	  to	  pour	  on	  to	  the	  streets.	  	  If	  you	  do	  so,	  you	  can	  be	  
sure	  to	  face	  any	  kind	  of	  punishment,	  either	  being	  arrested,	  raped,	  killed	  or	  anything	  else"	  (Talt,	  
The	  Guardian).	  	  In	  the	  span	  of	  one	  year	  an	  estimated	  5,000	  people	  were	  arrested,	  at	  least	  80	  
are	  estimated	  to	  have	  died	  in	  street	  clashes,	  and	  at	  least	  six	  political	  detainees	  were	  sentenced	  
to	  death,	  having	  been	  convicted	  of	  “waging	  war	  against	  God”	  for	  their	  alleged	  role	  in	  the	  
demonstrations	  (Talt,	  The	  Guardian).	  	  Evidence	  of	  the	  regime’s	  complicity	  in	  the	  torture,	  rape,	  
and	  even	  death	  of	  political	  detainees	  also	  surfaced	  during	  this	  time,	  with	  Karroubi	  leveling	  
charges	  against	  the	  state,	  particularly	  as	  it	  regards	  the	  treatment	  of	  prisoners	  detained	  at	  the	  
Kahrizak	  prison	  facility	  (Huffington	  Post,	  August	  25,	  2009).	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The	  regime	  was	  ultimately	  found	  complicit	  in	  several	  instances	  of	  abuse,	  the	  most	  
notorious	  case	  being	  that	  of	  Mohsen	  Ruholamini,	  a	  25-­‐year-­‐old	  university	  student	  arrested	  on	  
July	  9,	  2009.	  	  His	  family	  was	  informed	  of	  his	  death	  on	  July	  21,	  2009.	  	  His	  official	  cause	  of	  death	  
was	  purportedly	  Meningitis,	  however	  it	  was	  later	  revealed	  that	  the	  guards	  at	  the	  Kahrizak	  
detention	  center	  beat	  him	  to	  death.	  	  This	  fact	  would	  have	  most	  likely	  remained	  unknown	  were	  
it	  not	  for	  the	  political	  clout	  of	  Mohsen’s	  father,	  Abdol	  Hossein	  Ruholamini,	  who	  in	  his	  youth	  had	  
helped	  capture	  the	  American	  embassy.	  	  Today	  he	  is	  a	  prominent	  scientist	  and	  served	  as	  
campaign	  advisor	  to	  Mohsen	  Rezai	  in	  the	  recent	  election.	  	  Khamenei	  was	  forced	  to	  promise	  
Ruholamini	  justice	  for	  the	  killing	  of	  his	  son	  and	  as	  a	  result	  Kahrizak	  detention	  center	  was	  closed	  
in	  July	  and	  three	  guards	  were	  arrested	  in	  August	  (Apostolou,	  Tehran	  Bureau).	  	  The	  doctor	  on	  
duty	  at	  Kahrizak	  prison,	  Ramin	  Pourandarjani,	  was	  then	  found	  dead	  at	  the	  detention	  center	  on	  
November	  10,	  2009.	  	  The	  initial	  explanation	  was	  that	  he	  died	  of	  a	  heart	  attack.	  	  It	  was	  later	  
revealed	  in	  his	  autopsy	  report	  that	  he	  had	  been	  poisoned,	  casting	  further	  suspicion	  against	  
state	  actors	  	  (BBC,	  December	  1,	  2009).	  	  	  
While	  damaging	  for	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  regime,	  the	  public	  nature	  of	  these	  sordid	  
affairs	  proved	  an	  effective	  means	  of	  intimidation	  for	  those	  who	  dared	  to	  consider	  mobilizing	  
further	  demonstrations	  against	  the	  political	  status	  quo.	  	  The	  unchecked	  arrests	  of	  activists	  
neutralized	  dissident	  organizers	  while	  the	  public	  and	  reported	  violence	  perpetrated	  against	  
movement	  adherents	  on	  the	  street	  and	  behind	  bars	  impacted	  the	  calculus	  of	  movement	  
supporters	  yet	  untouched	  by	  such	  violence.	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  also	  evidence	  that	  the	  
violence	  served	  to	  splinter	  the	  opposition	  by	  radicalizing	  segments	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement.	  	  
This	  radicalized	  faction,	  no	  longer	  satisfied	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  reforming	  the	  state	  within	  the	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existing	  constitutional	  framework	  began	  giving	  voice	  to	  slogans	  attributing	  blame	  to	  the	  
Supreme	  Leader	  and	  calling	  for	  his	  removal.	  	  Protestors	  were	  cited	  as	  shouting:	  “Khamenei	  is	  a	  
murder,	  his	  leadership	  is	  illegitimate”	  (Talt,	  The	  Guardian,	  December	  27,	  2009).	  	  This	  targeted	  
language,	  going	  so	  far	  as	  calling	  for	  an	  end	  to	  velayat-­‐e-­‐faqih	  was	  first	  heard	  at	  the	  Ashura	  
demonstrations	  of	  December	  27,	  2009.	  	  The	  position	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Leader	  serves	  as	  the	  
central	  pillar	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution,	  and	  while	  Khamenei	  failed	  to	  uphold	  his	  role	  as	  impartial	  
arbitrator	  in	  his	  dealing	  with	  the	  election	  crisis,	  calling	  for	  his	  removal	  was	  a	  significant	  
departure	  from	  the	  goals	  articulated	  by	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement	  to	  date.	  	  	  	  
	  	  In	  addition	  to	  more	  radicalized	  and	  revolutionary	  slogans,	  the	  opposition	  also	  
abandoned	  its	  tactics	  of	  non-­‐violent	  resistance	  during	  the	  Ashura	  demonstrations,	  hurdling	  
bricks	  and	  stones	  at	  the	  security	  forces	  in	  self-­‐defense	  and	  destroying	  police	  vehicles	  and	  
setting	  fire	  to	  many	  motorcycles	  wrested	  from	  security	  forces	  targeting	  demonstrators	  with	  
bludgeons	  and	  batons.	  	  This	  divide	  within	  the	  Green	  Movement	  only	  six	  months	  after	  its	  
emergence,	  particularly	  the	  radical	  disparity	  of	  the	  prognostic	  and	  diagnostic	  frames	  endorsed	  
by	  various	  factions	  of	  the	  opposition	  contributed	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  the	  public’s	  perception	  of	  the	  
strength	  of	  the	  opposition.	  	  
This	  division	  is	  particularly	  problematic	  given	  the	  obstacles	  and	  dangers	  posed	  to	  the	  
leadership	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement	  should	  they	  attempt	  to	  meaningfully	  accommodate	  those	  
factions	  seeking	  structural	  reform	  of	  the	  state.	  	  The	  movement	  as	  a	  whole	  would	  be	  completely	  
vulnerable	  to	  the	  accusations	  of	  sedition	  that	  Khamenei	  and	  his	  political	  allies	  have	  consistently	  
sought	  to	  level	  against	  it.	  	  The	  regime	  can	  and	  has	  been	  able	  to	  excuse	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  
violence	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  state	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  squelch	  this	  so-­‐called	  counterrevolutionary	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movement.	  While	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  precisely	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  regime	  has	  actually	  lost	  credibility	  
in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  Iranians	  who	  have	  remained	  bystanders	  to	  this	  ongoing	  conflict,	  it	  
is	  clear	  that	  the	  leadership	  believes	  that	  these	  radicalized	  calls	  for	  the	  abolishment	  of	  velayat-­‐e-­‐
faqih	  could	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  death	  knell	  for	  the	  movement	  itself.	  	  Reporting	  on	  the	  2009	  Ashura	  
demonstrations,	  Iranian	  state	  television	  actually	  chose	  to	  broadcast	  clips	  of	  demonstrators	  
calling	  for	  an	  end	  to	  “the	  guardianship	  of	  the	  jurisprudent,”	  implying	  that	  they	  calculated	  
publicizing	  these	  slogans	  would	  be	  more	  damaging	  to	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  opposition	  
movement	  than	  to	  the	  regime	  itself	  (Tahami,	  Refworld).	  	  
Recalling	  Mousavi’s	  unveiling	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement	  Charter	  six	  months	  following	  this	  
watershed	  event	  and	  the	  very	  subtle	  effort	  he	  made	  to	  reassure	  those	  in	  the	  opposition	  seeking	  
a	  more	  radical	  departure	  from	  the	  political	  status	  quo,	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  publication	  of	  
this	  document	  did	  little	  to	  rejuvenate	  the	  flagging	  Green	  Movement	  in	  its	  quest	  for	  political	  and	  
social	  justice.	  	  Moving	  forward	  to	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  of	  the	  Ashura	  demonstrations	  in	  
December	  2010	  which	  followed	  the	  muffled	  commemoration	  of	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  election	  
crisis	  in	  June	  of	  the	  same	  year,	  headlines	  from	  that	  day	  generally	  reported	  that	  the	  opposition	  
had	  elected	  to	  remain	  below	  ground	  (Peterson,	  The	  Christian	  Science	  Monitor).	  	  	  	  Commenting	  
on	  the	  occasion,	  one	  young	  Iranian	  professional	  who	  had	  witnessed	  protestors	  being	  gunned	  
down	  by	  state	  security	  forces	  during	  last	  year’s	  demonstrations	  stated:	  “The	  opposition	  that	  
exists	  now	  has	  turned	  into	  an	  ideology.	  It	  will	  be	  less	  expressive	  but	  more	  dangerous	  [for	  the	  
regime].	  It	  will	  breed	  in	  people’s	  homes;	  children	  will	  be	  fed	  with	  this	  resentment”	  (Peterson,	  
The	  Christian	  Science	  Monitor).	  	  Mousavi	  also	  published	  a	  written	  statement	  commemorating	  
the	  day:	  “You	  remember	  what	  [authorities]	  did	  to	  protesting	  mourners	  during	  last	  year’s	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Ashura:	  They	  threw	  the	  protesters	  off	  the	  bridges,	  ran	  over	  their	  defenseless	  bodies	  with	  cars,	  
and	  shot	  at	  their	  love-­‐filled	  hearts.	  	  Little	  did	  they	  know	  that	  suppressing	  the	  anger	  of	  informed	  
and	  oppressed	  people	  is	  more	  dangerous	  as	  these	  voices	  seek	  justice”	  (Peterson,	  The	  Christian	  
Science	  Monitor).	  	  In	  response	  to	  this	  latest	  statement	  the	  same	  young	  man	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  
Green	  Movement	  commented	  that	  Mousavi	  “is	  a	  man	  of	  words	  –	  great	  words,	  too	  –	  but	  we	  are	  
beyond	  that.	  	  	  We	  don’t	  need	  convincing	  anymore.	  We	  need	  action	  plans”	  (Peterson,	  The	  
Christian	  Science	  Monitor).	  	  	  
At	  this	  moment,	  when	  many	  in	  the	  opposition	  were	  lamenting	  the	  lack	  of	  vision	  for	  
coordinated	  action	  capable	  of	  realizing	  the	  movement’s	  goals	  for	  Iran,	  a	  firestorm	  of	  
demonstrations	  were	  cropping	  up	  in	  the	  Tunisian	  city	  of	  Sidi	  Bouazid	  in	  response	  to	  the	  self-­‐
immolation	  of	  a	  young	  man	  exhausted	  by	  his	  prospects	  for	  a	  decent	  standard	  of	  living	  and	  the	  
perpetual	  abuses	  of	  corrupt	  officials.	  	  No	  one	  foresaw	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  peoples’	  anger	  
would	  take	  them	  in	  successfully	  forcing	  longtime	  leader	  Zine	  El	  Abidine	  Ben	  Ali	  from	  power,	  nor	  
the	  ripple	  effect	  the	  success	  of	  these	  demonstrations	  would	  have	  across	  the	  broader	  Middle	  
East	  and	  North	  African	  region.	  	  However	  it	  did	  not	  take	  long	  for	  both	  the	  Iranian	  opposition	  
movement	  and	  the	  Islamic	  leadership	  in	  Iran	  to	  recognize	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  as	  an	  opportunity	  
to	  be	  capitalized	  upon	  in	  the	  quest	  of	  each	  side	  to	  maintain	  the	  upper	  hand	  against	  their	  
political	  rivals	  at	  home.	  	  What	  follows	  in	  the	  subsequent	  chapter	  is	  a	  thorough	  investigation	  of	  
the	  framing	  contest	  embarked	  upon	  by	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement	  and	  the	  Iranian	  
establishment	  to	  appropriate	  events	  in	  the	  region	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  their	  competing	  aspiration	  
and	  particular	  worldviews.	  	  Following	  the	  analytical	  accounting	  of	  Iran’s	  internal	  struggle	  to	  
define	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  this	  work	  will	  conclude	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	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impact	  of	  this	  particular	  framing	  contest	  on	  the	  political	  opportunity	  space	  inside	  Iran,	  with	  
particular	  interest	  paid	  to	  the	  prospects	  for	  the	  future	  of	  political	  contestation	  therein.	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CHAPTER	  THREE:	  Framing	  Contestation	  and	  Oppositional	  Politics	  in	  Contemporary	  Iran	  
	  
Following	  the	  events	  of	  the	  disputed	  June	  2009	  Presidential	  election	  in	  Iran,	  it	  has	  become	  
increasingly	  clear	  that	  Iran's	  system	  of	  managed	  contestation	  and	  limited	  representation	  no	  
longer	  intends	  to	  accommodate	  the	  reformist	  agenda.	  	  The	  alleged	  fraud	  surrounding	  those	  
elections	  transformed	  an	  active	  electorate	  into	  an	  impassioned	  protest	  movement	  that	  was	  
able	  to	  sustain	  a	  visible	  presence	  in	  the	  streets	  months	  after	  the	  Supreme	  Leader	  unequivocally	  
rejected	  protestors	  demands	  for	  a	  sweeping	  investigation	  into	  allegations	  of	  electoral	  
misconduct.	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  a	  flagging	  Green	  Movement	  and	  an	  Iranian	  regime	  seeking	  to	  
rehabilitate	  its	  legitimacy	  and	  influence	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad,	  the	  sudden	  and	  unexpected	  
contagion	  of	  popular	  protest	  that	  constitute	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  was	  seized	  upon	  as	  a	  political	  
opportunity	  by	  both	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  and	  its	  opposition	  to	  revitalize	  their	  disparate	  
campaigns.	  	  	  
Participants	  and	  proponents	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement	  argue	  that	  the	  rounds	  of	  
demonstrations	  that	  followed	  the	  election	  dispute	  in	  Iran	  served	  as	  the	  precursor	  and	  
inspiration	  for	  the	  Arab	  Spring/uprisings.	  Simultaneously	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  and	  alarmist	  
pundits	  in	  the	  Western	  media	  landscape	  have	  championed	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  of	  1978-­‐1979	  
as	  the	  slow	  burning	  catalyst	  for	  the	  popular	  unrest	  we	  are	  witnessing	  directed	  towards	  corrupt	  
and	  often	  Western	  backed	  leaders	  in	  the	  region.	  	  In	  this	  regard	  both	  the	  regime	  and	  its	  
opposition	  are	  embroiled	  in	  "the	  politics	  of	  signification."	  	  Movement	  actors	  in	  each	  camp	  are	  
effectively	  engaged	  in	  the	  production	  of	  mobilizing	  ideas	  and	  the	  maintenance	  of	  meaning	  for	  
constituents,	  antagonists,	  bystanders,	  and	  observers	  (Benford	  and	  Snow,	  2000,	  613).	  	  The	  
byproduct	  of	  this	  competitive	  attempt	  at	  reality-­‐construction	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  "collective	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action	  frames"	  that	  are	  “intended	  to	  mobilize	  potential	  adherents	  and	  constituents,	  to	  garner	  
bystander	  support,	  and	  to	  demobilize	  antagonists"	  (Benford	  and	  Snow,	  2000,	  614).	  	  
Nevertheless,	  activists	  engaged	  in	  this	  sort	  of	  discursive	  framing	  are	  not	  able	  to	  construct	  and	  
impose	  any	  version	  of	  reality	  they	  would	  like	  on	  their	  intended	  targets,	  especially	  when	  
engaged	  in	  this	  sort	  of	  directly	  contested	  process.	  	  According	  to	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  (2000),	  the	  
three	  most	  common	  challenges	  facing	  activists	  engaged	  in	  contested	  processes	  are:	  1)	  
counterframing	  by	  movement	  opponents,	  bystanders	  and	  the	  media,	  2)	  frame	  disputes	  within	  
movements,	  and	  3)	  the	  dialectic	  between	  frames	  and	  events.	  
At	  this	  juncture	  I	  will	  proceed	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  three	  aforementioned	  variables,	  
first	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement,	  before	  analyzing	  the	  same	  set	  of	  variables	  
and	  their	  applicability	  to	  articulated	  positions	  taken	  by	  the	  Iranian	  leadership.	  	  There	  are	  
however,	  three	  caveats	  to	  my	  handling	  of	  the	  first	  of	  the	  three	  contested	  processes	  outlined	  by	  
Benford	  and	  Snow.	  	  Instead	  of	  employing	  the	  first	  variable	  outright,	  that	  is,	  an	  exploration	  of	  
counterframing	  by	  movement	  opponents,	  bystanders	  and	  the	  media,	  I	  will	  allow	  each	  
movement’s	  collective	  action	  frame,	  addressed	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  each	  parties’	  variable	  
analysis,	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  counterframing	  by	  movement	  opponents	  by	  means	  of	  cross-­‐
sectional	  comparison.	  	  Additionally	  I	  will	  refrain	  from	  an	  explicit	  exploration	  of	  counterframing	  
by	  bystanders	  due	  to	  the	  retrospective	  nature	  of	  this	  study	  and	  the	  paucity	  of	  journalistic	  
accounts	  from	  bystanders	  versus	  participants	  witness	  to	  oppositional	  activity	  in	  Iran	  or	  
elsewhere	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Lastly,	  while	  the	  literature	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  media	  frames	  of	  social	  
movements	  in	  their	  domestic	  context,	  I	  will	  entertain	  a	  discussion	  of	  counterframing	  by	  both	  
domestic	  and	  international	  press,	  due	  to	  the	  deliberate	  internationalization	  of	  Iran’s	  domestic	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dispute	  by	  the	  regime	  and	  opposition.	  	  It	  is	  the	  goal	  of	  this	  study	  to	  provide	  an	  analytical	  
account	  of	  the	  emergence	  and	  evolution	  of	  these	  competing	  narratives	  since	  the	  inception	  of	  
the	  Arab	  uprisings.	  	  These	  uprisings	  have	  both	  re-­‐energized	  and	  added	  a	  new	  international	  
dimension	  to	  the	  domestic	  conflict	  in	  Iran	  resultant	  from	  the	  political	  fallout	  over	  the	  election	  
crisis	  that	  began	  in	  June	  2009.	  	  	  Such	  an	  analysis	  will	  highlight	  the	  survival	  strategies	  employed	  
by	  both	  parties	  in	  light	  of	  the	  changing	  regional	  landscape.	  	  
A	  Green	  Spring?	  
On	  January	  29,	  2011,	  Mir	  Hossein	  Mousavi	  issued	  a	  public	  statement	  honoring	  the	  brave	  people	  
of	  Egypt,	  Tunisia,	  and	  Yemen	  and	  wished	  them	  victory	  in	  their	  struggle	  to	  eliminate	  the	  
oppressive	  regimes	  in	  the	  region	  that	  have	  variously	  failed	  to	  uphold	  the	  peoples’	  right	  to	  
determine	  their	  own	  destiny.	  	  In	  this	  statement	  Mousavi	  declares:	  
Today,	  the	  slogan	  of	  "Where	  is	  my	  vote?"	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Iran	  has	  reached	  
Egypt	  and	  transformed	  into	  "The	  people	  want	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  regime".	  In	  
order	  to	  discover	  the	  secret	  of	  these	  links	  and	  these	  similarities,	  one	  does	  not	  
have	  to	  go	  too	  far.	  You	  just	  have	  to	  compare	  the	  recent	  elections	  in	  Egypt	  with	  
our	  own	  and	  compare	  it	  with	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  Guardian	  Council	  who	  
explicitly	  says	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  millions	  of	  votes	  by	  Green	  citizens.	  If	  we	  look	  
at	  the	  collapsing	  political	  regimes	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  
carefully,	  we	  can	  identify	  a	  similar	  pattern	  of	  invading	  and	  shutting	  down	  social	  
networks,	  the	  press	  and	  the	  cyber	  space.	  In	  an	  amazingly	  similar	  fashion,	  they	  
have	  all	  blocked	  SMS	  systems,	  mobile	  phones	  and	  the	  Internet,	  have	  banned	  all	  
writers	  and	  taken	  dissidents	  to	  prisons	  (Mousavi,	  Facebook,	  January	  29,	  2011).	  
	  
Here,	  Mousavi	  clearly	  attributes	  inspiration	  for	  the	  regional	  political	  upheaval,	  particularly	  the	  
events	  underway	  in	  Egypt	  to	  Iran’s	  Green	  Movement.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  he	  delineates	  those	  at	  
fault	  for	  sowing	  unrest	  in	  both	  countries,	  laying	  blame	  squarely	  at	  the	  feet	  of	  Iran’s	  Guardian	  
Council	  and	  security	  apparatus,	  and	  their	  equivalent	  arms	  of	  government	  in	  Egypt.	  	  While	  
crediting	  Green	  Movement	  activists	  for	  inspiring	  Egyptian	  protestors,	  Mousavi	  appears	  to	  also	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blame	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  for	  inspiring	  many	  of	  the	  defensive	  and	  destructive	  tactics	  employed	  
by	  the	  Mubarak	  government	  in	  its	  attempts	  to	  squelch	  the	  Egyptian	  revolution.	  	  This	  kind	  of	  
“boundary	  framing”	  and	  its	  related	  attributional	  processes	  seeks	  to	  delineate	  the	  borders	  
between	  “good”	  and	  “evil”	  while	  constructing	  movement	  protagonists	  and	  antagonists	  
(Benford	  and	  Snow	  2000,	  616).	  	  In	  this	  case	  Mousavi	  is	  clearly	  casting	  the	  Iranian	  and	  Egyptian	  
protestors	  as	  unified	  protagonists	  in	  their	  quest	  for	  human	  dignity	  and	  political	  
enfranchisement	  from	  unrepentant	  and	  dictatorial	  states.	  	  He	  also	  diagnostically	  frames	  the	  
raison	  d'etre	  for	  the	  Egyptian	  protests	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  peoples’	  outrage	  concerning	  
allegations	  of	  electoral	  fraud	  in	  the	  2010	  Egyptian	  parliamentary	  elections,	  much	  in	  the	  same	  
way	  the	  Iranian	  opposition	  was	  galvanized	  by	  the	  purportedly	  fraudulent	  presidential	  election	  
in	  2009.	  	  While	  this	  diagnostic	  frame	  serves	  to	  substantiate	  Mousavi’s	  correlation	  between	  the	  
Green	  Movement	  and	  the	  Egyptian	  revolution,	  depicting	  the	  Egyptian	  movement	  as	  an	  
extension	  of	  the	  Iranian	  opposition’s	  struggle	  also	  provides	  a	  subtle	  warning	  to	  the	  Iranian	  
government	  regarding	  the	  propensity	  for	  peoples’	  movements	  to	  become	  radicalized	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  concessions	  and	  accommodation	  by	  the	  state.	  
Mousavi	  goes	  on	  to	  complain	  about	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Iranian	  media	  chose	  to	  cover	  
the	  demonstrations	  in	  Egypt,	  stating:	  	  	  
They	  [Iranian	  state	  run	  media]	  do	  refer	  to	  the	  'wrath	  of	  the	  people"	  of	  Egypt,	  but	  
they	  never	  explain	  that	  this	  day	  of	  wrath	  has	  come	  about	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  
inefficiency	  and	  corruption	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  state,	  extravagance	  and	  
wasting	  people's	  funds,	  censorship,	  shutting	  people	  down,	  executions	  and	  lining	  
up	  gallows	  to	  create	  fear	  in	  people.	  They	  never	  say	  that	  if	  the	  ruling	  system	  of	  
Egypt	  had	  respected	  people's	  right	  to	  determining	  their	  own	  destiny	  and	  had	  not	  
tampered	  with	  people's	  votes	  in	  the	  recent	  elections	  of	  Egypt,	  they	  would	  not	  
have	  to	  face	  the	  demand	  for	  the	  'overthrow	  of	  the	  regime'	  by	  the	  dear	  nation	  of	  
Egypt	  (Mousavi,	  Facebook,	  January	  29,	  2011).	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Building	  upon	  the	  subtle	  warning	  in	  the	  proceeding	  paragraph,	  Mousavi	  gives	  voice	  to	  the	  
grievances	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  people	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  Iranian	  population.	  	  Again	  he	  
emphasizes	  that	  were	  it	  not	  for	  the	  corrupt	  and	  despotic	  nature	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  state,	  the	  
Mubarak	  regime	  would	  not	  be	  facing	  the	  revolutionary	  aspirations	  articulated	  by	  more	  than	  a	  
million	  Egyptians	  who	  came	  to	  coalesce	  in	  Tahrir	  Square	  and	  other	  major	  city	  centers	  across	  
Egypt.	  	  	  
Mousavi’s	  criticism	  of	  the	  half-­‐truths	  invoked	  by	  Iranian	  media	  in	  their	  coverage	  of	  
events	  in	  Egypt	  speaks	  to	  one	  of	  the	  key	  concerns	  addressed	  in	  this	  variable	  analysis;	  
counterframing	  by	  the	  media.	  	  By	  failing	  to	  fully	  investigate	  and	  report	  on	  the	  underlying	  
grievances	  that	  motivated	  the	  Egyptian	  people	  in	  their	  quest	  to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  Mubarak’s	  rule,	  
it	  becomes	  less	  likely	  that	  an	  Iranian	  audience	  would	  draw	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  inferences	  
regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  country’s	  homegrown	  opposition	  movement	  and	  that	  
of	  the	  Egyptian	  people.	  	  	  At	  this	  juncture,	  Mousavi	  is	  attempting	  to	  fashion	  a	  collective	  action	  
frame	  capable	  of	  resurrecting	  the	  inherent	  sense	  of	  agency	  once	  shared	  by	  Green	  Movement	  
activists	  by	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  dynamic	  protest	  movement	  underway	  in	  Egypt.	  	  The	  
Iranian	  media	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  priming	  the	  Iranian	  populous	  for	  its	  own	  account	  of	  the	  
factors	  motivating	  Egyptian	  protestors	  in	  their	  quest	  to	  remove	  Mubarak	  from	  power.	  	  Media	  
framing	  is	  concerned	  with	  issues	  of	  selection	  and	  salience,	  placing	  issues	  or	  events	  within	  a	  field	  
of	  meaning	  (Wicks,	  340).	  	  	  While	  not	  explicitly	  alluded	  to	  in	  Mousavi’s	  statement,	  the	  Iranian	  
state	  quickly	  began	  framing	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  as	  indicative	  of	  an	  Islamic	  revival,	  i.e.	  inspired	  by	  
Iran’s	  own	  Islamic	  Revolution.	  	  I	  will	  reserve	  much	  of	  my	  discussion	  of	  the	  commentary	  from	  
Iranian	  state	  media	  regarding	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  for	  the	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  dedicated	  to	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analyzing	  the	  collective	  action	  frame	  posited	  by	  the	  state	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  regional	  turmoil.	  	  I	  
do	  this	  predominantly	  because	  Iranian	  media,	  be	  it	  televised,	  broadcast,	  or	  printed	  is	  all	  closely	  
monitored	  and	  aligned	  with	  the	  views	  of	  the	  Iranian	  government	  and	  will	  therefore	  be	  of	  utility	  
in	  fleshing	  out	  the	  collective	  action	  frame	  cultivated	  by	  the	  state	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  
or	  Islamic	  Awakening	  as	  the	  state	  concertedly	  labels	  it.	  	  	  	  
Counterframing	  by	  Western	  and	  international	  media,	  indirectly	  contradicting	  the	  Green	  
Movement’s	  frame	  regarding	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  Arab	  uprising	  was/is	  plentiful	  and	  at	  times	  
alarmist.	  	  	  Commenting	  on	  this	  trend	  in	  an	  article	  published	  in	  the	  Washington	  Post	  on	  February	  
7,	  2011,	  Fareed	  Zakaria	  writes:	  
A	  specter	  is	  haunting	  the	  West.	  In	  1979,	  the	  United	  States	  watched	  a	  street	  
revolution	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  saw	  its	  stalwart	  ally,	  Iranian	  Shah	  Reza	  Pahlavi,	  
ousted,	  only	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  theocratic	  Islamic	  Republic.	  Now,	  watching	  
another	  street	  revolution	  in	  another	  Middle	  Eastern	  country,	  many	  people	  seem	  
spooked	  by	  this	  memory.	  Fears	  of	  an	  Islamic	  takeover	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  Glenn	  
Beck,	  with	  his	  predictions	  that	  the	  fall	  of	  Hosni	  Mubarak	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  
an	  Islamic	  caliphate	  bent	  on	  global	  domination.	  …	  Serious	  conservative	  
politicians	  such	  as	  Mitt	  Romney	  and	  John	  McCain	  describe	  Egypt's	  Islamic	  
opposition	  in	  terms	  not	  so	  dissimilar	  from	  Beck's.	  On	  the	  left,	  The	  (Washington)	  
Post's	  Richard	  Cohen	  writes,	  'The	  dream	  of	  a	  democratic	  Egypt	  is	  sure	  to	  produce	  
a	  nightmare.'	  Leon	  Wieseltier	  (of	  the	  New	  Republic)	  believes	  the	  Islamists	  will	  
attempt	  a	  Bolshevik-­‐style	  takeover	  (Zakaria	  qtd.	  by	  Leichtman).	  
	  
While	  Zakaria	  himself	  does	  not	  endorse	  these	  projections,	  his	  summary	  of	  the	  whirlwind	  of	  
cynical	  commentary	  accompanying	  the	  unfolding	  events	  across	  the	  MENA	  region	  is	  effectively	  
representative	  of	  the	  trend.	  	  It	  also	  serves	  as	  the	  requisite	  context	  for	  his	  own	  narrative	  arch,	  
namely	  that	  such	  distracting	  parallels	  between	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  and	  the	  Egyptian	  Uprising	  
are	  drawing	  American	  eyes	  away	  from	  the	  actual	  problem	  in	  Egypt	  according	  to	  the	  author:	  
military	  dictatorship	  (Zakaria,	  The	  Washington	  Post).	  	  As	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  in	  the	  following	  
segment	  dedicated	  to	  the	  Iranian	  regime’s	  collective	  action	  frame,	  the	  regime	  availed	  itself	  of	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these	  Western	  pundits’	  commentaries	  to	  validate	  its	  own	  frame	  regarding	  the	  influential	  role	  
the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  was	  playing	  in	  the	  unfolding	  events	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  
	   Trusting	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  many	  speak	  louder	  than	  the	  words	  of	  a	  few,	  Mousavi	  and	  
Karroubi	  called	  for	  a	  protest	  by	  Iranians	  in	  solidarity	  and	  support	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring.	  	  Mousavi	  
and	  Karroubi	  requested	  permission	  from	  the	  interior	  ministry,	  submitting	  a	  formal	  letter	  of	  
request	  that	  states:	  	  
In	  order	  to	  show	  solidarity	  with	  the	  popular	  movements	  in	  the	  region	  and	  
specifically	  the	  freedom-­‐seeking	  movement	  embarked	  on	  by	  Tunisian	  and	  
Egyptian	  people	  against	  their	  autocratic	  governments,	  we	  hereby	  request	  a	  
permit	  to	  call	  for	  a	  rally	  -­‐-­‐	  as	  Article	  27	  of	  the	  constitution	  authorizes	  -­‐-­‐	  on	  
Monday,	  Feb	  14,	  2011,	  at	  3	  p.m.	  from	  Imam	  Hossein	  to	  Azadi	  Square	  (Tehran	  
Bureau,	  February	  6,	  2011).	  
	  
This	  request	  was	  summarily	  rejected	  along	  with	  the	  several	  other	  requests	  submitted	  by	  the	  
two	  leaders	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  last	  year.	  	  In	  a	  separate	  statement	  issued	  on	  January	  31,	  
resulting	  from	  an	  impromptu	  visit	  between	  Mousavi	  and	  Karroubi,	  the	  two	  leaders	  decried	  the	  
trend	  of	  rejections	  by	  the	  Interior	  ministry	  stating:	  
Today	  in	  Egypt,	  despite	  tensions	  and	  clashes;	  the	  protesters	  are	  given	  permission	  
to	  demonstrate	  so	  that	  it	  becomes	  clear	  which	  side	  has	  the	  public	  support,	  
therefore,	  we	  also	  believe	  that	  in	  Iran,	  the	  protestors	  to	  the	  election	  must	  be	  
given	  the	  right	  to	  demonstrate	  so	  that	  it	  becomes	  clear	  which	  movement	  has	  
social	  and	  public	  support	  (Mousavi,	  Facebook,	  February	  1,	  2011).	  
	  
This	  characterization	  is	  not	  altogether	  fair	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Egypt,	  as	  protestors	  there	  too	  were	  
confronted	  with	  violent	  harassment	  and	  attempts	  to	  break	  up	  demonstrations	  on	  the	  order	  of	  
President	  Hosni	  Mubarak.	  	  It	  was	  only	  after	  the	  military	  decided	  to	  intervene	  on	  behalf	  of	  
demonstrators	  and	  disavow	  violent	  action	  in	  order	  to	  push	  people	  out	  of	  public	  spaces	  that	  one	  
could	  characterize	  Egyptian	  protestors	  as	  having	  permission	  to	  continue	  their	  occupation	  of	  
Tahrir	  square	  and	  elsewhere.	  	  However,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  failure	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Iranian	  regime	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to	  sanction	  the	  February	  14	  demonstrations,	  various	  sources	  estimate	  that	  20,000	  to	  30,000	  
(International	  Herald	  Tribune,	  February	  16,	  2011)	  or	  even	  as	  many	  as	  350,000	  (Tehran	  Bureau,	  
February	  14,	  2011)	  people	  turned	  out	  to	  protest	  the	  various	  crimes	  of	  the	  state	  and	  to	  show	  
support	  for	  the	  recent	  victory	  of	  protestors	  in	  Egypt	  who	  witnessed	  the	  departure	  of	  Mubarak	  
on	  February	  11.	  	  Ironically	  February	  11	  happens	  to	  be	  the	  same	  day	  the	  Iranian	  state	  annually	  
commemorates	  the	  triumph	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  in	  Iran,	  providing	  greater,	  albeit	  minimal	  
and	  purely	  coincidental,	  credence	  to	  the	  Iranian	  regime’s	  counterframe.	  	  	  
	   Regardless	  of	  whether	  demonstrators	  numbered	  in	  the	  thousands	  or	  the	  hundreds	  of	  
thousands,	  this	  demonstration	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  largest	  mass	  mobilization	  of	  opposition	  
activists	  since	  the	  spontaneous	  and	  confrontational	  Ashura	  protests	  of	  December	  2009.	  	  Like	  
those	  protests,	  the	  February	  15	  demonstration	  was	  marred	  by	  reports	  of	  violence	  and	  arrests	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  heavy	  presence	  of	  security	  forces	  that	  prevented	  demonstrators	  from	  coalescing	  
in	  Azadi	  or	  Freedom	  square	  as	  planned	  (Tehran	  Bureau,	  February	  14,	  2011).	  	  In	  keeping	  with	  
most	  other	  opposition	  demonstrations,	  Mousavi	  and	  Karroubi	  were	  prevented	  by	  state	  security	  
from	  leaving	  their	  places	  of	  residence	  in	  order	  to	  join	  the	  protestors.	  	  The	  two	  leaders	  were	  
quickly	  detained	  thereafter,	  held	  in	  an	  undisclosed	  location	  at	  first,	  before	  being	  returned	  to	  
their	  homes	  where	  they	  remain	  confined	  to	  date	  (Sahimi,	  Tehran	  Bureau,	  January	  27,	  2012).	  	  
Another	  similarity	  between	  the	  two	  dates	  was	  the	  resurrection	  of	  more	  radical	  slogans	  that	  
emphasized	  the	  revolutionary	  agenda	  of	  some	  activists	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  reform-­‐oriented	  
goals	  emphasized	  by	  Mousavi	  and	  Karroubi,	  a	  recognition	  that	  occasions	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  
second	  of	  three	  contested	  processes	  employed	  in	  this	  study,	  frame	  disputes	  within	  movements.	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Frame	  Disputes	  within	  the	  Green	  Movement	  	  
While	  the	  February	  14,	  demonstration	  was	  occasioned	  by	  the	  call	  issued	  by	  Mousavi	  and	  
Karroubi,	  in	  part	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  Iranian	  opposition’s	  support	  and	  solidarity	  for	  the	  Arab	  
uprisings,	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement	  also	  articulated	  a	  desire	  to	  underscore	  the	  
hypocrisy	  of	  the	  Iranian	  regime’s	  purported	  support	  for	  these	  movements	  abroad	  while	  
simultaneously	  oppressing	  likeminded	  protests	  at	  home.	  	  The	  opposition	  protests,	  reported	  
upon	  in	  Iranian	  media,	  faced	  numerous	  criticisms	  from	  Iranian	  officials	  concerning	  the	  sparse	  
mention	  of	  support	  for	  the	  regional	  movements	  articulated	  by	  Iranian	  activists.	  	  Fars	  news	  
agency	  labeled	  the	  Iranian	  protestors	  “hypocrites,	  monarchists,	  ruffians	  and	  seditionists”	  who	  
did	  not	  even	  chant	  any	  slogans	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  despite	  the	  purported	  pretense	  
for	  the	  rally	  (Tehran	  Bureau,	  February	  14,	  2011).	  	  Other	  coverage	  on	  Iranian	  state	  television	  
reportedly	  showed	  clips	  of	  Reza	  Pahlavi,	  the	  exiled	  son	  of	  the	  former	  Shah,	  vocalizing	  support	  
for	  the	  February	  14	  demonstrations.	  	  This	  clip	  was	  part	  of	  a	  montage	  of	  other	  clips	  featuring	  
Voice	  of	  America	  and	  BBC	  Farsi	  analysts	  urging	  Iranians	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  planned	  protests,	  a	  
clip	  of	  US	  Press	  Secretary	  Robert	  Gibbs	  criticizing	  the	  Iranian	  government,	  and	  mention	  of	  the	  
US	  State	  Department’s	  newly	  created	  Farsi	  twitter	  feed.	  	  This	  mash-­‐up	  was	  meticulously	  
constructed	  to	  validate	  the	  Iranian	  government’s	  claim	  that	  the	  protestors	  were	  working	  in	  
concert	  and	  with	  the	  support	  of	  Western	  agents	  and	  the	  deposed	  royal	  family	  to	  topple	  the	  
Islamic	  Republic.	  	  In	  order	  to	  drive	  this	  message	  home,	  the	  segment	  is	  also	  reported	  to	  have	  
featured	  pictures	  of	  Mousavi	  and	  Karroubi	  cast	  against	  a	  backdrop	  of	  the	  Star	  of	  David	  and	  the	  
US	  flag.	  	  The	  Iranian	  broadcasting	  channel	  also	  spoke	  with	  pro-­‐government	  demonstrators,	  
eager	  to	  criticize	  the	  opposition	  activists	  (Tehran	  Bureau,	  February	  14,	  2011).	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   According	  to	  Tehran	  Bureau,	  an	  affiliate	  of	  the	  US	  public	  broadcasting	  program	  
Frontline,	  the	  demonstrations	  kicked	  off	  at	  midnight	  with	  shouts	  of	  “Allah-­‐u-­‐Akbar”	  heard	  
echoing	  across	  the	  Iranian	  capital.	  	  Reports	  of	  slogans	  voiced	  by	  opposition	  activists	  from	  the	  
day’s	  events	  included:	  “Na	  Ghaza,	  na	  Lobnan;	  Tunis	  o	  Misr	  o	  Iran!”	  (Not	  Gaza,	  Not	  Lebanon;	  
Tunisia	  and	  Egypt	  and	  Iran).	  Another	  slogan	  reported	  upon	  directly	  articulated	  the	  desire	  for	  
the	  Supreme	  Leader	  to	  be	  deposed:	  “Mubarak,	  Ben	  Ali,	  Nobateh	  Seyyed	  Ali”	  (Mubarak,	  Ben	  Ali,	  
Now	  its	  time	  for	  Mr.	  Ali	  [a	  reference	  to	  Khamenei]).	  	  Another	  demonstrator	  was	  captured	  on	  
film	  declaring,	  “This	  is	  the	  rage	  of	  the	  people!”	  	  Other	  reports	  included	  mention	  of	  deafening	  
cries	  of	  “Allah-­‐u-­‐Akbar”	  and	  “Ya	  Hossein!	  Mir	  Hossein!”	  being	  shouted	  by	  demonstrators	  
gathered	  in	  Tehran’s	  Revolution	  Square.	  	  Other	  chants	  included:	  “Khamenei	  haya	  kon!	  Mubarak	  
ro	  negah	  kon!”	  (Khamenei,	  have	  some	  shame!	  Look	  at	  Mubarak!)	  and	  “Dicator	  farar	  kon!	  
Mubarak	  ro	  negah	  kon!”	  (Dictator	  run!	  Look	  at	  Mubarak!).	  	  Another	  slogan	  referencing	  
developments	  in	  Egypt	  was	  heard:	  “Nezami	  joda	  sho!	  Ba	  mellat	  hamseda	  sho!”	  (Military,	  
separate	  [from	  them]!	  Join	  your	  voice	  with	  the	  nation’s!).	  	  “Marg	  bar	  Dictator!”	  (literally	  
translated	  as	  Death	  to	  the	  Dictator,	  although	  more	  aptly	  translated	  as	  Down	  with	  the	  Dictator),	  
was	  also	  commonly	  reported.	  	  	  
	   While	  few	  instances	  of	  slogans	  expressing	  solidarity	  for	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  were	  
reported	  upon,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Iranian	  opposition	  found	  inspiration	  in	  the	  recent	  successes	  
experienced	  by	  demonstrators	  in	  Egypt	  and	  Tunisia.	  	  Noticeably	  absent	  were	  slogans	  that	  
specifically	  called	  for	  reform.	  	  Each	  of	  the	  slogans	  above	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  protestors’	  indictment	  
of	  Iran’s	  supreme	  leader	  versus	  Iranian	  president,	  Mahmoud	  Ahmadinejad	  whose	  reelection	  
galvanized	  the	  Green	  Movement	  in	  it’s	  infancy.	  	  	  It	  must	  be	  emphasized	  that	  this	  phenomenon	  
	   77	  
represents	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  views	  expressed	  by	  Mousavi,	  Karroubi,	  Khatami,	  and	  other	  
reformist	  politicians	  commonly	  conceived	  as	  leaders	  of	  Iran’s	  Green	  Movement.	  	  Despite	  the	  
virulent	  criticisms	  issued	  by	  each	  of	  these	  three	  men	  regarding	  abuses	  inflicted	  upon	  the	  nation	  
and	  its	  people	  by	  the	  state,	  none	  have	  gone	  on	  record	  as	  calling	  for	  the	  abolishment	  of	  Iran’s	  
guardianship	  of	  the	  jurisprudent.	  	  It	  is	  also	  not	  clear	  whether	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  opposition	  
share	  the	  more	  radical	  aspirations	  of	  the	  movement’s	  more	  vocal	  proponents.	  	  The	  
organization,	  Mourning	  Mothers,	  in	  their	  statement	  issued	  in	  support	  of	  the	  February	  14	  
demonstration,	  articulated	  three	  demands	  of	  the	  government:	  unconditional	  release	  of	  all	  
political	  prisoners,	  abolition	  of	  the	  death	  penalty,	  and	  public	  prosecution	  of	  those	  responsible	  
for	  the	  brutal	  killings	  over	  the	  past	  32	  years.	  	  Political	  prisoners	  in	  Rejaee	  Shahr	  Prison,	  located	  
in	  Karaj,	  a	  northern	  suburb	  of	  Tehran,	  initiated	  a	  hunger	  strike	  in	  support	  of	  the	  protests	  and	  
another	  group	  of	  female	  political	  prisoners	  in	  Tehran’s	  notorious	  Evin	  Prison	  issued	  a	  statement	  
of	  support	  for	  the	  planned	  demonstrations	  while	  reiterating	  their	  commitment	  to	  the	  Green	  
Movement’s	  pursuit	  of	  political	  reform	  (Tehran	  Bureau,	  February	  14,	  2011).	  	  	  
	   The	  culmination	  of	  these	  fractious	  voices	  speaks	  to	  the	  divisions	  and	  disputes	  present	  
within	  the	  opposition	  movement.	  	  To	  date,	  former	  president	  Mohammed	  Khatami	  remains	  the	  
only	  one	  of	  the	  trio	  of	  Green	  Movement	  leaders	  who	  continues	  to	  enjoy	  freedom	  from	  some	  
form	  of	  incarceration.	  	  Khatami’s	  immunity	  from	  incarceration	  is	  most	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  former	  
president’s	  notorious	  grass-­‐roots	  support	  amongst	  the	  Iranian	  population	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
leader’s	  cautious	  approach	  towards	  criticizing	  the	  state.	  	  In	  his	  attempts	  to	  broker	  accord	  
between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  opposition	  and	  seek	  redress	  for	  political	  prisoners	  he	  published	  
comments	  he	  had	  shared	  with	  a	  group	  of	  veterans	  of	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war	  in	  May	  2011,	  some	  four	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months	  after	  the	  February	  14	  demonstrations.	  	  In	  his	  statement	  Khatami	  advised:	  "for	  the	  sake	  
of	  the	  future,	  people	  should	  forgive	  the	  government	  and	  Khamenei	  for	  the	  injustice	  done	  to	  
them,	  and	  Khamenei	  should	  do	  likewise,	  if	  people	  did	  something	  unjust	  to	  him."	  This	  comment	  
angered	  many	  in	  the	  opposition	  who	  were	  indignant	  about	  the	  implication	  that	  they	  should	  
forgive	  the	  leader	  in	  light	  of	  the	  brutalization	  endured	  by	  so	  many	  since	  the	  ill-­‐fated	  election	  
fallout	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  redress	  made	  to	  the	  victims,	  prisoners	  and	  their	  families.	  	  In	  response	  to	  
the	  backlash	  his	  commentary	  elicited,	  Khatami	  issued	  another	  statement	  the	  following	  month	  
asking:	  "How	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  set	  aside	  people's	  demands?	  Even	  if	  someone	  does	  it,	  the	  people	  
will	  not	  accept	  it."	  He	  went	  on	  to	  emphasize	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  move	  forward	  as	  a	  nation	  
required	  an	  end	  to	  extralegal	  imprisonments	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  open	  and	  lawful	  political	  
atmosphere	  (Tehran	  Bureau,	  June	  12,	  2011).	  	  While	  issued	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  diffuse	  the	  toxic	  
political	  atmosphere	  that	  characterizes	  the	  Iranian	  social	  and	  political	  climate,	  his	  words	  clearly	  
reiterate	  his	  commitment	  to	  seeking	  a	  resolution	  to	  Iran’s	  ongoing	  political	  ills	  through	  the	  
confines	  of	  Iran’s	  existing	  constitutional	  order.	  
	   Perhaps	  in	  recognition	  of	  the	  fracturing	  of	  the	  opposition	  movement	  resultant	  from	  the	  
divergent	  agenda	  and	  goals	  held	  by	  different	  factions	  therein,	  calls	  for	  future	  demonstrations	  
on	  June	  12,	  2011	  and	  February	  14,	  2012	  were	  accompanied	  by	  the	  suggestion	  that	  protestors	  
march	  silently	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  solidarity	  with	  political	  prisoners	  while	  urging	  the	  state	  for	  
their	  release.	  	  This	  measure	  may	  also	  have	  been	  a	  strategic	  attempt	  to	  shield	  prisoners	  from	  
association	  with	  protests	  that	  may	  actually	  reflect	  a	  seditious	  undercurrent	  reflected	  in	  slogans	  
calling	  for	  structural	  changes.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  demonstrations	  were	  marred	  by	  significantly	  lower	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turn	  out,	  several	  arrests	  and	  repeated	  reports	  of	  violence	  (Tehran	  Bureau,	  June	  12,	  2011;	  
February	  14,	  2012).	  	  
	   Accompanying	  the	  June	  12,	  2011	  demonstration,	  a	  group	  of	  Green	  Movement	  activists	  
issued	  a	  new	  manifesto.	  	  While	  the	  document	  echoed	  calls	  for	  social	  justice	  and	  accountability	  
for	  state	  perpetrators	  of	  violence	  against	  demonstrators,	  most	  notable	  was	  the	  clear	  
demarcation	  of	  the	  movement’s	  ultimate	  goal	  according	  to	  the	  group:	  “the	  supremacy	  of	  
popular	  sovereignty	  over	  all	  state	  and	  government	  institutions,	  including	  the	  post	  of	  Ayatollah	  
Ali	  Khamenei,	  the	  Supreme	  Leader	  of	  the	  Revolution”	  (Inside	  Iran,	  July	  12,	  2011).	  	  Responding	  
to	  Khatami’s	  statement	  documented	  in	  the	  preceding	  paragraph,	  the	  manifesto	  states:	  	  
Khatami’s	  discourse	  of	  reform	  is	  over,	  since	  Khamenei	  and	  those	  behind	  him	  
have	  shown	  that	  they	  are	  unwilling	  to	  take	  this	  course	  and	  will	  resort	  to	  murder	  
and	  mass	  suppression	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  their	  political	  and	  economic	  interests.	  	  
We	  believe	  that	  this	  goal	  of	  the	  complete	  subordination	  of	  all	  government	  and	  
state	  posts	  to	  direct	  popular	  sovereignty	  needs	  to	  be	  clearly	  and	  repeatedly	  
stated	  so	  that	  people	  know	  clearly	  for	  what	  they	  are	  fighting.	  Without	  a	  doubt,	  
most	  people	  in	  our	  society	  want	  this	  political	  change.	  The	  time	  for	  hesitation	  and	  
talk	  of	  reformism	  in	  this	  regard	  has	  finished	  (Inside	  Iran,	  July	  12,	  2011).	  
	  
While	  the	  manifesto	  includes	  more	  harsh	  criticism	  of	  Khatami’s	  controversial	  plea	  to	  the	  nation,	  
the	  document	  expresses	  persistent	  affinity	  and	  allegiance	  to	  Mousavi	  and	  Karroubi	  in	  light	  of	  
the	  important	  role	  they	  have	  played	  in	  the	  movement’s	  development	  and	  the	  persecution	  they	  
continue	  to	  endure	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  allegiance.	  	  	  It	  is	  encouraging	  to	  note	  that	  the	  authors	  of	  
this	  document	  have	  found	  a	  way	  to	  presumably	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  factions	  seeking	  a	  
more	  moderate	  platform	  and	  those	  seeking	  to	  overhaul	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  and	  the	  abolition	  
of	  the	  position	  of	  Supreme	  Leader.	  	  In	  calling	  for	  the	  subordination	  of	  all	  institutions	  of	  state	  to	  
the	  popular	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  people,	  the	  activists	  allow	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  a	  role	  for	  clerical	  
input	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  state	  so	  long	  as	  it	  does	  not	  trump	  the	  authority	  of	  popularly	  elected	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institutions.	  	  This	  vision	  is	  not	  new	  but	  was	  in	  fact	  championed	  by	  the	  late	  Ayatollah	  Hossein-­‐Ali	  
Montazeri	  who	  was	  at	  one	  time	  the	  heir	  designate	  to	  the	  position	  of	  Supreme	  Leader.	  	  
Unfortunately	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini,	  architect	  of	  Iran’s	  Islamic	  state	  did	  not	  share	  Montazeri’s	  
vision	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  position	  and	  the	  latter	  thusly	  fell	  out	  of	  favor	  and	  faced	  much	  
persecution	  during	  his	  lifetime	  in	  Qom.	  	  Ayatollah	  Montazeri’s	  death	  in	  December	  2009	  was	  
another	  watershed	  event	  for	  the	  Green	  Movement.	  	  Hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  mourners	  were	  
reported	  to	  have	  attended	  his	  funeral,	  which	  became	  another	  site	  for	  confrontation	  between	  
the	  state	  and	  the	  opposition,	  as	  security	  forces	  sought	  to	  disrupt	  the	  proceedings	  in	  response	  to	  
anti-­‐government	  slogans	  being	  shouted	  by	  many	  in	  attendance	  (The	  Telegraph,	  December	  21,	  
2009).	  	  This	  standoff	  preceded	  the	  Ashura	  demonstrations	  by	  nearly	  one	  week	  and	  contributed	  
to	  the	  heightened	  level	  of	  anger	  and	  violent	  confrontation	  reported	  on	  that	  day.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Some	  observers	  have	  questioned	  whether	  the	  government’s	  strategy	  of	  imposing	  an	  
isolation	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement’s	  leaders	  from	  its	  young	  base	  of	  support	  has	  paradoxically	  
pushed	  the	  opposition	  onto	  a	  much	  more	  radical	  course,	  i.e.	  from	  seeking	  reforms	  to	  
revolution.	  	  However,	  if	  the	  July	  12,	  manifesto	  can	  be	  recognized	  as	  authentic	  and	  
representative	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement’s	  new	  bottom	  line,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  movement	  is	  
adept	  at	  overcoming	  obstacles	  of	  consensus	  building	  within	  its	  own	  ranks.	  	  Commenting	  on	  the	  
hopeful	  prospects	  for	  this	  new	  generation	  engaged	  in	  the	  century	  long	  struggle	  for	  civil	  rights	  in	  
Iran,	  Mansour	  Farhang	  (2009),	  former	  Iranian	  diplomat	  and	  presently	  professor	  of	  politics	  at	  
Bennington	  College	  explained:	  	  
Criticism	  of	  what	  has	  happened	  in	  Iran	  is	  not	  simply	  ideological	  or	  utopian	  but	  
very	  concrete	  and	  pragmatic.	  	  Therefore	  contrary	  to	  the	  struggles	  of	  the	  past,	  I	  
am	  very	  hopeful	  that	  the	  democratic	  political	  discourse	  and	  democratization	  of	  a	  
new	  generation	  of	  Iranians	  who	  have	  gotten	  rid	  of	  the	  utopian	  ideal	  of	  Islam	  and	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the	  imported	  utopians	  of	  Maoism,	  Castroism	  and	  the	  rest	  as	  they	  have	  all	  gone	  
bankrupt	  […]	  the	  conditions	  and	  circumstances	  [are	  such]	  that	  the	  growth	  of	  
democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  education	  are	  possible.	  	  	  
	  
While	  this	  may	  be	  cause	  for	  celebration,	  as	  the	  conditions	  for	  a	  post-­‐Islamist	  push	  appear	  to	  be	  
taking	  hold	  in	  society,	  this	  new	  generation	  of	  non-­‐ideological	  Iranians	  have	  definitely	  got	  their	  
work	  cut	  out	  for	  them	  in	  their	  struggle	  to	  refashion	  the	  political	  rules	  that	  govern	  their	  
presently	  ideologically	  entrenched	  system	  of	  governance.	  	  Having	  sufficiently	  addressed	  the	  
intra-­‐movement	  frame	  disputes	  that	  have	  plagued	  the	  Iranian	  opposition	  following	  the	  advent	  
of	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  I	  will	  conclude	  this	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  dedicated	  to	  the	  variable	  
exploration	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement’s	  collective	  action	  frame	  via	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  last	  of	  the	  
three	  contested	  framing	  processes	  under	  exploration	  here,	  the	  dialectic	  between	  frames	  and	  
events.	  	  
The	  Dialectic	  Between	  Green	  Frames	  and	  Regional	  Events	  
Up	  to	  this	  point,	  this	  paper	  has	  predominantly	  explored	  collective	  action	  frames	  articulated	  by	  
movement	  leaders	  and	  proponents,	  all	  of	  which	  have	  targeted	  either	  the	  ruling	  establishment	  
or	  the	  movement’s	  own	  constituency	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  reconcile	  burgeoning	  divisions	  within	  the	  
Green	  Movement	  in	  the	  face	  of	  persistent	  persecution	  by	  the	  state.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  focus	  
on	  statements	  made	  by	  Iranian	  activists	  speaking	  directly	  to	  participants	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  in	  
order	  to	  assess	  the	  fidelity	  between	  the	  opposition’s	  targeted	  statements	  and	  regional	  
developments.	  	  The	  most	  common	  feature	  of	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  that	  took	  root	  in	  Tunisia,	  
Egypt,	  Bahrain,	  Yemen,	  Libya	  and	  elsewhere	  was	  the	  persistent	  call	  for	  the	  end	  of	  these	  
regimes.	  	  In	  states	  where	  these	  demonstrations	  succeeded,	  coalitions	  of	  activists	  and	  defected	  
politicians	  were	  quick	  to	  establish	  interim-­‐governing	  councils	  tasked	  with	  the	  unenviable	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responsibility	  of	  overseeing	  the	  transition	  of	  these	  various	  states	  towards	  representative	  forms	  
of	  government,	  conducting	  elections	  and	  drafting	  new	  constitutions	  that	  will	  define	  the	  rules	  
and	  character	  of	  these	  new	  states.	  	  Issues	  regarding	  ideology	  and	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  the	  
affairs	  of	  the	  state	  were	  largely	  unaddressed	  by	  the	  movements	  that	  brought	  about	  the	  demise	  
of	  secular	  autocracies	  in	  Tunisia,	  Egypt,	  Libya,	  and	  Yemen.	  	  	  
	   Recognizing	  the	  difficulties	  and	  dangers	  inherent	  to	  the	  arduous	  task	  of	  nation	  building	  
that	  must	  inevitably	  accompany	  this	  level	  of	  revolutionary	  success,	  Iranian	  opposition	  figures	  
were	  quick	  to	  extend	  cautionary	  advice	  to	  their	  newly	  enfranchised	  Arab	  neighbors.	  	  	  Ebrahim	  
Yazdi,	  secretary	  general	  of	  the	  Freedom	  Movement	  of	  Iran	  and	  foreign	  secretary	  in	  the	  Islamic	  
Republic’s	  first	  government,	  thrice	  detained	  and	  released	  after	  Iran’s	  disputed	  election	  in	  June	  
2009	  was	  sentenced	  to	  another	  8	  year	  prison	  term	  for	  a	  letter	  he	  wrote	  in	  October	  2011	  to	  
Tunisia’s	  Rached	  Ghannouchi,	  leader	  of	  Ennahda,	  Tunisia’s	  leading	  Islamist	  political	  party.	  	  Yazdi	  
calls	  on	  Ghannouchi	  to	  embrace	  all	  aspects	  of	  democracy,	  including	  tolerance.	  Yazdi	  warns	  
against	  toppling	  one	  dictatorship,	  only	  to	  lay	  the	  basis	  for	  another	  as	  happened	  in	  Iran	  when	  
the	  Shah	  was	  toppled	  (NPR,	  January	  17,	  2012).	  	  	  
	   In	  his	  letter,	  Yazdi	  outlined	  three	  categorical	  considerations	  that	  Ghannouchi’s	  populist	  
Ennahda	  party	  needs	  embrace	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  a	  democratic	  
system	  of	  governance.	  	  The	  first	  consideration	  Yazdi	  emphasizes	  is	  acceptance	  and	  respect	  for	  
diversity	  in	  society.	  	  Yazdi	  invokes	  the	  Quran,	  which	  reminds	  us	  of	  the	  differences	  present	  in	  
human	  society	  and	  the	  need	  for	  us	  to	  treat	  each	  other	  with	  respect.	  	  He	  points	  out	  that	  Tunisia	  
has	  all	  the	  features	  of	  a	  society	  in	  transition.	  	  He	  cautions	  that	  the	  diversity	  of	  views	  and	  ideas	  
of	  a	  society	  in	  transition	  is	  far	  greater	  than	  that	  of	  a	  society	  that	  enjoys	  a	  greater	  level	  of	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organization.	  	  Therefore,	  acceptance	  and	  respect	  for	  diversity	  in	  this	  stage	  of	  development	  is	  far	  
more	  important	  and	  necessary.	  The	  second	  consideration	  is	  tolerance	  and	  inclusion.	  	  In	  light	  of	  
the	  challenges	  that	  diversity	  poses	  to	  a	  community,	  tolerance	  is	  essential.	  	  However,	  tolerance,	  
he	  warns	  is	  not	  a	  sufficient	  safeguard	  against	  the	  consequences	  of	  conflict	  that	  may	  arise	  from	  
this	  diversity.	  	  His	  third	  and	  final	  consideration	  stresses	  the	  necessity	  for	  inclusion	  and	  
participation.	  	  Yazdi	  intones	  that	  Tunisia’s	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  requires	  inclusion	  
and	  participation	  of	  all	  Tunisian	  citizens,	  regardless	  of	  intellectual	  and	  religious	  affiliation,	  race,	  
or	  gender	  (Rah-­‐e	  Sabz,	  October	  30,	  2011).	  
	   Another	  letter	  written	  to	  Rached	  Ghannouchi	  and	  Mustafa	  Abdel-­‐Jalil,	  chief	  executive	  of	  
Libya’s	  National	  Transitional	  Council	  (NTC),	  and	  signed	  by	  several	  prominent	  Iranian	  activists	  
such	  as	  Shirin	  Ebadi,	  Hasan	  Yusefi	  Eshkevari,	  and	  Mehdi	  Bazargan,	  warns	  against	  opting	  for	  a	  
"religious	  state."	  The	  signatories	  say	  that	  Iran's	  experience	  has	  shown	  that	  a	  "religious	  
state"	  sooner	  or	  later	  turns	  into	  a	  "state	  religion"	  (Rooz	  Online,	  November	  5,	  2011).	  	  	  In	  
comments	  shared	  at	  a	  meeting	  held	  at	  George	  Washington	  University,	  which	  brought	  together	  
speakers	  from	  Libya,	  Syria,	  Egypt,	  Tunisia	  and	  Iran,	  Akbar	  Ganji	  explained	  that	  the	  successful	  
democratization	  of	  other	  states	  in	  the	  region	  is	  not	  incidental	  to	  Iranian	  activists	  and	  that	  the	  
political	  trajectories	  of	  these	  various	  nations	  are	  linked.	  	  Ganji	  explains:	  “The	  more	  democratic	  
states	  that	  are	  established	  in	  the	  region	  the	  more	  pressure	  non-­‐democratic	  states	  will	  face	  as	  a	  
consequence”	  (BBC	  Persian,	  September	  20,	  2011).	  	  One	  year	  following	  the	  successful	  ouster	  of	  
leaders	  in	  Tunisia,	  Egypt,	  Libya,	  and	  Yemen,	  it	  is	  still	  too	  soon	  to	  determine	  whether	  these	  
revolts	  will	  yield	  truly	  democratic	  states	  that	  institutionalize	  mechanisms	  for	  popular	  rule	  and	  
protect	  against	  discrimination	  and	  other	  autocratic	  tendencies.	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   Islamist	  parties/politicians	  have	  been	  elected	  by	  majority	  to	  draft	  new	  constitutions	  in	  
Tunisia	  and	  Egypt,	  but	  constituent	  assemblies	  in	  both	  countries	  are	  facing	  numerous	  pressures	  
arising	  from	  dissenting	  views	  on	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  and	  state	  both	  internally	  and	  in	  the	  streets.	  	  
In	  Tunisia,	  activists	  have	  staged	  competing	  demonstrations	  for	  and	  against	  upholding	  Tunisia’s	  
historic	  commitment	  to	  a	  secular	  state	  (National	  Tunisian	  TV,	  March	  20,	  2012;	  African	  News,	  
March	  16,	  2012).	  	  In	  Egypt,	  nearly	  20	  secular	  and	  liberal	  members	  of	  Egypt’s	  constitutional	  
assembly	  have	  relinquished	  their	  seats,	  saying	  that	  the	  body	  does	  not	  accurately	  represent	  the	  
diversity	  of	  Egyptian	  society;	  decrying	  the	  limited	  representation	  afforded	  to	  women,	  youth,	  
and	  Christians.	  	  Some	  of	  these	  defected	  lawmakers	  have	  vowed	  to	  draft	  an	  alternative	  
constitution	  outside	  of	  the	  official	  assembly	  and	  in	  collaboration	  with	  all	  segments	  of	  society.	  	  
The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  disputes	  that	  Islamists	  constitute	  a	  majority	  on	  the	  constitutional	  
assembly.	  	  It	  says	  that	  only	  48	  members	  out	  of	  100	  are	  Islamists.	  	  What	  is	  more,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  
growing	  dispute	  within	  Egypt	  between	  the	  ruling	  military	  council	  and	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  
over	  the	  transition	  to	  civilian	  rule	  planned	  for	  June	  2012	  (BBC,	  March	  28,	  2012).	  	  Clearly	  these	  
states	  are	  experiencing	  the	  sort	  of	  diversity	  and	  contestation	  that	  Yazdi	  cautioned	  is	  
characteristic	  of	  societies	  in	  transition	  and	  facing	  the	  arduous	  task	  of	  navigating	  this	  
transformational	  period.	  	  	  
	   Mousavi	  and	  Karroubi	  initially	  sought	  to	  frame	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  as	  inspired	  by	  their	  
own	  Green	  Movement,	  in	  order	  to	  legitimate	  the	  movement’s	  goals	  and	  resurrect	  a	  sense	  of	  
agency	  amongst	  its	  own	  base	  of	  support.	  	  More	  critical	  to	  the	  democracy	  movement	  at	  this	  
juncture	  however,	  is	  the	  successful	  institutionalization	  of	  democracy	  in	  Arab	  Spring	  states,	  
which	  Iranians	  may	  look	  to	  for	  inspiration	  and	  validation	  in	  the	  future.	  	  Recognizing	  this	  reality,	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the	  Iranian	  regime	  has,	  as	  mentioned,	  advertised	  its	  own	  example	  as	  cause	  and	  inspiration	  for	  
the	  Arab	  uprisings,	  encouraging	  Arab	  states	  to	  more	  or	  less	  emulate	  the	  Iranian	  system	  of	  
government.	  	  I	  will	  now	  explore	  this	  countervailing	  campaign	  in	  the	  same	  fashion;	  utilizing	  the	  
same	  set	  of	  variables	  that	  served	  to	  structure	  the	  preceding	  section	  dedicated	  to	  the	  Green	  
Movement.	  	  	  
An	  Islamic	  Awakening?	  
Speaking	  to	  an	  expansive	  gathering	  of	  Friday	  prayer	  attendees	  on	  February	  4,	  2011,	  Ayatollah	  
Khamenei	  declared	  that	  the	  approaching	  ten	  days	  of	  dawn,	  which	  are	  celebrated	  in	  the	  lead	  up	  
to	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  on	  February	  11,	  were	  characterized	  by	  a	  different	  
degree	  of	  enthusiasm	  that	  year.	  	  He	  explained	  that	  this	  is	  because,	  “after	  making	  endeavors	  for	  
many	  years,	  people	  are	  witnessing	  that	  the	  reverberation	  of	  their	  voices	  and	  their	  innocent	  but	  
powerful	  cry	  is	  being	  clearly	  heard	  today	  in	  various	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  Muslim	  world”	  (IRINN	  
Television,	  February	  4,	  2011).	  	  Clearly	  referring	  to	  the	  Arab	  uprisings,	  Khamenei	  goes	  on	  to	  
suggest	  that	  the	  Islamic	  Awakening,	  first	  occasioned	  by	  the	  success	  of	  Iran’s	  Islamic	  Revolution,	  
is	  fully	  manifest	  in	  the	  region	  today.	  	  Speaking	  first	  to	  his	  fellow	  Iranians,	  Khamenei	  declared:	  
“Your	  emphasis	  during	  the	  32	  years	  on	  the	  main	  slogans	  of	  the	  revolution	  had	  this	  great	  
blessing,	  that	  the	  world	  of	  Islam	  has	  a	  lot	  more	  respect	  for	  Iran	  [...]	  The	  Iranian	  nation	  has	  
turned	  to	  a	  role	  model	  and	  you	  are	  witnessing	  this	  fact	  today”	  (IRINN	  Television,	  February	  4,	  
2011).	  	  For	  Khamenei,	  this	  occasion	  to	  claim	  victory	  for	  Iran’s	  Islamic	  Revolution	  presented	  
several	  opportunities	  for	  the	  regime.	  	  It	  provided	  the	  leader	  the	  occasion	  to	  champion	  the	  
export	  of	  the	  Revolution,	  which	  was	  a	  cherished	  goal	  of	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini,	  to	  trumpet	  the	  
demise	  of	  Western	  Imperial	  power	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  an	  occasion	  to	  shore	  up	  credibility	  for	  the	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Islamic	  system	  at	  home	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  many	  confrontations	  between	  the	  state	  and	  Green	  
Movement	  activists	  since	  June	  2009.	  	  	  
	   The	  shifting	  tides	  of	  power	  and	  allegiance	  in	  the	  region	  also	  presented	  the	  Iranian	  
regime	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  accumulate	  further	  regional	  support	  which	  might	  help	  check	  the	  
escalating	  international	  campaign	  targeting	  Iran’s	  nuclear	  program.	  	  In	  the	  service	  of	  the	  latter,	  
Khamenei	  directed	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  his	  sermon	  directly	  to	  Arab	  populations	  engaged	  in	  
historic	  upheavals.	  	  Khamenei	  thusly	  read	  a	  prepared	  statement	  in	  Arabic,	  which	  enumerated	  
cautionary	  advice	  to	  Arab	  revolutionaries	  as	  to	  how	  best	  to	  safeguard	  their	  revolution	  from	  
subversion	  by	  what	  Iranian	  hardliners	  term	  “the	  global	  arrogance.”	  	  Before	  delivering	  his	  
comments	  in	  Arabic,	  Khamenei	  addressed	  American	  and	  Israeli	  insecurities	  regarding	  the	  turn	  
of	  events	  in	  the	  region,	  a	  pretext	  he	  uses	  to	  justify	  his	  suspicions	  regarding	  Western	  attempts	  to	  
hijack	  and	  derail	  these	  various	  revolutions	  as	  a	  means	  to	  secure	  their	  regional	  hegemony	  (IRINN	  
Television,	  February	  4,	  2011).	  	  	  	  
	   In	  framing	  the	  motivations	  of	  Egyptian	  protestors,	  Khamenei	  stated:	  “The	  greatest	  crime	  
of	  this	  current	  regime	  in	  Egypt	  is	  that	  it	  brought	  down	  a	  great	  nation	  from	  an	  elevated	  status	  to	  
that	  of	  lowly	  helpless	  pawn	  in	  political	  games	  in	  the	  region.	  	  The	  explosion	  we	  are	  witnessing	  in	  
the	  great	  Egyptian	  nation	  is	  a	  response	  to	  this	  unforgivable	  crime	  a	  dependent	  dictator	  
committed	  against	  his	  people”	  (Race	  for	  Iran,	  February	  4,	  2011).	  	  Here	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  
Khamenei	  appraises	  Egyptian	  defiance	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  subservient	  role	  the	  Mubarak	  
regime	  played	  in	  maintaining	  peace	  with	  Israel	  and	  in	  currying	  favor	  with	  the	  West	  and	  its	  
hegemonic	  agenda.	  	  This	  criteria,	  while	  potentially	  related	  to	  issues	  of	  disenfranchisement,	  is	  
clearly	  differentiated	  from	  Mousavi’s	  own	  diagnostic	  frame	  regarding	  collective	  action	  in	  Egypt	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resulting	  from	  concerns	  related	  to	  electoral	  fraud	  and	  repressive	  tendencies	  manifest	  under	  
Mubarak’s	  reign.	  	  	  
	   While	  admitting	  that	  each	  nation’s	  uprising	  is	  necessarily	  the	  unique	  byproduct	  of	  the	  
particular	  country’s	  geographic,	  historical,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  cofounders	  as	  he	  puts	  it,	  
Khamenei	  presages	  his	  advice	  to	  Egypt	  and	  other	  Arab	  nations	  by	  commenting	  that	  there	  are	  
relevant	  commonalities	  among	  the	  Iranian	  revolution	  and	  the	  regional	  awakenings	  where	  the	  
experience	  of	  one	  nation	  maybe	  useful	  to	  others	  in	  this	  context.	  	  Urging	  vigilance,	  good	  faith	  in	  
the	  righteousness	  of	  their	  cause,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  maintaining	  a	  united	  front,	  Khamenei	  
warned	  against	  entertaining	  any	  arbitration	  by	  the	  West	  in	  securing	  a	  political	  transition	  for	  
these	  various	  states,	  urging	  his	  audience	  not	  to	  tolerate	  such	  an	  insult	  and	  not	  to	  “submit	  to	  
anything	  but	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  system	  that	  is	  independent,	  works	  for	  the	  people,	  and	  
genuinely	  adheres	  to	  Islam”	  (Race	  for	  Iran,	  February	  4,	  2011).	  	  	  
	   Khamenei	  concludes	  his	  sermon	  and	  message	  to	  the	  Arab	  world	  by	  explaining	  that	  he	  
has	  offered	  up	  these	  experiences	  as	  a	  Muslim	  brother,	  and	  out	  of	  his	  religious	  duties	  and	  
obligations.	  	  His	  final	  warning	  addressed	  anticipated	  frames	  constructed	  by	  Western	  media	  
outlets,	  seeking	  to	  cast	  the	  Iranian	  nation	  as	  meddling	  or	  opportunist:	  	  
They	  will	  claim	  Iran	  wants	  to	  interfere.	  	  They	  will	  say	  Iran	  wants	  to	  turn	  Egypt	  
into	  a	  Shi’a	  nation.	  	  They	  will	  say	  Iran	  wants	  to	  export	  “Velayat	  Faghih.”	  And	  Iran	  
wants	  …	  Iran	  wants	  …	  Iran	  wants	  …	  They	  have	  repeated	  these	  lies	  for	  30	  years	  to	  
keep	  our	  nations	  and	  people	  apart	  and	  deprive	  us	  from	  helping	  one	  another.	  	  
They	  say	  these	  and	  their	  paid	  lackeys	  will	  repeat	  these	  (Race	  for	  Iran,	  February	  4,	  
2011).	  	  	  
	  
While	  Khamenei	  is	  shrewd	  enough	  to	  downplay	  Iranian	  intentions	  to	  export	  its	  own	  revolution	  
verbatim,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  he	  is	  invested	  in	  encouraging	  transitions	  beholden	  to	  Islamic	  precepts,	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that	  are	  at	  once	  independent	  but	  united	  in	  fraternal	  opposition	  to	  hostile	  or	  self	  serving	  
Western	  agendas.	  	  	  
	   In	  an	  effort	  to	  disseminate	  this	  frame	  regarding	  the	  regime’s	  triumphant	  interpretation	  
of	  events	  unfolding	  across	  the	  region,	  Friday	  prayer	  leaders,	  columnists,	  and	  politicians	  quickly	  
began	  to	  echo	  the	  fruition	  of	  a	  regional	  Islamic	  Awakening	  modeled	  after	  the	  success	  of	  Iran’s	  
own	  Islamic	  Revolution	  and	  Republic.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  many	  contributors	  sought	  to	  substantiate	  
their	  interpretation	  of	  events	  by	  pointing	  to	  similar	  frames	  invoked	  by	  Western	  journalists	  or	  
politicians	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Arab	  uprisings.	  	  The	  head	  of	  Iran’s	  public	  broadcasting	  station,	  
Ezzatollah	  Zarghami,	  took	  the	  liberty	  to	  justify	  Iran’s	  assertions	  by	  quoting	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  
sources.	  	  Zarghami	  stated:	  “The	  head	  of	  the	  France	  Center	  of	  Strategic	  Studies	  announced	  that	  
the	  Egyptians	  want	  a	  government	  based	  on	  Islam,”	  and	  mentioned	  that	  the	  “Zionist	  television	  
network”	  had	  drawn	  parallels	  between	  images	  captured	  of	  Egyptian	  protests	  and	  photos	  taken	  
of	  Iran’s	  Islamic	  Revolution.	  	  He	  also	  referred	  to	  comments	  by	  EU	  President,	  Javier	  Solana,	  
stating:	  This	  person	  has	  said	  that	  Iran	  has	  taken	  over	  leadership	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  has	  
turned	  into	  a	  premier	  global	  power”.	  	  Finally	  he	  also	  refers	  to	  Fareed	  Zakaria’s	  editorial	  cited	  
earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  remarking	  that	  the	  well-­‐known	  US	  analyst	  had	  described	  the	  Egyptian	  
revolt	  as	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  (Keyhan	  Online,	  March	  3,	  2011).	  	  While	  most	  of	  
these	  instances	  cited	  by	  Zarghami	  speak	  to	  Western	  misgivings	  regarding	  the	  potential	  outcome	  
of	  popular	  unrest	  in	  the	  region,	  if	  read	  in	  their	  proper	  context,	  this	  commentary	  would	  not	  so	  
neatly	  substantiate	  the	  Iranian	  regime’s	  version	  of	  events.	  	  This	  is	  clearly	  the	  case	  in	  regards	  to	  
Zakaria’s	  analysis	  for	  instance,	  which	  was	  more	  about	  addressing	  concerns	  circulating	  amongst	  
American	  pundits	  and	  politicians	  than	  endorsing	  the	  correlation	  between	  the	  two	  revolutions.	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However	  the	  strategic	  deployment	  of	  statements	  made	  by	  these	  various	  representatives	  
located	  in	  the	  West	  provides	  compelling	  evidence	  for	  the	  regime’s	  construction	  of	  reality	  in	  
conformity	  with	  its	  own	  political	  agenda.	  	  	  	  
	   Facing	  the	  opposition’s	  counterframe	  concerning	  the	  inspirational	  role	  Mousavi	  and	  
Karroubi	  ascribed	  to	  the	  Green	  Movement	  in	  inspiring	  the	  Arab	  uprisings,	  the	  regime	  was	  quick	  
to	  dismiss	  these	  parallels	  and	  denounce	  the	  opposition’s	  calls	  for	  staging	  solidarity	  
demonstrations	  on	  February	  14.	  	  Commenting	  on	  this	  matter,	  Iranian	  Judiciary	  Spokesman,	  
Gholamhoseyn	  Ezhe’i	  stated:	  	  
A	  request	  for	  a	  rally	  on	  25	  Bahman	  (14	  February)	  means	  separating	  themselves	  
from	  the	  people,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  political	  move	  …	  If	  an	  individual	  truly	  shares	  the	  
motivation	  of	  the	  brave	  Egyptians	  and	  Tunisians,	  then	  he	  will	  participate	  in	  the	  
rally	  to	  be	  held	  on	  22	  Bahman	  (11	  February,	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Islamic	  
Revolution’s	  victory),	  along	  with	  the	  government	  and	  the	  nation	  (Iranian	  Labor	  
News	  Agency,	  February	  9,	  2011).	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  February	  14	  demonstrations	  took	  place	  notwithstanding	  these	  kinds	  of	  public	  
remonstrations	  and	  the	  heavy	  security	  presence	  out	  in	  force	  that	  day,	  Iranian	  state	  media	  
wasted	  no	  time	  in	  retooling	  their	  language	  regarding	  Western	  interference	  in	  regional	  events,	  
making	  the	  case	  that	  the	  Iranian	  opposition	  had	  come	  to	  constitute	  a	  subversive	  fifth	  column	  
buttressed	  by	  American,	  Israeli,	  and	  British	  intelligence	  services.	  	  This	  accusation	  has	  been	  
levied	  against	  Iran’s	  reform-­‐minded	  opposition	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  occasions	  in	  the	  country’s	  recent	  
history,	  as	  noted	  in	  an	  earlier	  chapter	  of	  this	  work.	  	  However,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  Iranian	  
government	  sought	  to	  cast	  this	  alleged	  collusion	  as	  part	  of	  a	  “false	  wave”	  orchestrated	  to	  
deceive	  the	  Arab	  and	  international	  community	  during	  this	  crucial	  historical	  juncture.	  Addressing	  
this	  alleged	  Western	  conspiracy,	  Iran’s	  Foreign	  Ministry	  Spokesman,	  Ramin	  Mehmanparast,	  
criticized	  these	  Western	  attempts	  to	  foment	  revolution	  in	  Iran	  stating:	  “They	  are	  making	  great	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efforts	  to	  show	  that	  something	  like	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  North	  African	  and	  Middle	  Eastern	  
countries	  will	  happen	  in	  independent	  and	  successful	  countries	  in	  the	  region	  like	  the	  Islamic	  
Republic	  of	  Iran”	  (IRINN,	  March	  8,	  2011).	  	  	  
	   Following	  the	  February	  14	  demonstrations,	  accusations	  leveled	  by	  the	  far	  right	  in	  Iran	  
against	  the	  country’s	  opposition	  became	  more	  frenzied;	  several	  members	  of	  parliament	  staged	  
a	  demonstration	  the	  following	  day	  on	  February	  15,	  calling	  for	  the	  trial	  and	  executions	  of	  the	  
leaders	  of	  the	  sedition	  on	  the	  charge	  of	  being	  “corrupt	  on	  earth”	  (BBC,	  February	  15,	  2011).	  	  This	  
demonstration	  was	  followed	  by	  numerous	  like-­‐minded	  statements	  and	  editorials	  issued	  by	  
regime	  loyalists.	  	  In	  an	  article	  published	  in	  Keyhan,	  the	  leading	  establishment	  daily,	  an	  expert	  on	  
jurisprudence	  and	  legal	  affairs	  argued	  that	  in	  light	  of	  the	  events	  of	  February	  14,	  “there	  is	  a	  clear	  
line	  up	  between	  the	  two	  fronts	  of	  Revolution	  and	  anti-­‐Revolution	  and	  the	  confrontation	  of	  
Muhammadian	  Islam	  against	  American	  Islam.”	  	  The	  author	  goes	  on	  to	  state:	  “Based	  on	  the	  
teachings	  of	  jurisprudence	  and	  the	  law	  and	  the	  Islamic	  Penal	  Code,	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  the	  
seditionists	  like	  “Musavi	  and	  Karrubi”	  are	  guilty	  of	  waging	  war	  against	  God,	  ignoring	  the	  
guardianship	  of	  the	  top	  spiritual	  leader,	  and	  spreading	  corruption	  on	  earth.	  	  In	  legal	  and	  
juridical	  terms,	  the	  punishment	  of	  such	  individuals	  cannot	  be	  milder	  than	  execution”	  (Keyhan,	  
February	  25,	  2011).	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  two	  opposition	  leaders	  were	  preempted	  from	  attending	  
the	  February	  14	  demonstrations,	  which	  occasioned	  these	  allegations,	  one	  must	  simply	  assume	  
that	  the	  simple	  act	  of	  encouraging	  public	  protests	  as	  estranged	  members	  of	  the	  Islamic	  state	  is	  
sufficient	  grounds	  for	  execution.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  neither	  Mousavi	  nor	  Karroubi	  have	  faced	  public	  
prosecution	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law,	  let	  alone	  been	  executed	  for	  their	  role	  in	  the	  country’s	  latest	  
political	  unrest	  indicates	  that	  the	  regime	  is	  all	  too	  aware	  of	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  legal	  case,	  as	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well	  as	  the	  danger	  such	  a	  radical	  move	  would	  likely	  engender	  in	  terms	  of	  renewed	  public	  
outcry.	  	  	  	  	  
	   Other	  criticisms	  and	  condemnations	  of	  the	  opposition	  leaders	  have	  been	  couched	  in	  
bizarre	  and	  conspiratorial	  language	  punctuated	  by	  the	  strategic	  invocation	  of	  resonant	  Shi’a	  
narratives	  intended	  to	  lend	  credibility	  to	  the	  regime’s	  framing	  of	  this	  contemporary	  conflict.	  	  	  
For	  example,	  in	  an	  editorial	  that	  appeared	  on	  March	  1,	  2011	  in	  Keyhan,	  the	  author	  echoed	  
other	  calls	  for	  the	  prosecution	  of	  Mousavi,	  Karroubi,	  and	  Khatami,	  alluding	  to	  the	  secretive	  
pacts	  they	  made	  with	  foreign	  entities	  in	  what	  may	  politely	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  creative	  and	  or	  
paranoid	  terms.	  	  The	  author,	  describing	  Khamenei’s	  discerning	  wisdom,	  explains	  that	  the	  
Leader	  (who	  the	  author	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘the	  Ali	  of	  our	  age’)	  could	  see	  the	  collusion	  taking	  place	  
before	  his	  eyes:	  “he	  could	  see	  the	  Zionist	  George	  Soros,	  who	  had	  borrowed	  a	  piece	  of	  a	  green	  
cloth	  from	  Jean	  Sharp”	  –	  the	  same	  color	  Green	  featured	  in	  the	  Palace	  of	  Mu’awiyya	  –	  “who	  had	  
given	  it	  to	  Khatami	  to	  compare	  it	  to	  the	  greenness	  of	  the	  “Green	  Dome”	  of	  the	  Prophet	  of	  God	  
(peace	  be	  upon	  Him),	  and	  had	  put	  it	  round	  Mousavi’s	  neck	  –	  the	  man	  who	  was	  the	  same	  as	  
Ash’ath	  bin-­‐Gheyth	  who	  signed	  a	  secret	  covenant	  with	  the	  Jews”	  all	  knowingly	  conspired	  to	  
“cover	  up	  the	  shame	  of	  their	  treachery	  against	  one’s	  homeland	  under	  the	  color	  green”	  (Keyhan,	  
March	  1,	  2011).	  	  With	  the	  proliferation	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  public	  allegations,	  those	  establishment	  
figures	  who	  failed	  to	  issue	  similar	  condemnations	  fell	  prey	  to	  criticisms	  and	  suspicions	  
concerning	  the	  righteousness	  of	  their	  political	  allegiances.	  	  This	  provides	  a	  point	  of	  entrance	  for	  
the	  discussion	  of	  frame	  disputes	  within	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  related	  to	  both	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  
and	  the	  events	  of	  February	  14,	  2011.	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Frame	  Disputes	  within	  the	  Iranian	  Regime	  
	  
The	  majority	  of	  disputes	  explored	  in	  this	  section	  refer	  less	  to	  regional	  events,	  and	  in	  turn	  focus	  
more	  on	  the	  framing	  and	  responses	  to	  the	  resurgence	  of	  oppositional	  activity	  inside	  Iran	  
inspired	  by	  the	  Arab	  uprisings.	  	  The	  one	  exception	  to	  this	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  Ahmadinejad,	  
who	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  distinguish	  himself	  from	  the	  hardline/principlist	  camp,	  has	  been	  quoted	  
as	  referring	  to	  regional	  events	  not	  as	  an	  Islamic	  Awakening	  but	  as	  a	  great	  “human	  awakening”	  
that	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  ideals	  of	  “justice	  and	  monotheism”	  (IRINN,	  March	  7,	  2011).	  	  This	  frame	  
conforms	  to	  the	  President’s	  populist	  appeals	  to	  Iranian	  nationalism	  over	  the	  state’s	  Islamic	  
identity,	  a	  stance	  that	  the	  president	  adopted	  during	  his	  second	  term,	  which	  many	  ascribe	  to	  the	  
influence	  of	  Ahmadinejad’s	  controversial	  chief	  of	  staff	  Esfandiar	  Rahim	  Mashaei	  (Geist,	  Tehran	  
Bureau).	  	  While	  this	  disparity	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  widening	  gulf	  
between	  the	  president	  and	  supreme	  leader’s	  respective	  political	  camps,	  this	  departure	  was	  
largely	  overlooked	  given	  Ahmadinejad’s	  willingness	  to	  condemn	  Iranian	  opposition	  protestors.	  	  
Commenting	  on	  the	  February	  14	  demonstrations,	  the	  president	  accused	  the	  opposition	  of	  
wanting	  to	  tarnish	  the	  Iranian	  nation’s	  brilliance,	  stating:	  “It	  is	  a	  shining	  sun.	  	  They	  threw	  some	  
dust	  towards	  the	  sun.	  It	  is	  funny.	  	  By	  throwing	  dust	  at	  the	  sun,	  the	  dust	  will	  return	  to	  their	  eyes”	  
(BBC,	  February	  15,	  2011).	  	  While	  accusations	  and	  charges	  against	  Ahmadinejad	  have	  escalated	  
in	  recent	  months,	  with	  the	  President	  actually	  held	  to	  account	  before	  parliament	  in	  March	  2012	  
for	  a	  variety	  of	  contentions	  related	  to	  his	  conduct	  during	  the	  second	  term	  of	  his	  presidency,	  
none	  of	  the	  charges	  pertain	  to	  his	  comment	  on	  the	  sedition	  (The	  Guardian,	  June	  7,	  2011;	  
Tehran	  Bureau,	  March	  9,	  2012).	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   Former	  president,	  and	  current	  chief	  of	  Iran’s	  Expediency	  Council,	  Akbar	  Hashemi	  
Rafsanjani	  has	  been	  less	  immune	  to	  criticism	  regarding	  suspicions	  over	  his	  divided	  loyalty	  to	  the	  
regime	  at	  this	  crucial	  juncture.	  	  In	  a	  variety	  of	  articles	  and	  statements	  following	  the	  February	  14	  
demonstrations,	  Rafsanjani’s	  conduct	  during	  the	  20-­‐month	  period	  following	  the	  election	  crisis	  
of	  June	  2009	  was	  called	  into	  question.	  	  One	  commentator	  argues	  that	  “whether	  he	  likes	  it	  or	  
not,	  he	  [Rafsanjani]	  placed	  himself	  in	  a	  defensive	  position,	  and	  has	  acted	  in	  a	  hasty	  and	  
inappropriate	  manner	  […]	  It	  is	  truly	  a	  great	  pity	  that	  in	  such	  a	  decisive	  juncture	  in	  the	  political	  
history	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic,	  a	  great	  figure	  such	  as	  Hashemi-­‐Rafsanjani,	  with	  such	  a	  valuable	  
record	  […]	  keeps	  quiet	  or	  adopts	  a	  contrary	  stance,	  such	  as	  the	  stance	  the	  he	  adopted	  towards	  
the	  events	  of	  25	  Bahman	  (14	  February)”	  (Resalat	  Online,	  March	  1,	  2011).	  	  While	  the	  author	  of	  
this	  statement	  concedes	  that	  Rafsanjani	  is	  not	  in	  fact	  one	  of	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  sedition,	  he	  
concludes	  that	  he	  has	  not	  emerged	  from	  this	  “divine	  test”	  unscathed.	  	  
	   Ironically,	  Rafsanjani	  had	  actually	  issued	  a	  statement	  condemning	  the	  activities	  of	  
opposition	  actors	  on	  February	  14,	  stating:	  “Lawlessness	  in	  society	  gives	  way	  to	  arbitrariness	  […]	  
We	  must	  stand	  together	  in	  total	  unity	  and	  intelligently	  against	  plots	  hatched	  by	  foreign	  powers”	  
(Rafsanjani,	  February	  16,	  2011).	  	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  statement,	  another	  statement	  issued	  by	  
Mohammad	  Reza	  Bahonar,	  secretary	  general	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Association	  of	  Engineers,	  warned	  
“the	  silence	  of	  some	  ‘elites’	  will	  not	  create	  an	  appropriate	  atmosphere	  for	  their	  political	  future”	  
(Siyasat-­‐e	  Ruz,	  February	  23,	  2012).	  	  This	  kind	  of	  veiled	  threat	  would	  prove	  prescient,	  as	  the	  
culmination	  of	  these	  attacks	  amounted	  to	  Rafsanjani’s	  decision	  not	  to	  stand	  for	  reelection	  
against	  the	  establishment	  candidate,	  Ayatollah	  Mahdavi	  Kani,	  in	  the	  March	  election	  contest	  for	  
chairmanship	  of	  the	  assembly	  of	  experts,	  the	  critical	  clerical	  body	  charged	  with	  overseeing	  the	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conduct	  of	  the	  supreme	  leader	  as	  well	  as	  selecting	  the	  leader’s	  replacement	  in	  the	  event	  that	  
such	  a	  need	  arises	  (Tehran	  Bureau,	  March	  9,	  2011).	  
	   Additionally,	  these	  criticisms	  were	  not	  limited	  to	  Rafsanjani	  himself	  but	  have	  also	  been	  
leveled	  against	  his	  children.	  	  In	  comments	  shared	  with	  the	  nation	  on	  Iranian	  television,	  
intelligence	  minister,	  Heydar	  Moslehi,	  argued	  that	  one	  of	  the	  dangerous	  and	  subversive	  tactics	  
employed	  by	  the	  global	  arrogance	  is	  the	  use	  of	  notables’	  children.	  	  Moslehi	  explains	  that	  the	  
nation	  is	  currently	  questioning	  Rafsanjani	  about	  the	  conduct	  of	  his	  three	  children	  regarding	  the	  
alleged	  affiliation	  with	  the	  sedition.	  	  These	  questions	  include:	  	  
Why	  did	  Mr.	  Hashemi’s	  children	  and	  their	  followers	  shed	  the	  blood	  of	  ordinary	  
people,	  security	  forces	  and	  Basiji	  in	  Nezam	  street	  and	  he	  stayed	  silent	  and	  said:	  
Faezeh	  did	  not	  go	  for	  the	  riots,	  she	  went	  for	  a	  sandwich!	  People	  are	  asking	  about	  
Mehdi’s	  political	  and	  financial	  corruption	  and	  fleeing	  the	  country	  and	  Hashemi	  
states:	  He	  has	  gone	  for	  further	  studies	  with	  a	  monthly	  salary	  of	  $5,000	  to	  London.	  	  
People	  are	  questioning	  about	  suspected	  communications	  and	  foreign	  trips	  by	  
Hashemi’s	  children	  and	  he	  says:	  They	  have	  work	  responsibilities	  and	  are	  on	  
official	  missions!	  People	  are	  questioning	  about	  the	  slogan	  “No	  Gaza,	  No	  Lebanon”	  
and	  the	  desecration	  of	  Imam	  Khomeyni	  and	  the	  guardianship	  of	  the	  supreme	  
jursiconsult	  and	  the	  Ashura	  tragedy	  –	  and	  he	  is	  silent	  (Iran	  Online,	  March	  1,	  
2011).	  
	  
This	  kind	  of	  aggressive	  campaign	  by	  the	  regime,	  to	  try	  Hashemi	  and	  his	  family	  in	  the	  court	  of	  
public	  opinion,	  speaks	  to	  the	  lengths	  that	  the	  state	  will	  go	  in	  ensuring	  conformity	  amongst	  the	  
establishment’s	  elite	  power	  brokers.	  	  
	   Another	  source	  of	  contention,	  which	  indirectly	  constitutes	  a	  frame	  dispute	  relative	  to	  
the	  regime’s	  portrayal	  of	  itself	  as	  the	  champion	  of	  this	  resurgent	  Islamic	  Awakening,	  ironically	  
comes	  from	  members	  of	  Iran’s	  clergy	  residing	  in	  Qom,	  the	  epicenter	  for	  the	  country’s	  Islamic	  
seminaries	  and	  scholarship.	  	  	  	  More	  specifically,	  a	  handful	  of	  dissident,	  albeit	  high	  ranking	  
Ayatollahs	  have	  provided	  council	  to	  Iran's	  victims	  of	  political	  violence,	  levied	  virulent	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condemnations	  against	  the	  state's	  morally	  bankrupted	  treatment	  of	  its	  citizens	  and	  warned	  of	  
the	  consequences	  such	  abuses	  would	  have	  for	  the	  longevity	  of	  the	  Islamic	  system.	  	  Such	  figures	  
include	  Ayatollahs	  Sanei	  and	  Mousavi-­‐Ardbilli,	  Grand	  Ayatollahs	  Vahdi-­‐Khorsani	  and	  Bayat-­‐
Zanjani	  and	  Ayatollah	  Mohammad	  Dastgheib	  (Athanasiadis,	  The	  Christian	  Science	  Monitor,	  
January	  6,	  2010;	  Tehran	  Bureau,	  October	  5,	  2010;	  Rah-­‐e	  Sabz,	  February	  14,	  2011).	  	  	  	  	  
	   There	  have	  been	  several	  attempts	  initiated	  by	  hardline	  elements	  within	  the	  regime	  to	  
instill	  conformity	  amongst	  this	  group	  of	  Ayatollahs	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  plight	  of	  Iran’s	  
persecuted	  opposition.	  	  	  In	  one	  instance	  the	  Qom	  Theological	  Lecturers	  Association,	  a	  group	  of	  
clergy	  closely	  allied	  with	  the	  regime,	  issued	  a	  mandate	  that	  Ayatollah	  Sanei’s	  edicts	  or	  fatwas	  
are	  no	  longer	  legally	  binding	  in	  light	  of	  the	  counsel	  he	  has	  provided	  to	  victims	  of	  Iran’s	  political	  
violence.	  	  This	  ruling	  was	  repudiated	  by	  rival	  clerical	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Association	  of	  Lecturers	  
and	  Scholars	  of	  Qom	  Theological	  Seminary	  and	  the	  Association	  of	  Combatant	  Clerics	  who	  rose	  
to	  the	  defense	  of	  Ayatollah	  Sanei	  and	  his	  position	  as	  a	  source	  of	  emulation	  within	  the	  Shi’a	  
community	  (Athanasiadis,	  The	  Christian	  Science	  Monitor,	  January	  6,	  2010).	  	  This	  move	  
preceded	  the	  renewal	  of	  oppositional	  activity	  in	  February	  2011.	  	  While	  intended	  to	  inspire	  
obedience	  and	  the	  abandonment	  of	  criticism	  regarding	  the	  regime’s	  treatment	  of	  political	  
prisoners	  and	  their	  families,	  Ayatollah	  Sanei	  remained	  steadfast	  in	  the	  counsel	  he	  provided	  to	  
members	  of	  the	  opposition	  and	  his	  critiques	  of	  power	  and	  its	  abuses	  under	  the	  present	  system	  
of	  leadership.	  	  	  
	   Speaking	  to	  a	  gathering	  of	  political	  activists	  and	  families	  of	  Iran’s	  political	  prisoners	  on	  
February	  14,	  2011,	  Ayatollah	  Sanei	  cautioned:	  “The	  despotism	  we	  are	  witnessing	  today	  is	  
unprecedented	  in	  history	  […]	  Today	  the	  spread	  of	  awareness	  of	  human	  beings	  is	  rooted	  in	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religion.	  	  Today	  the	  prisons,	  the	  torture	  and	  the	  pressures	  are	  all	  loudspeakers	  for	  making	  
people	  aware”	  (Rah-­‐e	  Sabz,	  February	  14,	  2011).	  	  At	  the	  same	  gathering	  Ayatollah	  Musavi-­‐
Ardebili	  decried	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  state	  in	  refusing	  aid	  to	  needy	  families	  of	  political	  prisoners,	  
of	  blocking	  the	  studies	  of	  dissident	  students,	  of	  obtaining	  forced	  confessions	  under	  torture	  and	  
the	  of	  passage	  of	  unsubstantiated	  and	  politically	  motivated	  verdicts	  against	  the	  nation’s	  
activists	  and	  elites	  (Rah-­‐e	  Sabz,	  February	  14,	  2011).	  	  	  
	   Ayatollah	  Ardebili	  in	  turn	  was	  singled	  out	  by	  Hossein	  Shariatmadari,	  editor	  of	  Iran’s	  
conservatively	  aligned	  paper	  Keyhan,	  regarding	  a	  statement	  in	  which	  Ardebili	  expressed	  
concern	  over	  certain	  behaviors,	  which	  he	  described	  as	  “contrary	  to	  Shari’a	  law,	  ethics,	  human	  
generosity	  and	  the	  law,”	  behaviors	  being	  engaged	  in	  in	  the	  name	  of	  “defending	  Islam	  and	  
Islamic	  rule”	  (Keyhan,	  March	  8,	  2011).	  	  Shariatmadari	  expressed	  his	  reticence	  to	  condemn	  the	  
Ayatollah	  for	  his	  statement	  due	  to	  the	  cleric’s	  historical	  record	  of	  support	  for	  the	  regime.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  author	  questions	  the	  bias	  of	  Ayatollah	  Ardebili	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  slew	  of	  
accusations	  he	  lays	  at	  the	  feet	  of	  the	  opposition	  in	  provoking	  unrest	  and	  sowing	  sedition	  
amongst	  the	  populous.	  	  In	  speaking	  of	  the	  alleged	  crimes	  of	  the	  opposition,	  Shariatmadari	  asks:	  	  
Did	  not	  the	  sedition	  leaders	  and	  their	  street	  agents	  insult	  the	  sacred	  image	  of	  
Aba	  Abdollah	  ol-­‐Hoseyn?	  […]	  Did	  they	  not	  attack	  such	  and	  such	  a	  woman	  in	  full	  
Islamic	  hijab	  with	  guns	  and	  knives	  and	  not	  butcher	  her	  body	  with	  machetes	  while	  
they	  were	  chanting	  “death	  to	  …”	  because	  she	  was	  wearing	  a	  chador	  and	  
supported	  the	  revolution	  and	  Islam?	  […]	  Did	  the	  not	  set	  mosques	  on	  fire?	  […]	  Did	  
they	  not	  force	  a	  righteous	  man	  to	  chant	  the	  slogan	  “death	  to	  …”	  Did	  they	  not	  
murder	  him	  in	  front	  of	  his	  wife	  and	  small	  child	  because	  he	  refused	  to	  chant	  this	  
slogan	  […]	  And	  three	  weeks	  ago,	  after	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  explicit	  need	  by	  
US	  and	  Israeli	  officials,	  did	  they	  not	  issue	  a	  summons	  to	  riot	  in	  order	  to	  eclipse	  
the	  Islamic	  revolutions	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Egypt,	  Tunisia,	  Yemen,	  and	  Jordan?	  
(Keyhan,	  March	  8,	  2011).	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These	  allegations	  are	  both	  serious	  and	  condemnable	  however	  while	  the	  author	  speaks	  of	  them	  
as	  facts,	  such	  allegations	  are	  next	  to	  impossible	  to	  independently	  verify.	  	  And	  this	  was	  just	  a	  
smattering	  of	  the	  exhaustive	  list	  of	  charges	  that	  Shariatmadari	  places	  at	  the	  feet	  of	  the	  sedition	  
and	  their	  foreign	  sponsors,	  namely	  the	  US,	  Israel,	  and	  Britain.	  	  With	  such	  drastic	  accounts	  of	  the	  
same	  set	  of	  circumstances	  it	  is	  incredible	  to	  consider	  that	  each	  party	  could	  possibly	  be	  
addressing	  the	  same	  series	  of	  events.	  	  	  
	   In	  reflecting	  upon	  the	  variety	  of	  disputes	  discussed	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  particular	  variable	  
analysis,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  while	  the	  regime	  retains	  the	  upper	  hand	  in	  promoting	  its	  own	  version	  of	  
events,	  the	  country	  is	  not	  simply	  divided	  between	  a	  dichotomy	  of	  hardliners	  and	  
reformist/opposition	  activists,	  but	  that	  the	  establishment	  itself	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  series	  of	  
cleavages	  which	  have	  grown	  increasingly	  pronounced	  since	  the	  election	  fallout	  of	  June	  2009	  
and	  the	  incumbent	  oppositional	  activity	  that	  has	  persisted	  in	  challenging	  the	  political	  status	  
quo.	  	  Khamenei	  is	  ironically,	  increasingly	  at	  odds	  with	  Ahmadinejad	  despite	  having	  risked	  and	  
endured	  significant	  domestic	  unrest	  in	  response	  to	  his	  decision	  to	  support	  Ahmadinejad’s	  claim	  
to	  the	  Presidency.	  	  Khamenei	  is	  also	  at	  odds	  with	  his	  former	  ally	  and	  Kingmaker,	  Ayatollah	  
Hashemi-­‐Rafsanjani,	  who	  many	  consider	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  Khamenei’s	  ascension	  to	  his	  
present	  post	  of	  supreme	  leader.	  	  And	  finally,	  at	  a	  time	  in	  which	  the	  regime	  is	  seeking	  to	  
champion	  itself	  as	  a	  model	  for	  Islamic	  democracy	  and	  emulation,	  Khamenei	  and	  his	  allies	  have	  
managed	  to	  persecute	  several	  of	  Iran’s	  most	  distinguished	  Ayatollahs	  for	  their	  persistent	  
support	  and	  counsel	  provided	  to	  victims	  of	  Iran’s	  political	  violence	  and	  their	  accompanying	  
criticisms	  regarding	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  state	  in	  these	  affairs.	  	  	  Having	  outlined	  the	  substance	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and	  nature	  of	  these	  various	  frame	  disputes,	  I	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  dialectic	  
between	  the	  regime’s	  frames	  and	  the	  regional	  and	  domestic	  contexts	  that	  they	  address.	  
The	  Dialectic	  between	  Regime	  Frames	  and	  Events	  
	  
There	  are	  several	  instances	  of	  narrative	  challenges	  that	  have	  arisen	  in	  contradiction	  to	  the	  
regime’s	  frame	  regarding	  the	  inspiration	  Arab	  activists	  have	  found	  in	  Iran’s	  Islamic	  revolution	  
and	  contemporary	  system	  of	  governance.	  	  One	  young	  Tunisian	  activist,	  in	  a	  video	  log	  addressed	  
to	  Iranian	  protestors	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  planned	  demonstrations	  for	  February	  14,	  2011	  explained	  
how	  inspirational	  the	  Green	  Movement	  protests	  had	  been	  in	  challenging	  her	  to	  dream	  of	  a	  
better	  future	  for	  Tunisia.	  	  She	  exclaims:	  
Iranian	  people,	  what	  can	  I	  say,	  last	  year,	  I	  witnessed,	  I	  had	  the	  chance	  to	  witness	  
what	  happened	  in	  Iran	  after	  the	  elections	  […]	  I	  saw	  the	  brave	  Iranian	  people	  
through	  Facebook,	  how	  they	  went	  in	  streets,	  fighting	  for	  freedom	  and	  protesting	  
and	  demonstrating,	  and	  I	  was	  so	  moved	  and	  so	  impressed	  and	  so	  touched	  and	  at	  
that	  time	  I	  said	  to	  myself,	  I	  hope,	  I	  hope	  one	  day	  we	  can	  do	  the	  same.	  	  And	  look	  
at	  that,	  today	  the	  dream	  came	  true	  and	  we	  had	  our	  own	  revolution	  
Alhamdulillah.	  	  So	  at	  that	  time	  we	  learned	  from	  you	  and	  now	  its	  time	  that	  you	  
Iranian,	  brave	  Iranian	  people	  learn	  from	  us	  Tunisians.	  	  So	  please	  carry	  on,	  keep	  
resisting,	  don't	  be,	  don't	  lose	  hope,	  I	  mean,	  and	  keep	  fighting	  for	  your	  principles	  
and	  rights	  and	  for	  freedom	  and	  at	  the	  end	  I	  just	  want	  to	  say	  viva	  freedom,	  live	  la	  
liberte,	  vive	  la	  liberte,	  tahiya	  houria,	  zendabad	  azadi!	  (Tehran	  Bureau,	  February	  
14,	  2011).	  	  
	  
Speaking	  in	  neither	  French	  nor	  Arabic	  save	  her	  trilingual	  tribute	  to	  freedom	  towards	  the	  end,	  
the	  encouraging	  words	  of	  this	  young	  Tunisian	  activist	  spoken	  in	  English,	  addressed	  to	  Iranians,	  
and	  uploaded	  and	  disseminated	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  networking	  sites,	  is	  a	  powerful	  case	  in	  
point	  regarding	  the	  uptick	  in	  transnational	  communication	  and	  cooperation	  amongst	  activists.	  	  	  
Similar	  evidence	  regarding	  the	  inspirational	  impact	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement	  upon	  Arab	  activists	  
in	  the	  region	  is	  evident	  in	  a	  Washington	  Post	  article	  published	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  the	  first	  major	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demonstrations	  undertaken	  by	  the	  Green	  Movement	  in	  June	  2009,	  entitled:	  “Arab	  Activists	  
Watch	  Iran	  and	  Wonder:	  ‘Why	  Not	  Us?’”	  	  The	  author	  spoke	  with	  several	  Egyptian	  activists	  
about	  the	  demonstrations	  in	  Iran,	  which	  elicited	  a	  range	  of	  responses	  from	  jealousy	  to	  
congratulatory	  sentiments,	  and	  questions	  regarding	  the	  Egyptian	  oppositions	  inability	  to	  
mobilize	  similar	  crowds	  in	  support	  of	  similar	  grievances.	  	  It	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  to	  note	  
that	  the	  article	  made	  mention	  of	  a	  planned	  demonstration	  to	  be	  held	  in	  downtown	  Cairo	  in	  
support	  of	  “democracy”	  in	  Iran	  and	  to	  mourn	  the	  death	  of	  Neda	  Agha	  Soltan,	  the	  young	  Iranian	  
woman	  whose	  death	  by	  a	  regime	  sniper’s	  bullet	  was	  captured	  on	  video	  and	  shared	  widely	  
online,	  and	  whose	  bloody	  face	  became	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement’s	  cause.	  	  However	  
just	  as	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  cracked	  down	  on	  opposition	  protests	  staged	  in	  solidarity	  with	  the	  
Arab	  uprisings	  in	  February	  2011,	  Mubarak	  too	  had	  deployed	  several	  large	  trucks	  filled	  with	  anti-­‐
riot	  police	  to	  curtail	  the	  June	  2009	  solidarity	  demonstrations	  organized	  by	  Egyptian	  activists	  in	  
support	  of	  their	  Iranian	  counterparts	  (The	  Washington	  Post,	  June	  26,	  2009).	  	  While	  these	  
parallels	  are	  interesting,	  this	  reversal	  is	  particularly	  challenging	  for	  the	  Iranian	  regime,	  which	  
seeks	  to	  present	  itself	  at	  the	  vanguard	  of	  regional	  popular	  movements	  seeking	  justice	  and	  
popular	  sovereignty.	  	  In	  many	  ways	  the	  Iranian	  state	  appears	  to	  be	  moving	  away	  from	  many	  of	  
its	  own	  previously	  negotiated	  commitments	  to	  democracy	  and	  civil	  rights,	  largely	  in	  response	  to	  
its	  own	  bout	  of	  popular	  protests,	  and	  it	  does	  so	  at	  a	  time	  in	  which	  Arab	  Spring	  states	  are	  
seeking	  a	  reprisal	  of	  these	  self-­‐same	  tenets.	  	  	  
	   While	  these	  anecdotes	  pointedly	  counter	  the	  Iranian	  regime’s	  frame	  regarding	  the	  role	  
of	  its	  revolution	  in	  inspiring	  revolt	  in	  Egypt	  and	  Tunisia,	  at	  least	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  some	  
activists,	  other	  remarks	  from	  emerging	  leaders	  of	  these	  fledgling	  states	  also	  prove	  problematic	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for	  the	  Iranian	  regime’s	  collective	  action	  frame.	  	  Responding	  to	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  
influence	  of	  the	  Iranian	  precedent	  for	  Tunisia,	  Rached	  Ghannouchi	  stated:	  "I	  am	  not	  Khomeini.	  
We	  are	  not	  ecclesiastics,	  Tunisia	  is	  not	  Iran,	  and	  I	  do	  not	  subscribe	  to	  Khomeini's	  way	  of	  
thinking"	  (Corriere	  della	  Sera,	  January	  21,	  2011).	  	  Alternatively,	  Ghannouchi	  went	  on	  to	  stress	  
that	  Turkey’s	  Justice	  and	  Development	  Party	  more	  closely	  resembled	  his	  own	  thinking	  
regarding	  a	  role	  for	  combining	  religion	  and	  politics	  beholden	  to	  a	  democratic	  system	  of	  
governance.	  	  The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  was	  also	  quick	  to	  respond	  to	  Khamenei’s	  framing	  of	  the	  
regional	  uprisings	  in	  his	  February	  4,	  2011	  Friday	  Prayer	  sermon.	  	  The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  
published	  a	  statement	  on	  the	  party’s	  official	  website	  just	  hours	  after	  Khamenei’s	  remarks	  which	  
stated,	  “The	  MB	  regards	  the	  revolution	  as	  the	  Egyptian	  People’s	  Revolution	  not	  an	  Islamic	  
Revolution,	  asserting	  that	  the	  Egyptian	  People’s	  revolution	  includes	  Muslims,	  Christians,	  from	  
all	  sects	  and	  political	  groups”	  (Green	  Voice	  of	  Freedom,	  February	  4,	  2011).	  	  	  
	   Various	  Egyptian	  activists	  rejected	  Khamenei’s	  claim	  as	  well.	  	  A	  speaker	  in	  Cairo’s	  Tahrir	  
Square	  responded	  to	  Khamenei’s	  sermon,	  to	  great	  applause:	  “Egypt	  will	  not	  be	  another	  Iran.	  	  
We	  will	  not	  be	  governed	  by	  a	  religious	  dictatorship,	  as	  in	  Iran”	  (Kurzman	  2012,	  163).	  	  The	  crowd	  
then	  reportedly	  chanted	  anti-­‐Iranian	  slogans.	  	  A	  statement	  by	  another	  activist	  also	  in	  response	  
to	  Khamenei,	  denounced	  the	  leader	  for	  trying	  to	  “drive	  a	  wedge	  in	  the	  nation’s	  fabric	  by	  talking	  
about	  an	  Islamic	  revolution	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  eliminate	  our	  Coptic	  brothers	  from	  our	  revolution”	  
(Kurzman	  2012,	  164).	  	  These	  statements	  each	  communicate	  distaste	  for	  Iranian	  attempts	  to	  
influence	  or	  interfere	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  both	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt.	  	  Nevertheless,	  they	  do	  
not	  clearly	  foretell	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  particular	  regimes	  that	  are	  presently	  being	  forged	  by	  
activists	  and	  politicians	  in	  either	  country.	  	  As	  I	  have	  indicated	  in	  an	  earlier	  segment	  of	  this	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chapter,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  Islamism	  holds	  a	  broad	  appeal	  amongst	  significant	  constituencies	  in	  
both	  Egypt	  and	  Tunisia,	  reflected	  in	  the	  electoral	  victories	  by	  Islamists	  in	  both	  states.	  	  However,	  
in	  both	  contexts	  Islamists	  are	  also	  facing	  vibrant	  challenges	  from	  secularist	  contingents	  and	  it	  
looks	  as	  though	  there	  will	  be	  significant	  compromises	  to	  be	  made	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  this	  issue	  in	  
terms	  of	  how	  these	  new	  states	  reconcile	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  political	  affairs.	  	  So	  long	  as	  the	  
Iranian	  regime	  does	  not	  over	  step	  its	  bounds	  in	  offering	  unsolicited	  advice	  to	  these	  newly	  
enfranchised	  states,	  the	  Iranian	  leadership	  does	  stand	  to	  benefit	  from	  these	  political	  
transitions,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  new	  systems	  closely	  resemble	  Iran’s	  own	  system	  
of	  Islamic	  governance.	  	  	  
	   Iran’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  region	  has	  often	  been	  stifled	  by	  the	  rule	  of	  regional	  
dictatorships	  that	  ignored	  many	  of	  their	  own	  national	  interests	  in	  order	  to	  curry	  favor	  with	  the	  
West.	  	  At	  this	  point	  Iran	  is	  already	  benefiting	  from	  this	  new	  regional	  dynamic	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  
ways.	  	  The	  improved	  working	  relationship	  that	  Iran	  enjoys	  with	  Egypt	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  trips	  its	  
naval	  forces	  have	  been	  permitted	  to	  take	  across	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  is	  just	  one	  of	  many	  examples.	  	  
Iran’s	  navel	  ships	  have	  passed	  through	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  twice,	  once	  in	  February	  of	  2011	  on	  the	  
heels	  of	  the	  Egyptians’	  successful	  ouster	  of	  Mubarak,	  and	  a	  second	  time	  in	  February	  2012,	  at	  a	  
time	  of	  growing	  speculation	  regarding	  the	  potential	  for	  eminent	  Israeli	  airstrikes	  on	  Iran’s	  
nuclear	  facilities	  (The	  Telegraph,	  February	  18,	  2012).	  	  	  
	   As	  for	  Libya,	  upon	  welcoming	  Iran’s	  new	  ambassador	  to	  the	  country,	  the	  National	  
Transitional	  Council	  chairman,	  Mustafa	  Abdul-­‐Jalil,	  expressed	  gratitude	  for	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  
of	  Iran’s	  support	  for	  the	  Islamic	  awakening	  in	  Libya	  and	  requested	  that	  Iran	  continue	  its	  
assistance	  to	  the	  country,	  particularly	  in	  regards	  to	  health	  and	  medicine,	  and	  in	  de-­‐mining	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(Iranian	  National	  Public	  Radio,	  December	  5,	  2011).	  	  Of	  all	  the	  countries	  transformed	  by	  the	  Arab	  
uprisings,	  Libya’s	  National	  Transitional	  Council	  has	  provided	  the	  most	  forthright	  assurances	  
regarding	  the	  Islamic	  nature	  of	  Libya’s	  new	  state,	  much	  to	  the	  dismay	  of	  Western	  leaders	  who	  
helped	  Libyan	  rebels	  topple	  Qadafi.	  	  Mustafa	  Abdul-­‐Jalil	  has	  forthrightly	  stated	  that	  Sharia	  law	  
would	  be	  the	  main	  source	  of	  legislation,	  that	  laws	  contradicting	  its	  tenets	  would	  be	  nullified,	  
and	  that	  polygamy	  would	  be	  legalized	  (Gamel,	  The	  Christian	  Science	  Monitor).	  	  This	  kind	  of	  
assurance,	  issued	  at	  a	  time	  of	  increasing	  factionalism	  in	  post-­‐Qadafi	  Libya,	  is	  somewhat	  
problematic	  when	  recalling	  the	  vociferous	  comments	  made	  by	  Fazlollah	  Nuri,	  during	  Iran’s	  
constitutional	  revolution	  regarding	  the	  incompatibility	  of	  many	  Western	  democratic	  tenets	  with	  
components	  of	  Sharia	  law,	  cited	  in	  Chapter	  One	  of	  this	  work.	  	  Jalil’s	  statement	  preempted	  the	  
work	  of	  an	  elected	  constituent	  assembly	  and	  the	  incumbent	  discourse	  that	  would	  characterize	  
the	  work	  of	  such	  a	  body	  in	  regards	  to	  how	  the	  new	  Libyan	  state	  might	  adeptly	  reconcile	  issues	  
pertaining	  to	  democratic	  assurances	  with	  due	  deference	  to	  Islamic	  laws	  and	  precepts.	  	  	  Libya’s	  
NTC	  is	  also	  facing	  significant	  threats	  from	  internal	  armed	  factions	  of	  the	  revolution	  which	  the	  
NTC	  may	  use	  to	  justify	  a	  consolidation	  of	  power	  much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  Khomeini	  was	  able	  
to	  do	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Iran’s	  own	  revolution	  thanks	  to	  similar	  post	  revolutionary	  turmoil.	  	  	  
	   Not	  surprisingly,	  it	  is	  the	  Islamic	  Republic’s	  position	  on	  Syria	  that	  proves	  to	  be	  the	  
biggest	  challenge	  to	  Khamenei’s	  frame	  regarding	  Iran’s	  support	  for	  the	  region’s	  various	  Islamic	  
uprisings.	  	  It	  is	  also	  the	  Iranian	  leadership’s	  position	  on	  Syria	  that	  stands	  to	  undermine	  Iran’s	  
broader	  populist	  appeal,	  which	  the	  regime	  has	  notoriously	  enjoyed	  thanks	  to	  its	  vocal	  and	  
financial	  support	  of	  Palestine	  and	  its	  anti-­‐Western	  appeals,	  particularly	  following	  the	  failure	  of	  
the	  US	  imposed	  democracy	  project	  in	  Iraq.	  	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  mounting	  casualties,	  which	  the	  UN	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estimates	  to	  have	  reached	  over	  9,000	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  movement	  in	  March	  2011,	  It	  is	  
becoming	  more	  difficult	  for	  parties	  such	  as	  Iran,	  Russia,	  or	  China	  to	  support	  Syrian	  President	  
Bashar	  al-­‐Asad’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  ongoing	  violence	  in	  Syria,	  particularly	  that	  the	  bulk	  of	  
causalities	  are	  the	  result	  of	  attacks	  by	  armed	  terrorist	  groups	  seeking	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Baathist	  
regime.	  	  As	  mentioned	  at	  an	  earlier	  juncture,	  members	  of	  the	  Iranian	  government	  have	  on	  few	  
occasions,	  issued	  measured	  condemnations	  of	  violence	  directed	  at	  both	  the	  regime	  and	  the	  
opposition.	  	  However,	  most	  recently	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  has	  been	  emphasizing	  its	  categorical	  
support	  for	  the	  Syrian	  nation	  and	  the	  reform	  program	  introduced	  by	  the	  Syrian	  president,	  
which	  calls	  for	  a	  referendum	  to	  approve	  the	  new	  constitution	  which	  envisaged	  democratic	  
elections	  and	  a	  shift	  in	  power	  structure	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  new	  Constitution	  (IRNA,	  April	  9,	  
2012).	  	  	  
	   Imprisoned	  since	  the	  June	  2009	  demonstrations,	  Mostafa	  Tajzadeh,	  an	  activist	  and	  
former	  cabinet	  minister	  under	  the	  Khatami	  administration,	  wrote	  an	  open	  letter	  addressed	  to	  
senior	  Iranian	  clerics,	  calling	  on	  them	  to	  take	  a	  clear	  stance	  on	  the	  “tragedies	  in	  Syria	  and	  the	  
killing	  of	  Muslims	  there	  by	  the	  Bashar	  al-­‐Asad	  state”	  (Green	  Voice	  of	  Freedom,	  September	  7,	  
2011).	  	  	  Tajzadeh	  also	  criticizes	  Iranian	  leaders	  for	  "trying	  to	  reduce	  Iran,	  Iranians	  and	  Shi'is	  to	  
the	  level	  of	  'a	  natural	  ally	  of	  the	  Ba'th	  Party	  of	  Syria'",	  adding	  that	  "they	  do	  not	  realize	  that	  they	  
are	  thereby	  planting	  the	  wind	  of	  revenge	  in	  the	  hearts	  of	  the	  region's	  freedom-­‐seekers	  and	  that	  
they	  will	  reap	  a	  storm	  in	  the	  future"	  (Green	  Voice	  of	  Freedom,	  September	  7,	  2011).	  	  In	  the	  
possible,	  albeit	  unlikely	  event	  that	  the	  Syrian	  opposition	  succeeds	  in	  toppling	  the	  Asad	  state,	  it	  
is	  becoming	  increasingly	  unfathomable	  that	  the	  new	  Syrian	  government	  will	  be	  able	  to	  overlook	  
the	  instrumental	  role	  played	  by	  the	  Iranian	  state	  in	  arming	  and	  supporting	  the	  Baathist	  regime,	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nor	  will	  Iran	  earn	  any	  points	  with	  other	  Arab	  states	  which	  are	  increasingly	  endorsing	  
international	  coordinated	  action	  against	  Asad	  in	  the	  face	  of	  intolerable	  and	  mounting	  
casualties.	  	  While	  the	  Iranian	  state	  stands	  to	  endure	  a	  significant	  setback	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  key	  
regional	  partner	  in	  Iran’s	  axis	  of	  resistance,	  it	  also	  stands	  to	  lose	  significant	  popular	  appeal	  
amongst	  Arab	  states,	  increasingly	  appalled	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  Iran’s	  Syrian	  ally.	  	  This	  is	  
particularly	  likely	  as	  well,	  given	  the	  flurry	  of	  analysis	  entertained	  by	  journalists	  and	  
commentators	  in	  both	  hemispheres	  regarding	  accusations	  that	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  is	  devolving	  into	  
a	  proxy-­‐war	  for	  influence	  in	  the	  region	  across	  Sunni	  and	  Shi’i	  lines,	  largely	  waged	  between	  
Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Iran	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  competing	  stances	  taken	  by	  both	  states	  on	  Syria	  as	  
well	  as	  Yemen	  and	  Bahrain.	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CHAPTER	  FOUR:	  CONCLUSION	  	  
This	  work	  found	  inspiration	  in	  the	  thwarted	  demonstrations	  staged	  by	  Green	  Movement	  
activists	  following	  the	  June	  2009	  Presidential	  election,	  and	  the	  swift	  success	  enjoyed	  by	  activists	  
in	  Arab	  Spring	  states.	  	  Following	  the	  events	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  the	  rapid	  spread	  of	  demonstrations	  
to	  Egypt	  and	  elsewhere	  it	  quickly	  became	  evident	  that	  both	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Islamic	  
Republic	  and	  the	  Green	  Movement	  came	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  regional	  upheavals	  sparked	  by	  the	  
successful	  ouster	  of	  longtime	  leaders	  in	  Arab	  Spring	  states,	  as	  a	  political	  opportunity	  to	  
resurrect	  the	  flagging	  legitimacy	  each	  camp	  faced	  as	  a	  byproduct	  of	  the	  country's	  own	  political	  
fallout.	  	  I	  wanted	  to	  study	  the	  framing	  contest	  embarked	  upon	  by	  these	  two	  camps	  and	  assess	  
the	  measure	  of	  success	  enjoyed	  by	  both	  parties	  in	  their	  quest	  to	  balance	  the	  claims	  of	  their	  
constituencies	  with	  their	  attempts	  to	  maximize	  advantages	  internationally.	  	  	  	  
Having	  just	  recently	  discussed	  the	  narrative	  fidelity	  of	  both	  parties’	  collective	  action	  
frames	  with	  regional	  events,	  I	  will	  not	  extensively	  replicate	  those	  findings	  here.	  	  It	  suffices	  to	  
say	  that	  while	  the	  Green	  Movement	  may	  have	  played	  a	  more	  decisive	  role	  in	  informing	  the	  
tactics	  and	  inspiring	  the	  collective	  action	  witnessed	  in	  Arab	  Spring	  states,	  both	  the	  Iranian	  
opposition	  and	  the	  regime	  share	  significant	  political	  stakes	  in	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  
transformational	  politics	  taking	  shape	  in	  Tunisia,	  Egypt,	  Libya,	  and	  Yemen	  as	  well	  as	  the	  future	  
of	  contestation	  in	  Syria,	  Bahrain,	  and	  elsewhere.	  	  From	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  Green	  
Movement,	  the	  successful	  institutionalization	  of	  democracy	  in	  Arab	  Spring	  states	  stands	  to	  
provide	  Iranians	  with	  badly	  needed	  alternatives	  that	  challenge	  their	  own	  regime’s	  purported	  
monopoly	  upon	  Islamic	  democracy.	  	  Genuine	  democratic	  transitions	  in	  Arab	  Spring	  states	  would	  
both	  validate	  the	  aims	  of	  Iranian	  opposition	  activists,	  while	  also	  potentially	  bring	  additional	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pressure	  to	  bear	  on	  Iran’s	  increasingly	  authoritarian	  regime.	  	  Alternatively,	  notwithstanding	  the	  
complex	  challenge	  that	  Syria	  poses	  for	  the	  Iranian	  leadership,	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  stands	  to	  
benefit	  from	  the	  proliferation	  of	  more	  representative	  forms	  of	  government	  in	  the	  region	  that	  
are	  likely	  to	  respond	  favorably	  towards	  engaging	  in	  renewed	  strategic	  relations	  with	  Iran.	  
	   In	  light	  of	  the	  opportunities	  that	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  present	  the	  Iranian	  regime,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  accompanying	  threat	  these	  popular	  demonstrations	  posed	  in	  inspiring	  a	  renewal	  of	  
oppositional	  activity	  at	  home,	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  be	  spent	  in	  evaluating	  the	  
impact	  of	  the	  Iranian	  framing	  contest	  on	  the	  political	  opportunity	  space	  inside	  Iran	  within	  which	  
activists	  may	  maneuver	  at	  this	  critical	  juncture.	  	  Recalling	  the	  utility	  of	  collective	  action	  frames	  
as	  vehicles	  to	  mobilize	  the	  support	  of	  potential	  adherents	  and	  constituents,	  to	  garner	  bystander	  
support,	  and	  demobilize	  antagonists,	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  appears	  to	  have	  proven	  more	  adept	  at	  
successfully	  employing	  framing	  tactics	  aimed	  at	  curtailing	  its	  current	  political	  rivals.	  In	  spite	  of	  
the	  Green	  Movement’s	  efforts	  to	  claim	  credit	  for	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  and	  thereby	  rejuvenate	  the	  
popular	  legitimacy	  and	  sense	  of	  agency	  that	  formerly	  characterized	  the	  movement	  in	  the	  
heyday	  of	  the	  election	  crisis	  demonstrations,	  the	  regime	  successfully	  put	  down	  the	  renewed	  
protests	  occasioned	  by	  the	  Green	  Movement’s	  calls	  for	  demonstrations	  in	  solidarity	  with	  Arab	  
Spring	  states.	  	  While	  the	  February	  14	  demonstrations	  took	  place	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  two	  long	  years	  
of	  persecution	  and	  recrimination	  perpetrated	  against	  the	  opposition’s	  more	  conspicuous	  
proponents,	  by	  all	  accounts	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  witnessed	  a	  reassertion	  of	  the	  opposition’s	  
angst	  as	  thousands	  of	  protestors	  came	  out	  to	  voice	  their	  support	  for	  their	  Arab	  counterparts	  
whilst	  decrying	  the	  Iranian	  leadership	  and	  its	  conduct	  since	  the	  June	  2009	  election.	  	  
Nevertheless	  these	  demonstrations,	  like	  so	  many	  similar	  demonstrations	  that	  preceded	  them,	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were	  effectively	  curtailed	  with	  the	  strategic	  use	  of	  force	  employed	  by	  Iranian	  state	  security	  
agents.	  	  What	  is	  more,	  the	  regime	  was	  effectively	  able	  to	  justify	  these	  violent	  incursions	  by	  
relying	  upon	  their	  attributional	  frame,	  which	  casts	  opposition	  activists	  as	  members	  of	  a	  
seditious	  current	  seeking	  to	  desecrate	  the	  sanctity	  of	  Iran’s	  Islamic	  revolution	  and	  clerical	  
system	  of	  government.	  	  	  
	   Furthermore,	  recognizing	  the	  persistent	  determination	  of	  this	  disaffected	  contingent	  of	  
the	  Iranian	  population	  as	  well	  as	  the	  sympathies	  the	  opposition	  appeared	  to	  be	  garnering	  
amongst	  contingents	  of	  the	  political	  and	  clerical	  elite,	  the	  regime	  relied	  upon	  the	  strength	  and	  
privilege	  of	  the	  state	  to	  both	  arrest	  the	  former	  presidential	  contenders	  and	  leaders	  of	  the	  
Green	  Movement,	  as	  well	  as	  systematically	  alter	  the	  political	  rules	  governing	  contestation	  and	  
activism	  inside	  the	  country.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  steps	  mentioned	  earlier	  as	  a	  component	  of	  the	  
political	  background	  provided	  in	  Chapter	  Two	  of	  this	  work,	  which	  included	  allegations	  of	  state	  
complicity	  in	  electoral	  fraud,	  the	  banning	  of	  Iran’s	  reformist	  political	  parties,	  new	  limitations	  
imposed	  upon	  civil	  society,	  press	  closures,	  draconian	  persecution	  of	  political	  prisoners,	  the	  
elimination	  of	  opposition	  candidates	  from	  elections,	  the	  introduction	  of	  yet	  another	  
supervisory	  committee	  to	  monitor	  the	  conduct	  of	  members	  of	  parliament,	  and	  the	  supreme	  
leader’s	  threat	  to	  abolish	  the	  presidency,	  the	  regime	  has	  also	  stepped	  up	  its	  efforts	  to	  monitor	  
and	  filter	  the	  activities	  of	  its	  citizens	  online	  in	  addition	  to	  monitoring	  cell	  phone	  
communications.	  	  Reflecting	  this	  trend,	  a	  report	  issued	  by	  Freedom	  House	  in	  April	  2011	  ranked	  
Iran	  last	  in	  regards	  to	  Internet	  freedom.	  	  Acknowledging	  the	  bias	  that	  often	  crops	  up	  in	  
Freedom	  House’s	  rankings,	  whether	  we	  are	  looking	  at	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  state	  of	  freedom	  in	  
US-­‐allied	  Israel,	  or	  an	  American	  foe	  like	  Iran,	  the	  report	  does	  document	  disconcerting	  trends	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regarding	  the	  regime’s	  various	  ventures	  to	  control	  cyber-­‐space.	  	  Enumerating	  a	  variety	  of	  the	  
regime’s	  “extensive	  and	  sophisticated	  methods	  of	  control”	  the	  report	  lists:	  “tampering	  with	  
Internet	  access,	  mobile-­‐telephone	  services,	  and	  satellite	  broadcasting;	  hacking	  opposition	  and	  
other	  critical	  websites;	  monitoring	  dissenters	  online	  and	  using	  the	  information	  to	  intimidate	  
and	  arrest	  them”	  (Tehran	  Bureau,	  July	  22,	  2011).	  	  	  
	   Iran	  does	  experience	  a	  much	  higher	  volume	  of	  Internet	  users	  compared	  to	  its	  Middle	  
Eastern	  neighbors;	  some	  23	  million	  according	  to	  a	  2008	  estimate	  issued	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  
Open	  Net	  Initiative	  (Tehran	  Bureau,	  July	  22,	  2011).	  	  This	  pervasive	  use	  of	  the	  Internet	  by	  the	  
Iranian	  people	  may	  go	  some	  way	  in	  explaining	  the	  success	  Green	  Movement	  activists	  initially	  
enjoyed	  in	  prevailing	  upon	  new	  media	  technology	  to	  organize	  demonstrations	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  
the	  election	  crisis,	  inadvertently	  promoting	  the	  utility	  of	  these	  technologies	  to	  latent	  opposition	  
groups	  in	  Tunisia,	  Egypt	  and	  beyond.	  	  However,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  regime’s	  institution	  of	  its	  own	  
cyber	  army,	  and	  the	  cordoning	  off	  of	  the	  Internet	  into	  spaces	  deemed	  halal	  and	  haram,	  these	  
new	  tools	  are	  proving	  inadequate	  means	  of	  organizing	  dissent	  as	  the	  regime	  is	  increasingly	  
enabled	  to	  intercept	  opposition	  communications	  and	  act	  accordingly.	  	  While	  some	  Internet	  
users	  have	  found	  clever	  means	  of	  bypassing	  the	  state’s	  cyber	  security	  measures,	  the	  regime	  
maintains	  the	  upper	  hand	  for	  now.	  	  	  
	   It	  must	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  all	  of	  the	  offensive	  measures	  mentioned	  above	  have	  been	  
tactics	  that	  have	  been	  variously	  employed,	  off	  and	  on	  throughout	  the	  lifespan	  of	  the	  regime.	  	  
However,	  the	  increasing	  pressure	  that	  the	  regime	  has	  brought	  to	  bear	  upon	  its	  once	  fairly	  loyal	  
opposition,	  escalated	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  Khatami’s	  first	  term	  as	  president,	  and	  has	  accelerated	  
in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  election	  crisis	  of	  June	  2009,	  and	  the	  brief	  renewal	  of	  visible	  oppositional	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activity	  occasioned	  by	  the	  Arab	  Spring.	  	  In	  Mostafa	  Tajzadeh’s	  open	  letter	  from	  which	  I	  quoted	  
towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  last	  chapter,	  the	  imprisoned	  political	  actor	  also	  lamented	  that	  had	  the	  
election	  protests	  been	  tolerated	  by	  the	  Iranian	  leadership,	  then,	  "we	  would	  be	  witnessing	  a	  
different	  scene	  in	  the	  Middle	  East"	  and	  there	  would	  be	  "sweet	  democratic	  rivalry	  between	  
Turkish,	  Iranian	  and	  Arab	  Muslims	  to	  rush	  to	  the	  aid	  of	  the	  wronged	  people	  of	  Syria,	  Bahrain,	  
Libya	  and	  Yemen"	  (Green	  Voice	  of	  Freedom,	  September	  7,	  2011).	  	  While	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  assess	  
the	  potential	  impact	  of	  developments	  that	  never	  were,	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  arrived	  
at	  an	  inopportune	  juncture	  for	  the	  Islamic	  Republic,	  as	  the	  regime	  has	  significantly	  distanced	  
itself	  from	  its	  own	  track	  record	  of	  holding	  relatively	  free	  and	  fair	  elections	  when	  compared	  to	  
other	  MENA	  states.	  	  	  
Electoral	  politics	  as	  practiced	  in	  Iran	  have	  previously	  managed	  to	  introduce	  a	  degree	  of	  
uncertainty,	  pluralism,	  and	  public	  participation	  into	  Iranian	  politics	  that	  is	  unprecedented	  
amongst	  most	  its	  Middle	  Eastern	  counterparts.	  	  As	  Iran’s	  political	  system	  is	  built	  around	  a	  
complex	  and	  elaborate	  power	  structure	  with	  multiple	  veto	  holders	  and	  the	  diffusion	  of	  power	  
among	  a	  group	  of	  elites,	  the	  regime	  has	  historically	  tolerated	  and	  relied	  upon	  electoral	  politics	  
to	  primarily	  enable	  dominant	  factions	  within	  the	  country	  to	  participate	  politically	  and	  to	  
nonviolently	  compete	  against	  each	  other	  while	  seeking	  public	  approval.	  	  Therefore	  the	  
parliamentary	  and	  presidential	  elections	  can	  historically	  be	  interpreted	  as	  extensions	  of	  
factional	  conflicts	  within	  the	  regime	  itself.	  	  The	  lingering	  amount	  of	  uncertainty	  that	  these	  
elections	  necessarily	  entailed	  was	  tolerated	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  competing	  interests	  to	  peacefully	  
mediate	  their	  contentions	  while	  simultaneously	  contributing	  to	  a	  façade	  of	  popular	  legitimacy	  
for	  the	  regime	  (Tezcur,	  56-­‐57).	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   However	  following	  the	  June	  2009	  presidential	  election,	  the	  regime	  appears	  to	  conceive	  
of	  the	  ballot	  box	  as	  a	  destabilizing	  force.	  	  Aside	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  formally	  
eligible	  reformist	  politicians	  and	  activists	  are	  under	  arrest	  and	  serving	  time	  at	  home	  or	  in	  jail,	  
the	  regime	  has	  significantly	  narrowed	  the	  field	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ideological	  alignment	  of	  those	  
politicians	  they	  allow	  to	  contest.	  	  As	  a	  byproduct	  of	  this	  trend,	  the	  March	  2012	  parliamentary	  
elections	  were	  essentially	  contests	  between	  various	  actors	  aligned	  with	  Iran’s	  principlist	  camp.	  	  
These	  conservatives	  do	  vary	  to	  some	  degree,	  ultimately	  according	  to	  their	  self-­‐identification	  as	  
traditional,	  pragmatic,	  or	  hardline,	  or	  according	  to	  whether	  they	  side	  with	  the	  supreme	  leader	  
versus	  the	  president	  in	  the	  various	  conflicts	  that	  have	  come	  to	  define	  the	  relationship	  between	  
the	  two	  leaders	  in	  Ahmadinejad’s	  second	  term.	  	  However,	  the	  limited	  degree	  of	  pluralism	  in	  
Iranian	  electoral	  contests	  is	  fast	  diminishing.	  	  Because,	  the	  Iranian	  leadership	  uses	  elections	  to	  
lend	  credibility	  to	  its	  system	  of	  government	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  and	  at	  home,	  Khamenei	  
this	  year	  issued	  a	  Fatwa	  mandating	  that	  all	  Iranians	  eligible	  to	  vote	  must	  participate	  in	  the	  
election,	  and	  other	  regime	  officials	  made	  efforts	  to	  link	  high	  voter	  turnout	  in	  Iran’s	  
parliamentary	  election	  to	  the	  health	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Awakening	  (NPR,	  March	  1,	  2012;	  Mehr	  News	  
Agency,	  February	  23,	  2012).	  	  Faced	  with	  the	  necessity	  to	  compel	  participation	  in	  the	  
parliamentary	  election	  with	  fatwas	  and	  threats	  of	  recrimination	  in	  the	  face	  of	  widespread	  calls	  
for	  a	  public	  boycott	  by	  reformists,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  ideal	  time	  for	  the	  regime	  to	  extol	  the	  merits	  of	  
its	  own	  political	  system.	  	  Nevertheless,	  in	  his	  Friday	  Prayer	  sermon	  addressed	  to	  Arab	  activists,	  
Khamenei	  stated:	  “In	  the	  Islamic	  Republic,	  thank	  God,	  the	  government	  is	  decided	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  elections.	  	  The	  people	  choose	  and	  their	  taste	  and	  wishes	  are	  the	  main	  determinants”	  (IRINN	  
Television,	  February	  4,	  2011).	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While	  the	  regime	  had	  predicted	  voter	  turnout	  at	  around	  60%,	  a	  representative	  of	  Iran’s	  
election	  headquarters,	  in	  what	  may	  very	  well	  have	  been	  an	  inadvertent	  slip	  of	  the	  tongue,	  
potentially	  validated	  the	  suspicions	  of	  many	  observers	  anticipating	  a	  fraudulent	  account	  of	  the	  
vote.	  	  The	  representative,	  Mr.	  Mortazavi,	  commenting	  on	  Iranian	  national	  television	  stated:	  
“Unofficial	  statistics	  are	  what	  they	  are,	  unofficial.	  But	  the	  official	  statistics	  are	  what	  the	  
respected	  Minister	  of	  Interior	  [Mostafa	  Mohammad	  Najar]	  has	  announced,	  34	  and	  a	  few	  tenths	  
of	  a	  percent,	  pardon	  me,	  64.4	  percent	  was	  the	  percentage	  of	  people's	  participation	  in	  the	  
voting”	  (Geist,	  Tehran	  Bureau,	  March	  4,	  2012).	  	  In	  an	  opaque	  system	  of	  government,	  such	  as	  
Iran’s,	  this	  kind	  of	  public	  gaff	  by	  a	  regime	  official	  is	  as	  close	  as	  observers	  may	  get	  to	  identifying	  
state	  complicity	  and	  preoccupation	  with	  inflating	  figures	  for	  public	  consumption.	  	  What	  is	  clear	  
however	  is	  that	  the	  regime’s	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  champion	  of	  justice	  and	  democracy	  is	  being	  
challenged	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  	  	  
	   It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  mention	  here	  that	  while	  the	  regime	  emerged	  ahead	  of	  the	  
opposition	  in	  framing	  contest	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  Three	  of	  this	  work,	  at	  least	  at	  the	  domestic	  
level,	  this	  should	  by	  no	  means	  imply	  that	  the	  Iranian	  opposition	  failed	  to	  benefit	  in	  modest	  but	  
important	  ways	  from	  this	  war	  of	  narratives.	  	  The	  renewal	  of	  oppositional	  activity	  witnessed	  on	  
February	  14,	  2011,	  challenged	  if	  not	  invalidated	  the	  assertions	  made	  by	  regime	  hardliners	  who	  
had	  declared	  the	  movement	  dead	  following	  the	  first	  anniversary	  of	  the	  election	  crisis	  in	  June	  
2010	  (BBC	  Worldwide	  Monitoring,	  June	  29,	  2010).	  	  	  Additionally,	  this	  renewal	  of	  oppositional	  
activity	  occasioned	  attempts	  within	  the	  Green	  Movement	  to	  reconcile	  longstanding	  frame	  
disputes	  regarding	  the	  movement’s	  prognostic	  goals	  which	  ranged	  from	  calling	  upon	  the	  state	  
to	  fully	  implement	  and	  respect	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  Iranian	  constitution	  to	  other	  calls	  which	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demanded	  the	  ouster	  of	  Supreme	  Leader	  Ayatollah	  Ali	  Khamenei.	  	  The	  last	  indication	  from	  
individuals	  claiming	  to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement,	  in	  a	  manifesto	  issued	  on	  July	  
12,	  2011,	  indicated	  that	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  the	  movement	  envisages:	  “the	  supremacy	  of	  
popular	  sovereignty	  over	  all	  state	  and	  government	  institutions,	  including	  the	  post	  of	  Ayatollah	  
Ali	  Khamenei,	  the	  Supreme	  Leader	  of	  the	  Revolution”	  (Inside	  Iran,	  July	  12,	  2011).	  	  If	  the	  July	  12,	  
manifesto	  can	  be	  recognized	  as	  authentic	  and	  representative	  of	  the	  Green	  Movement’s	  new	  
bottom	  line,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  movement	  is	  adept	  at	  overcoming	  obstacles	  of	  consensus	  
building	  within	  its	  own	  ranks.	  	  	  
Moreover,	  in	  addition	  to	  prompting	  debate	  and	  resolution	  regarding	  movement	  goals,	  
providing	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  opposition	  to	  reassert	  itself	  publically,	  and	  challenge	  the	  
regime’s	  moral	  authority	  and	  democratic	  character	  at	  a	  critical	  juncture	  in	  the	  social	  and	  
political	  history	  of	  the	  region,	  this	  framing	  contest	  also	  highlighted	  growing	  fractures	  within	  the	  
Iranian	  political	  establishment	  between	  key	  powerbrokers	  such	  as	  Khamenei,	  Rafsanjani,	  
Ahmadinejad,	  and	  a	  contingent	  of	  Iran’s	  clergy	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  plight	  of	  Iran’s	  growing	  
number	  of	  political	  prisoners.	  	  The	  increasingly	  visible	  disagreements	  between	  these	  various	  
parties	  have	  prompted	  the	  regime	  to	  invoke	  retaliatory	  action	  against	  members	  within	  its	  own	  
political	  and	  spiritual	  fold	  in	  order	  to	  inspire	  conformity	  within	  its	  ranks.	  	  Such	  retaliation	  may	  
come	  to	  threaten	  the	  longevity	  of	  the	  regime	  should	  various	  other	  officials	  yet	  untouched	  by	  
this	  conflict	  come	  to	  question	  their	  allegiance	  to	  a	  system	  so	  willing	  to	  vilify	  various	  pillars	  of	  
the	  establishment	  such	  as	  former	  President	  Rafsanjani	  who	  presently	  serves	  as	  chief	  of	  Iran’s	  
Expediency	  and	  Discernment	  Council.	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The	  degree	  of	  uncertainty	  we	  are	  left	  with	  regarding	  the	  future	  nature	  of	  political	  
contestation	  in	  Iran	  in	  light	  of	  this	  study	  speaks	  to	  the	  limitations	  of	  this	  theoretical	  approach	  
looking	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  circumstances	  of	  Iran’s	  present	  situation.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  
more	  concerted	  study	  of	  cross	  country	  comparisons	  between	  Iran’s	  frustrated	  Green	  
Movement	  and	  instances	  of	  successful	  popular	  mobilization	  in	  Arab	  Spring	  states	  may	  prove	  
instructive	  in	  regards	  to	  how	  the	  Iranian	  opposition	  might	  better	  position	  itself	  for	  a	  successful	  
confrontation	  with	  the	  state.	  	  However,	  early	  contributions	  to	  this	  work	  do	  not	  indicate	  that	  
such	  a	  study	  would	  prove	  particularly	  edifying	  for	  the	  Iranian	  opposition	  or	  those	  of	  us	  who	  
study	  it.	  	  For	  example,	  Steven	  Heydemann	  (2011),	  makes	  the	  case	  that	  Tunisians	  succeeded	  
where	  Iranian	  activists	  failed	  due	  to	  five	  major	  factors	  including	  the	  defection	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  
military	  (unlikely	  to	  occur	  in	  Iran	  given	  the	  vested	  economic	  interests	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  
guard),	  the	  centralization	  of	  wealth	  and	  political	  power	  under	  Ben	  Ali,	  making	  him	  an	  obvious	  
target	  for	  the	  peoples	  anger,	  the	  secular	  nature	  of	  the	  Tunisian	  state,	  the	  clear	  revolutionary	  
goals	  articulated	  by	  Tunisian	  activists,	  and	  the	  differences	  in	  scale	  and	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  
Tunisian	  state	  as	  opposed	  to	  Iran	  which	  is	  large,	  diverse,	  and	  diffusely	  governed.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  
same	  factors	  could	  be	  reasserted	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  cross	  country	  comparison	  between	  Iran	  and	  
Egypt,	  particularly	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  military’s	  defection,	  the	  secular	  nature	  
of	  the	  Egyptian	  state,	  the	  revolutionary	  agenda	  of	  Egyptian	  actors,	  and	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  
Egyptian	  population.	  	  	  However,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  lessons	  unearthed	  by	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  for	  
scholars	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  politics	  is	  to	  never	  settle	  in	  to	  entrenched	  notions	  regarding	  the	  
impervious	  nature	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes	  to	  popular	  accountability.	  	  There	  are	  limits	  to	  the	  
authoritarian	  resilience	  of	  MENA	  states	  and	  Iran	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  no	  exception.	  	  	  	  
	   114	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY	  
Abootalebi,	  Ali.	  "Iran’s	  Tenth	  Presidential	  Elections:	  Candidates,	  Issues,	  and	  Implications."	  
Middle	  East	  Review	  of	  International	  Affairs	  13.3	  (2009):	  1-­‐18.	  	  
Apostolou,	  Andrew.	  "The	  Supreme	  Leader’s	  Slow	  Purge."	  Tehran	  Bureau.	  3	  December	  2009.	  
Web.	  10	  December	  2009.	  
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/12/the-­‐supreme-­‐leaders-­‐
slow-­‐	  purge.html;>.	  	  
Arjomand,	  Said.	  The	  Turban	  for	  the	  Crown	  :	  The	  Islamic	  Revolution	  in	  Iran.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1988.	  	  
Athanasiadis,	  Iason.	  "Iran	  Move	  to	  Defrock	  Dissident	  Ayatollah	  Opens	  Rifts	  in	  Theocracy."	  The	  
Christian	  Science	  Monitor.	  6	  January	  2010.	  Web.	  15	  April	  2012.	  
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-­‐East/2010/0106/Iran-­‐move-­‐to-­‐defrock-­‐
dissident-­‐ayatollah-­‐opens-­‐rifts-­‐in-­‐theocracy>	  	  
"Ayatollahs	  Sane'i,	  Musavi-­‐Ardebili	  Call	  For	  Release	  of	  Political	  Prisoners	  "	  Rah-­‐e	  Sabz.	  15	  
February	  2011.	  World	  News	  Connection.	  Web.	  28	  March	  2011.	  	  
Babb,	  S.	  "A	  True	  American	  System	  of	  Finance':	  Frame	  Resonance	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Labor	  Movement."	  
American	  Sociological	  Review	  61	  (1996):	  1033-­‐1052.	  	  
Badiozamani,	  Badi.	  "Iran’s	  Supreme	  Leader	  Rejects	  Vote	  Fraud	  Claims."	  CNN.	  19	  June	  2009.	  
Web.	  6	  December	  2011	  
<http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/19/iran.election/index.html;>.	  	  
"BBC	  showing	  'concern'	  on	  consensus	  for	  punishing	  'sedition	  leaders'	  -­‐	  Iran	  paper	  "	  Keyhan	  
Online.	  25	  February	  2011.	  World	  News	  Connection.	  Web.	  28	  March	  2011.	  	  
Benford,	  Robert,	  and	  David	  Snow.	  "Framing	  Processes	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  An	  Overview	  and	  
Assessment."	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Sociology	  26	  (2000):	  611-­‐39.	  	  
Benford,	  Robert.	  "Frame	  Disputes	  within	  the	  Nuclear	  Disarmament	  Movement."	  Social	  Forces	  
71	  (1993):	  677-­‐701.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  Framing	  Activity,	  Meaning,	  and	  Social	  Movement	  Participation	  :	  The	  Nuclear	  Disarmament	  
Movement.	  Ph.	  D	  University	  of	  Texas	  at	  Austin,	  1987	  Austin,	  Texas.	  	  
Black,	  Ian.	  "Guardian	  council	  rules	  out	  fresh	  Iran	  election."	  The	  Guardian.	  26	  June	  2009.	  Web.	  
26	  June	  2009.	  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/26/iran-­‐middleeast;>.	  	  
	   115	  




Comparative	  Perspectives	  on	  Social	  Movements:	  Political	  Opportunities,	  Mobilizing	  Structures,	  
and	  Cultural	  Framings.	  Ed.	  Doug	  McAdam,	  John	  McCarthy,	  and	  Mayer	  Zald.	  Cambridge	  UK:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996.	  	  
Dehgan,	  Saeed.	  "Iran's	  president	  admits	  rift	  with	  country's	  senior	  Islamic	  figures."	  The	  
Guardian.	  7	  June	  2011.	  Web.	  12	  April	  2012.	  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/07/iran-­‐president-­‐rift-­‐islamic-­‐figures;>.	  	  
Downey,	  Gary.	  "Ideology	  and	  the	  Clamshell	  Identity:	  Organizational	  Dilemmas	  in	  the	  Anti-­‐
Nuclear	  Power	  Movement."	  Social	  Problems	  33.5	  (1986):	  357-­‐373.	  	  
"Egypt	  constitutional	  assembly	  begins	  work."	  BBC.	  28	  March	  2012.	  Web.	  28	  March	  2012.	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐middle-­‐east-­‐17533655;>.	  	  
Ehsani,	  Kaveh.	  "Iran:	  The	  Populist	  Threat	  to	  Democracy."	  Middle	  East	  Research	  and	  Information	  
Project	  36.MER241	  (2006)	  .	  20	  February	  2012.	  <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer241/iran-­‐
populist-­‐threat-­‐democracy>.	  	  
Ellingson,	  Stephen.	  "Understanding	  the	  Dialectic	  of	  Discourse	  and	  Collective	  Action:	  Public	  
Debate	  and	  Rioting	  in	  Antebellum	  Cincinnati."	  American	  Journal	  of	  Sociology	  101	  (1995):	  
100-­‐144.	  	  
Esfandiari,	  Golnaz.	  "In	  Iran,	  Segregation	  Divide	  Pits	  President	  Against	  Religious	  Conservatives."	  
RFE.	  13	  July	  2011.	  Web.	  16	  February	  2012.	  
<http://www.rferl.org/content/iran_segregation_divide/24264572.html;>.	  	  
"Evidence	  grows	  Iran	  aiding	  Syria's	  Assad."	  UPI.	  2	  June	  2011.	  Web.	  2	  June	  2011.	  
<http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/06/02/Evidence-­‐grows-­‐Iran-­‐aiding-­‐Syrias-­‐
Assad/UPI-­‐72061307024479/;>.	  	  
Farhang,	  Mansour.	  “Appraising	  the	  Life	  of	  the	  Republic,	  Iran:	  After	  the	  Election.”	  	  
Columbia	  University.	  Lecture.	  iTunes	  U.	  6	  December	  2009.	  	  
Ferree,	  Myra.	  "The	  Political	  Context	  of	  Rationality."	  Frontiers	  in	  Social	  Movement	  Theory.	  Ed.	  
Aldon	  Morris	  and	  Carol	  Mueller.	  New	  Haven,	  Connecticut:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1992.	  29-­‐
52.	  	  
"FM	  Spokesman	  Condemns	  Western	  Attempts	  To	  Foment	  Revolution	  in	  Iran	  "	  IRINN.	  8	  March	  
2011.	  World	  News	  Connection.	  Web.	  28	  March	  2011.	  	  
	   116	  
Gamel,	  Kim.	  "Sharia	  law	  to	  be	  main	  source	  of	  legislation	  in	  Libya."	  The	  Christian	  Science	  
Monitor.	  25	  October	  2011.	  Web.	  16	  April	  2012.	  
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-­‐News-­‐Wires/2011/1025/Sharia-­‐law-­‐to-­‐be-­‐
main-­‐source-­‐of-­‐legislation-­‐in-­‐Libya>	  	  
Gamson,	  William,	  and	  David	  Meyer.	  "Framing	  Political	  Opportunity."	  Comparative	  Perspectives	  
on	  Social	  Movements.	  Ed.	  Doug	  McAdam,	  John	  McCarthy,	  and	  Mayer	  Zald.	  Cambridge,	  UK:	  
Cambridge	  University,	  1996.	  275-­‐290.	  	  
Gamson,	  William.	  "The	  Social	  Psychology	  of	  Collective	  Action."	  Frontiers	  in	  Social	  Movement	  
Theory.	  Ed.	  Aldon	  Morris	  and	  Carol	  Mueller.	  New	  Haven,	  Connecticut:	  Yale	  University	  
Press,	  1992b.	  53-­‐76.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  The	  Strategy	  of	  Social	  Protest.	  Homewood,	  Illinois:	  Dorsey	  Press,	  1975.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  Talking	  Politics.	  London,	  UK;	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1992a.	  	  
Geist,	  Dan.	  "News	  |	  Election	  Chief	  Slips?	  States	  Turnout	  Near	  '34	  Percent'."	  Tehran	  Bureau.	  4	  
March	  2012.	  Web.	  16	  April	  2012.	  
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/03/news-­‐principlist-­‐
camp-­‐dominates-­‐in-­‐preliminary-­‐election-­‐results.html;>.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  "News	  |	  Majles	  Will	  Grill	  Ahmadinejad;	  Leader	  Hails	  'Window	  of	  Opportunity.'"	  Tehran	  
Bureau.	  12	  March	  2012.	  Web.	  20	  March	  2012.	  	  
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/03/news-­‐majles-­‐will-­‐grill-­‐
ahmadinejad-­‐leader-­‐hails-­‐window-­‐of-­‐opportunity.html;>.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  "Oppression	  2.0:	  Iranian	  Discontent	  in	  Cyberspace."	  Tehran	  Bureau.	  22	  June	  2011.	  Web.	  16	  
April	  2011.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/03/news-­‐principlist-­‐
camp-­‐dominates-­‐in-­‐preliminary-­‐election-­‐results.html;>.	  	  
"George	  Washington	  University	  conference	  explores	  issues	  of	  Iran	  and	  the	  Arab	  Revolutions."	  
BBC	  Persian.	  20	  September	  2011.	  Web.	  6	  November	  2011.	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2011/09/110920_l33_u05_iran_usa_meeting_univer
sity.shtml;>.	  	  
Gerhards,	  Jürgen,	  and	  Dieter	  Rucht.	  "Mesomobilization:	  Organizing	  and	  Framing	  in	  Two	  Protest	  
Campaigns	  in	  West	  Germany."	  American	  Journal	  of	  Sociology	  98	  (1992):	  555-­‐595.	  	  
"Grand	  Ayatollah	  Montazeri's	  funeral	  sees	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  challenge	  the	  Iranian	  
regime."	  The	  Telegraph.	  21	  December	  2009.	  Web.	  24	  April	  2012.	  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/6856357/Grand-­‐
	   117	  
Ayatollah-­‐Montazeris-­‐funeral-­‐sees-­‐hundreds-­‐of-­‐thousands-­‐challenge-­‐the-­‐Iranian-­‐
regime.html;>.	  	  
"Green	  Movement	  in	  Iran	  Issues	  New	  Manifesto	  in	  Wake	  of	  Arab	  Uprising."	  Inside	  Iran.	  12	  July	  
2011.	  Web.	  21	  March	  2012.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.insideiran.org/featured/green-­‐movement-­‐in-­‐iran-­‐issues-­‐new-­‐manifesto-­‐in-­‐
wake-­‐of-­‐arab-­‐uprising/;>.	  	  
"Greens	  Seek	  Egyptian	  Solidarity	  March;	  State	  Media:	  Protesters	  'Thank	  Iran'."	  Tehran	  Bureau.	  6	  
February	  2011.	  Web.	  19	  March	  2012.	  
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/02/greens-­‐seek-­‐
egyptian-­‐solidarity-­‐march-­‐state-­‐media-­‐protesters-­‐thank-­‐iran.html;>.	  	  
Hashemi,	  Nader,	  and	  Danny	  Postel,	  eds.	  The	  People	  Reloaded:	  The	  Green	  Movement	  and	  the	  
Struggle	  for	  Iran's	  Future.	  Brooklyn,	  New	  York:	  Melville	  House,	  2011.	  	  
Heydemann,	  Steven.	  "Why	  Tunisia	  and	  not	  Iran."	  The	  United	  States	  Institute	  for	  Peace.	  25	  
January	  2011.	  Web.	  25	  April	  2012.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2011/jan/25/why-­‐tunisia-­‐and-­‐not-­‐iran>.	  	  
Hunt,	  Scott,	  Robert	  Benford,	  and	  David	  Snow.	  "Identity	  Fields:	  Framing	  Processes	  and	  the	  Social	  
Construction	  of	  Movement	  Identities."	  New	  Social	  Movements	  :	  From	  Ideology	  to	  Identity.	  
Ed.	  Enrique	  Larana,	  Hank	  Johnston,	  and	  Joseph	  Gusfield.	  Philadelphia,	  Pennsylvania:	  
Temple	  University	  Press,	  1994.	  	  
"In	  Iran's	  Election,	  Not	  All	  Candidates	  Are	  Welcome."	  NPR.	  1	  March	  2012.	  Web.	  16	  April	  2012.	  
<http://www.npr.org/2012/03/01/147578818/in-­‐irans-­‐election-­‐not-­‐all-­‐candidates-­‐are-­‐
welcome;>.	  	  
"Iran	  As	  A	  Cautionary	  Tale	  For	  Arab	  Spring	  Leaders?"	  National	  Public	  Radio.	  17	  January	  2012.	  
Web.	  12	  April	  2012.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.npr.org/2012/01/17/145341044/iran-­‐as-­‐a-­‐cautionary-­‐tale-­‐for-­‐arab-­‐spring-­‐
leaders;>.	  	  
"Iran	  bans	  three	  reformist	  parties	  from	  participating	  in	  upcoming	  polls."	  Al-­‐Arabiya.	  4	  
November	  2011.	  Web.	  4	  November	  2011.	  	  
<http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/11/04/175366.html;>.	  	  
"Iran	  claims	  its	  navy	  enters	  Mediterranean	  as	  tensions	  with	  Israel	  grow."	  The	  Telegraph.	  18	  
February	  2012.	  Web.	  16	  April	  2012.	  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9090465/Iran-­‐claims-­‐its-­‐
navy-­‐enters-­‐Mediterranean-­‐as-­‐tensions-­‐with-­‐Israel-­‐grow.html;>.	  	  
	   118	  
"Iran	  Denies	  Role	  in	  Syria	  Crackdown."	  Voice	  of	  America.	  14	  June	  2011.	  Web.	  14	  June	  2011.	  
<http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-­‐east/iran/Iran-­‐Denies-­‐Role-­‐In-­‐Syria-­‐
Crackdown-­‐123829854.html;>.	  	  
"Iran	  Deputy	  FM:	  Anti-­‐Syria	  plots	  failing."	  IRNA.	  9	  April	  2012.	  Web.	  16	  April	  2012.	  
<http://irna.ir/ENNewsShow.aspx?NID=80069560;>.	  	  
"Iran	  hardliner	  to	  contest	  run-­‐off."	  BBC.	  18	  June	  2011.	  Web.	  15	  February	  2012.	  	  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4105752.stm;>.	  	  
"Iran	  Live	  Blog:	  25	  Bahman	  /	  14	  February."	  Tehran	  Bureau.	  14	  February	  2011.	  Web.	  14	  February	  
2011.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/02/iran-­‐live-­‐blog-­‐25-­‐
bahman-­‐14-­‐february.html#ixzz1soKBGpWK;>.	  	  
"Iran	  president	  bans	  Western	  music."	  BBC.	  25	  December	  2005.	  Web.	  17	  February	  2012.	  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4543720.stm;>.	  	  
"Iran	  Prison	  Doctor	  ‘Was	  Poisoned’	  Prosecutor	  Says."	  BBC.	  1	  December	  2009.	  Web.	  10	  
December	  2009.	  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8388728.stm;>.	  	  
"Iran	  Rejects	  Reformists	  Request	  To	  Hold	  Rally	  in	  Support	  of	  Egypt,	  Tunisia	  "	  Iranian	  Labor	  News	  
Agency.	  9	  February	  2011.	  World	  News	  Connection.	  Web.	  28	  March	  2011.	  	  
"Iran	  unrest:	  MPs	  call	  for	  death	  of	  Mousavi	  and	  Karroubi."	  15	  February	  2011.	  Web.	  15	  February	  
2011.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐middle-­‐east-­‐12462491;>.	  	  
"Iran:	  Ahmadinezhad	  Speaks	  of	  End	  of	  Oppression	  During	  Visit	  to	  Fars	  Province	  Speech	  by	  
Iranian	  President	  Mahmud	  Ahmadinezhad	  in	  Shiraz,	  Fars	  Province	  at	  a	  mines	  and	  industries	  
festival."	  IRINN.	  7	  March	  2011.	  World	  News	  Connection.	  Web.	  28	  March	  2011.	  	  
"Iran:	  Khamene'i	  Berates	  Mubarak,	  Ben	  Ali	  for	  Subservience	  to	  US	  Tehran	  Friday	  Prayer	  
sermons	  delivered	  by	  Iranian	  Supreme	  Leader	  Ayatollah	  ali	  Khamene'i	  at	  Tehran	  
University"	  IRINN.	  4	  February	  2011.	  World	  News	  Connection.	  Web.	  6	  February	  2011.	  	  
"Iran:	  Parliament	  Ignores	  Concerns	  of	  Independent	  Civil	  Society	  Organizations	  Over	  Draft	  Bill."	  
Human	  Rights	  Watch.	  10	  April	  2011.	  Web.	  10	  February	  2012.	  
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/10/iran-­‐parliament-­‐ignores-­‐concerns-­‐independent-­‐
civil-­‐society-­‐organisations-­‐over-­‐draft-­‐;>.	  	  
"Iranian	  Conservative	  Paper	  Accuses	  Hashemi-­‐Rafsanjani	  of	  Siding	  With	  'Sedition'"	  Resalat	  
Online.	  1	  March	  2011.	  World	  News	  Connection.	  Web.	  28	  March	  2011	  .	  	  
	   119	  
"Iranian	  Hardline	  Paper	  Calls	  for	  'Leaders	  of	  Sedition'	  To	  Be	  Taken	  to	  Court	  "	  Keyhan.	  1	  March	  
2011.	  World	  News	  Connection.	  Web.	  28	  March	  2011.	  	  
"Iranian	  Minister	  Comments	  on	  'Sedition'	  by	  Opponents,	  Related	  Arrests	  Report	  by	  political	  
desk	  entitled	  "Intelligence	  minister	  mentioned	  -­‐	  Revelation	  of	  shocking	  details	  of	  presence	  
of	  foreigners	  in	  25	  Bahman	  riots"	  Iran	  Online.	  1	  March	  1	  2011.	  World	  News	  Connection.	  
Web.	  28	  March	  2011.	  	  
"Iranian	  President	  Wins	  Re-­‐election	  in	  an	  Unprecedented	  Landslide."	  CNN.	  9	  June	  2001	  15	  
February	  2012.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0106/09/tonight.02.html;>.	  	  
"Iranian	  press	  highlights	  29	  June	  10."	  BBC	  Worldwide	  Monitoring	  Service.	  29	  June	  2010.	  Lexis	  
Nexus.	  25	  April	  2012.	  	  
"Iran's	  Khamenei	  Speaks	  to	  Egypt's	  Awakening."	  Race	  for	  Iran.	  4	  February	  2011.	  Web.	  4	  
February	  2011.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.raceforiran.com/irans-­‐khamenei-­‐speaks-­‐to-­‐egypts-­‐awakening>	  
"Iran's	  youth	  stunned	  into	  action."	  BBC.	  22	  June	  2005.	  Web.	  13	  February	  2011.	  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4116218.stm;>.	  	  
Klein,	  Joe,	  and	  Nahid	  Siamdoust.	  "The	  Man	  Who	  Could	  Beat	  Ahmadinejad:	  Mousavi	  Talks	  to	  
TIME."	  TIME.	  12	  June	  2009.	  Web.	  12	  December	  2009.	  
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1904343-­‐2,00.html;>.	  	  
Kurzman,	  Charles.	  "The	  Arab	  Spring:	  Ideals	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Green	  Movement,	  Methods	  of	  the	  
Iranian	  Revolution."	  International	  Journal	  of	  Middle	  East	  Studies	  44	  (2012).	  	  
Leichtman,	  Maria.	  "Iran,	  Shi'i	  Muslims	  and	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  in	  Retrospect."	  The	  Islamic	  Monthly.	  
2	  (2011).	  17	  March	  2012.	  
<http://theislamicmonthly.com/issues/2/article/57/iran_shii_muslims_and_the_arab_spri
ng_in_retrospect.html>.	  	  
"Letter	  to	  Tunisia's	  Rached	  Ghannouchi	  and	  Libya's	  Musatafa	  al-­‐Jalil."	  Rooz	  Online.	  5	  November	  
2011.	  Web.	  6	  November	  2011.	  
<http://www.roozonline.com/persian/news/newsitem/archive/2011/november/05/article
/-­‐13e1f080fc.html;>.	  	  
"Libyan	  National	  Transitional	  Council	  chairman	  receives	  new	  Iranian	  ambassador."	  Iranian	  
National	  Public	  Radio.	  5	  December	  2011.	  Lexis	  Nexus.	  Web.	  BBC	  Worldwide	  Monitoring.	  15	  
April	  2012.	  	  
	   120	  
Mahtafar,	  Tara.	  "A	  Charter	  for	  the	  Green	  Movement	  Charter."	  Tehran	  Bureau.	  23	  July	  2009.	  
Web.	  8	  March	  2012.	  
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/07/a-­‐charter-­‐for-­‐the-­‐
green-­‐movement.html>	  
McAdam,	  Doug.	  "Conceptual	  Origins,	  Current	  Problems,	  Future	  Directions."	  Comparative	  
Perspectives	  on	  Social	  Movements:	  Political	  Opportunities,	  Mobilizing	  Structures,	  and	  
Cultural	  Framings.	  Ed.	  Doug	  McAdam,	  John	  McCarthy,	  and	  Mayer	  Zald.	  Cambridge,	  UK;	  
New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996.	  23-­‐40.	  	  
McCallion,	  Michael,	  and	  David	  Maines.	  "The	  Liturgical	  Social	  Movement	  in	  the	  Vatican	  II	  
Catholic	  Church."	  Research	  in	  Social	  Movements,	  Conflicts	  and	  Change.	  Ed.	  Michael	  
Dobkowski	  and	  Isidor	  Wallimann.	  Stamford,	  Connecticut:	  JAI	  Press,	  1999.	  	  
McFarquhar,	  Neil,	  and	  Allen	  Cowell.	  "Iran	  responds	  forcefully	  to	  first	  large-­‐scale	  protests	  since	  
'09;	  Crackdown	  in	  Tehran,	  as	  unrest	  continues	  in	  Bahrain	  and	  Yemen."	  The	  International	  
Herald	  Tribune.	  16	  February	  2011.	  Lexis	  Nexus.	  Web.	  23	  March	  2012.	  	  
"Mehdi	  Karroubi	  Publishes	  Graphic	  Account	  Of	  Prison	  Rape."	  Huffington	  Post.	  25	  August	  2009.	  
Web.	  16	  March	  2012.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/25/mehdi-­‐karroubi-­‐
publishes_n_268036.html?>.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Meyer,	  David,	  and	  Debra	  Minkoff.	  "Conceptualizing	  Political	  Opportunity."	  Social	  Forces	  82.4	  
(2004):	  1457-­‐1492.	  	  
Meyer,	  David.	  "Political	  Opportunity	  and	  Nested	  Institutions."	  Social	  Movement	  Studies	  2.1	  
(2003):	  17-­‐35.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  "Protest	  and	  Political	  Opportunities."	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Sociology	  30	  (2004):	  125-­‐145.	  	  
Morris,	  Aldon,	  and	  Carol	  Mueller,	  eds.	  Frontiers	  in	  Social	  Movement	  Theory.	  New	  Haven,	  
Connecticut:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1992.	  	  
"Mostafa	  Tajzadeh	  on	  the	  Consequences	  for	  the	  Syrian	  Uprising	  for	  Iran."	  Green	  Voice	  of	  
Freedom.	  7	  September	  2011.	  Web.	  11	  September	  2011.	  
<http://www.irangreenvoice.com/article/2011/sep/07/15023;>.	  	  
Mousavi,	  Mir	  Hossein.	  "Mousavi's	  Statement	  Regarding	  The	  Events	  Unfolding	  In	  The	  Middle	  
East	  (FULL	  EN)."	  Facebook.	  29	  January	  2011.	  Web.	  14	  March	  2012.	  
<http://www.facebook.com/notes/mir-­‐hossein-­‐mousavi-­‐myr-­‐hsyn-­‐mwswy/mousavis-­‐
statement-­‐regarding-­‐the-­‐events-­‐unfolding-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle-­‐east-­‐full-­‐en-­‐yad/489167242605>.	  	  
	   121	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  "Mousavi	  and	  Karroubi	  held	  a	  joint	  meeting."	  Facebook.	  1	  February	  2011.	  Web.	  19	  March	  
2012.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=490712207605&id=4506191945>.	  	  
"Mousavi’s	  17th	  Statement:	  “Killing	  us	  will	  only	  make	  us	  stronger.”	  Khordad	  88.	  7	  January	  2011.	  
Web.	  8	  March	  2012.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://khordaad88.com/?p=925>.	  	  
"MP	  Dismisses	  US	  Sanctions	  on	  Iran's	  Security	  Forces	  as	  "Humorous	  Act"."	  Fars	  News	  Agency.	  
12	  June	  2011.	  Web.	  12	  June	  2011.	  	  
<http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9003226224;>.	  	  
"Muslim	  Brotherhood	  rejects	  Khamenei	  calls	  for	  Iran-­‐style	  Islamic	  state."	  Green	  Voice	  of	  
Freedom.	  4	  February	  2011.	  Web.	  4	  February	  2011.	  
<http://en.irangreenvoice.com/article/2011/feb/04/2724;>.	  	  
"New	  Sanctions	  On	  Iran	  For	  Human	  Rights	  Abuses."	  Voice	  of	  America.	  11	  June	  2011.	  Web.	  11	  
June	  2011.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.voanews.com/policy/editorials/New-­‐Sanctions-­‐On-­‐Iran-­‐For-­‐Human-­‐Rights-­‐
Abuses-­‐-­‐123778154.html;>.	  	  
Perrow,	  Charles.	  Complex	  Organizations	  :	  A	  Critical	  Essay.	  New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1986.	  	  
Peterson,	  Scott.	  "This	  year	  on	  Ashura,	  Iran's	  opposition	  Green	  Movement	  stays	  below	  ground."	  
The	  Christian	  Science	  Monitor.	  16	  December	  2010.	  Web.	  16	  March	  2012.	  	  
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-­‐East/2010/1216/This-­‐year-­‐on-­‐Ashura-­‐Iran-­‐s-­‐
opposition-­‐Green-­‐Movement-­‐stays-­‐below-­‐ground;>.	  	  
Political	  Participation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Ed.	  Ellen	  Lust-­‐Okar	  and	  Saloua	  Zerhouni.	  Boulder,	  
Colorado:	  Lynne	  Rienner,	  2008.	  	  
Poulson,	  Stephen.	  "Nested	  Institutions,	  Political	  Opportunity,	  and	  the	  Decline	  of	  the	  Iranian	  
Reform	  Movement	  Post	  9/11."	  American	  Behavioral	  Scientist	  53.1	  (2009):	  27-­‐43.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  Social	  Movements	  in	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  Iran	  :	  Culture,	  Ideology,	  and	  Mobilizing	  Frameworks.	  
Lanham,	  Maryland:	  Lexington	  Books,	  2005.	  	  
"Profile:	  Mahmoud	  Ahmadinejad."	  BBC.	  4	  August	  2010.	  Web.	  13	  February	  2012.	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐middle-­‐east-­‐10866448;>.	  	  
Putnam,	  Robert.	  "Diplomacy	  and	  Domestic	  Politics:	  The	  Logic	  of	  Two-­‐Level	  Games."	  
International	  Organization	  42.3	  (1988):	  427-­‐460.	  	  
	   122	  
"Rafsanjani	  Loses	  Assembly	  of	  Experts	  Chair;	  Report:	  Mousavi	  is	  Still	  in	  Home."	  Tehran	  Bureau.	  
9	  March	  2011.	  Web.	  14	  April	  2012.	  
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/03/rafsanajani-­‐loses-­‐
assembly-­‐of-­‐experts-­‐chair-­‐report-­‐mousavis-­‐still-­‐in-­‐home.html;>.	  	  
Rafsanjani,	  Hashemi.	  "Experts	  Assembly	  Urges	  Nation's	  Vigilance	  Against	  Enemy	  Plots."	  16	  
February	  2011.	  World	  News	  Connection.	  Web.	  14	  April	  2012.	  
<http://www.hashemirafsanjani.ir>.	  	  
Raghavan,	  Sudarsan.	  "Arab	  Activists	  Watch	  Iran	  And	  Wonder:	  'Why	  Not	  Us?'."	  The	  Washington	  
Post.	  26	  June	  2009.	  Web.	  18	  March	  2012.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/06/25/AR2009062504415
_pf.html;>.	  	  
"Regime	  Blocks	  Pro-­‐Reform	  Ayatollahs'	  Website;	  Woos	  Lebanon."	  Tehran	  Bureau.	  5	  October	  
2010.	  Web.	  24	  April	  2012.	  	  
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/10/regime-­‐blocks-­‐pro-­‐
reform-­‐ayatollahs-­‐websites-­‐woos-­‐lebanon.html;>.	  	  
"Report:	  Silent	  Protests	  Met	  with	  Violence;	  'Layla':	  The	  Full	  Prison	  Account."	  Tehran	  Bureau.	  12	  
June	  2011.	  Web.	  21	  March	  2012.	  	  
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/06/opposition-­‐supports-­‐
silent-­‐sunday-­‐protests-­‐layla-­‐the-­‐full-­‐prison-­‐account.html>.	  	  
Rogers,	  Simon.	  "The	  Iranian	  Election	  Results,	  By	  Province."	  The	  Guardian.	  15	  June	  2009.	  Web.	  	  
22	  June	  2009.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2009/jun/15/iran1;>.	  	  
Sadjadpour,	  Karim.	  "Setting	  the	  Scene:	  Iran’s	  Presidential	  (S)election."	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  
International	  Peace.	  2	  June	  2009.	  Web.	  12	  December	  2009.	  
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=23210#1;>.	  	  
Sahimi,	  Muhammad.	  "News	  |	  Political	  Prisoners	  Call	  for	  Release	  of	  Mousavi,	  Karroubi,	  and	  
Rahnavard."	  Tehran	  Bureau.	  27	  January	  2012.	  Web.	  27	  January	  2012.	  
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/01/news-­‐political-­‐
prisoners-­‐call-­‐for-­‐release-­‐of-­‐mousavi-­‐karroubi-­‐and-­‐rahnavard.html;>.	  	  
Samii,	  Abbas.	  "The	  Changing	  Landscape	  of	  Party	  Politics	  in	  Iran	  -­‐-­‐	  A	  Case	  Study."	  The	  Journal	  of	  
the	  European	  Society	  for	  Iranian	  Studies	  1	  (2009):	  1-­‐9.	  	  
Schirazi,	  Asghar.	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Iran	  :	  Politics	  and	  the	  State	  in	  the	  Islamic	  Republic.	  London,	  
UK:	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  1997.	  	  
	   123	  
"The	  Scourge	  Descended!"	  Keyhan.	  8	  March	  2011.	  World	  News	  Connection.	  Web.	  28	  March	  
2011.	  	  
"Senior	  Iranian	  cleric	  says	  high	  voter	  turnout	  will	  boost	  "Islamic	  Awakening."	  BBC	  Monitoring	  
Service.	  23	  February	  2012.	  Lexis	  Nexus.	  Web.	  23	  March	  2012.	  	  
"Seyyed	  Ezzatollah	  Zarghami	  in	  His	  Friday	  Prayers	  Sermon	  in	  Tehran:	  The	  West	  Cannot	  Stand	  
Against	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution."	  Keyhan	  Online.	  3	  March	  2011.	  World	  News	  Connection.	  
Web.	  28	  March	  2011.	  	  
Siddiqi,	  Ahmad.	  "Khatami	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  Reform	  in	  Iran."	  Stanford	  Journal	  of	  International	  
Affairs	  VI.1	  (2005).	  20	  November	  2010.	  
<http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.04_siddiqi.html>	  
"Syria	  crisis:	  Iran's	  Ahmadinejad	  criticizes	  killings."	  BBC.	  22	  October	  2011.	  Web.	  20	  January	  
2012.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐middle-­‐east-­‐15416410;>.	  	  
Tahami,	  Raha.	  "Iranian	  Police	  Meet	  Stiff	  Resistance	  in	  Ashura	  Protests."	  Refworld.	  5	  January,	  
2010.	  Web.	  13	  February	  2012.	  	  
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IWPR,,IRN,,4b45e2f71e,0.html>	  
Talt,	  Robert.	  "Iran	  Election	  Anniversary	  Protests	  Face	  Severe	  Crackdown"	  The	  Guardian.	  9	  June	  
2010.	  Web.	  10	  February	  2012.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/09/iran-­‐election-­‐demonstration-­‐green-­‐
repression>.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  "Nine	  Deaths	  in	  Bloody	  Clashes	  at	  Ashura	  Mourning	  Ceremony	  in	  Tehran."	  The	  Guardian.	  27	  
December	  2009.	  Web.	  22	  February	  2012.	  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/27/iran-­‐protests-­‐tehran-­‐ashura-­‐ceremony>.	  
Tarrow,	  Sydney.	  Power	  in	  Movement:	  Social	  Movements,	  Collective	  Action	  and	  Politics.	  
Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1994.	  	  
"Tehran	  clashes	  reported	  on	  Iran	  vote	  anniversary."	  BBC.	  12	  June	  2010.	  Web.	  15	  March	  2012.	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10299933;>.	  	  
Tezcur,	  Gunes.	  "Iran's	  Presidential	  Election:	  The	  Failure	  of	  Managed	  Functionalism."	  Insight	  
Turkey	  11.3	  (2009):	  13-­‐22.	  	  
Tisdell,	  Simon.	  "Iran’s	  Old	  Rivals	  Renew	  Their	  Battle."	  The	  Guardian.	  18	  June	  2009.	  Web.	  12	  
December	  2009.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/18/iran-­‐mousavi-­‐khamenei;>.	  	  
	   124	  
Tsebelis,	  George.	  Nested	  Games	  :	  Rational	  Choice	  in	  Comparative	  Politics.	  Berkeley,	  California:	  
University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1990.	  	  
"Tunisia;	  More	  Than	  4,000	  People	  Descend	  On	  Constituent	  Assembly	  to	  Call	  for	  Shariaa."	  Africa	  
News.	  16	  March	  2012.	  Lexis	  Nexus.	  Web.	  27	  March	  2012.	  	  
"Tunisian	  Islamist	  leader	  backs	  democratic	  method,	  vows	  to	  return	  home."	  Corriere	  della	  Sera.	  
21	  January	  2011.	  Lexis	  Nexus.	  BBC	  Worldwide	  Monitoring.	  Web.	  15	  April	  2012.	  	  
"Tunisians	  stage	  protests	  calling	  for	  state	  to	  remain	  secular."	  BBC	  Worldwide	  Monitoring.	  20	  
March	  2012.	  Lexis	  Nexus.	  Web.	  27	  March	  2012.	  	  
"Unclear	  stance	  of	  'the	  elite'	  has	  no	  impact:	  Mohammad	  Reza	  Bahonar."	  Siyasat-­‐e	  Ruz.	  23	  
February	  2011.	  World	  News	  Connection.	  Web.	  28	  March	  2011.	  	  
Weaver,	  Matthew.	  "Iran	  protests:	  live	  blog."	  The	  Guardian.	  11	  February	  2010.	  Web.	  11	  
February	  2010.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2010/feb/11/iran-­‐protests-­‐22-­‐bahman;>.	  	  
Wendt,	  Alexander.	  "Collective	  Identity	  Formation	  and	  the	  International	  State."	  American	  
Political	  Science	  Review	  88	  (1994):	  384–396.	  	  
"Who	  holds	  the	  power?"	  BBC.	  9	  June	  2009.	  Web.	  12	  June	  2011.	  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8051750.stm#top;>.	  	  
"Who's	  who	  in	  Iran."	  BBC.	  2	  March	  2011.	  Web.	  15	  February	  2011.	  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8102406.stm>	  
Wicks,	  Robert.	  "Message	  Framing	  and	  Constructing	  Meaning:	  An	  Emerging	  Paradigm	  in	  Mass	  
Communication	  Research."	  Communication	  Yearbook	  29.	  Ed.	  Pamela	  Kalbfleisch.	  Mahwah,	  
New	  Jersey	  ;	  London:	  Lawrence	  Erlbaum	  Associates,	  2005.	  335-­‐360.	  	  
Wiktorowicz,	  Quintan,	  ed.	  Islamic	  Activism:	  A	  Social	  Movement	  Theory	  Approach.	  Bloomington,	  
Indiana:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  2003.	  	  
Worth,	  Robert.	  "As	  Iran	  Gets	  Ready	  to	  Vote,	  Economy	  Dominates."	  NYTimes.	  9	  June	  2009.	  Web.	  
20	  February	  2012.	  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/world/middleeast/10iran.html;>.	  	  
Yazdi,	  Ebrahim.	  "Letter	  to	  Rached	  Ghannouchi,	  Leader	  of	  Tunisia's	  Ennahda	  "	  Rah-­‐e	  Sabz.	  30	  
October	  2011.	  Web.	  30	  October	  2011.	  <http://www.rahesabz.net/story/44435/;>.	  	  
Zakaria,	  Fareed.	  "Egypt's	  real	  parallel	  to	  Iran's	  revolution."	  The	  Washington	  Post.	  7	  February	  
2011.	  Web.	  18	  March	  2012.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   125	  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/06/AR2011020603398
.html;>.	  	  
	  
